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OUTSIDE LOOKING IN: NON-STANDARD WORK AND THE POLITICS OF
LABOR MARKET SEGMENTATION.

Kathleen Bolter, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 2019

Since the 1980s, major structural and demographic changes in the OECD have
encouraged the proliferation of nonstandard work (part-time and temporary jobs). The increase
in nonstandard work is viewed as a key cause for income and social inequality. Inequality creates
many issues for states including the erosion of trust in institutions and a weakening of civic
society as economic growth fails to benefit all of those involved in its production. Up to this
point, there have been few studies examining why states vary in employment protection and
regulation for nonstandard work. This study seeks to answer how the insider/outsider divide, left
party composition and competition, unions, and corporatist institutions interact to influence the
quality of nonstandard work.
I examine how the policy preferences of labor market insiders and labor market outsiders
have evolved over the past 20-years in advanced industrialized countries, as well as their level of
political enfranchisement. I find that labor market outsiders are more likely to support policies
emphasizing job security as well as some types of social insurance (pensions), but not others
(unemployment). When it comes to voter mobilization, labor market outsiders are less likely to
vote than labor market insiders, and when they do vote, they are more likely to vote for parties
on the left and far-left. The findings suggest economic insecurity plays a key role in voter
mobilization for more extreme parties.

Additionally, this study uses a mixed methods approach to look at the role of left parties,
unions, and corporatist institutions in influencing nonstandard work regulations. To do this, I
first develop an index of employment regulation for part-time and temporary work. This index
measures the strength of protection for nonstandard work. Next, performing a quantitative
analysis of panel data, I find part-time employment regulations are higher when the state is a
member of the European Union, the government is less traditional culturally and leans toward
the economic left, and when union members have a strong partisan affiliation with left parties.
Temporary work protections are higher when there is a greater concentration of labor market
insiders in left parties or when the Social Democratic party faces an alternative-left competitor.
Additionally, ideological distance on the economic dimension between Social Democratic and
right parties in the long-term, as well as higher levels of deindustrialization, union density in the
long-term, union affiliation with left parties and corporatist institutions are found to lead to
higher levels of protections for temporary work. The results of the quantitative analysis are
supported with case study research on the evolution of employment protection and regulation for
nonstandard work in Australia, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
Overall, this dissertation contributes to (1) the understanding of outsider partisanship and
political behavior, (2) the role of the Social Democratic party and party competition in labor
market reforms, (3) the role of corporatist institutions in perpetuating the insider/outsider divide
(4) an understanding of union strategies and their implications for part-time and temporary
employment reform.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The New York Times recently featured a story of two women who started their careers as
custodians. One woman, Ms. Evans, began her job in the 1980s as a full-time employee for
Kodak. The other woman, Ms. Ramos, began her job in the 2010s as a contractor hired by
Apple. While both women ostensibly performed the same duties, their employment
circumstances were very different. As a full-time employee, Ms. Evans was eligible for paid
vacation, a tuition waiver from the company to go to school part-time, and a yearly bonus. As a
contractor, Ms. Ramos was eligible for none of these things. Ms. Evans was able to take
advantage of the opportunities provided by Kodak to go to school. Upon graduating, she was
promoted to a managerial track job and a decade later became Chief Technology Officer of the
entire Kodak Corporation. The only advancement opportunities for Ms. Ramos, within her
current company, were a promotion to team leader, a position that provides an additional 0.50
cents an hour (Irwin, 2017).
In the 35 years between when these two women started their professions, how
corporations and other businesses employ individuals has changed immensely. Where
businesses once hired the people, who were needed to get the product in the hands of consumers,
they now outsource many of these jobs to firms hiring people on a part-time, temporary, and
contingent basis. Where companies once needed full-time employees to complete their tasks,
technology has enabled them to hire employees to work fewer hours with increased production.
Where employees once knew their schedules in advance, zero-hour contracts now allow
companies to call-in employees only when they are needed. As firms have become leaner, only
hiring the very high-skilled to work directly for their companies, the opportunities for people to
work their way up the ladder have virtually disappeared. It is this loss of opportunity, the ability
to climb the to the top of the corporate world through hard-work, which has driven inequality
and generally increased dissatisfaction with the status-quo.
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This discontent has manifested in many ways politically in the past few years. In the
United States, Donald Trump won the presidential election as an antisystem populist, promising
to reverse the established order. In Europe, similar right-wing populist parties, the National
Front in France, the Alternative for Germany, and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands have
managed to gain seats in parliment. On the left, support for socialism is increasing, especially
among the millennial generation. Although votes for socialist-parties have been declining, the
seats held by Green Parties have increased. This political mobilization away from the traditional
parties of the Left, Center, and Right and to the extremes of the political spectrum serves as a
signal of the dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs. Parties, across the advanced
industrialized world, continue to struggle with practical ways to govern in the new economy.
As more and more individuals are exposed to less secure employment, the reaction of
states has varied widely. While the Netherlands responded by passing legislation declaring its
nonstandard workers to have equal rights as full-time workers, Germany responded by creating a
secondary class of worker employed in so-called “mini-jobs” which expanded the number of
individuals employed in marginal part-time employment. While Sweden expressly passed laws
aimed at preventing “the part-time trap,” the U.S. and Great Britain saw a marked increase in the
number of individuals working “zero hour contracts” under which employees are temporarily
and have no guaranteed minimum number of hours they are scheduled to work.
The purpose of this dissertation is to understand why this dissimilarity among countries
exists by examining: Why states vary in their employment regulation and protection for
workers in non-standard work arrangements? In order to do so, I intend to examine how the
policy and party preferences of labor market insiders (those who are most likely to find
themselves employed in standard work) and labor market outsiders (those who are least likely to
find themselves employed in standard work) impact the willingness of states to legislate on nonstandard work arrangements. I also examine how unions, parties, and institutions have
responded to the needs of individuals in non-standard work. In doing so, I provide a better
understanding of what policies labor market insiders and outsiders want, how these wants have
aligned with particular parties, and the impact of this alignment on employment protection and
regulation for non-standard work arrangements (NSWA).
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Labor Market Segmentation: An Overview
Labor market segmentation occurs when labor markets are divided into primary and
secondary markets. The primary labor market offers jobs with relatively high wages, good
working conditions, and job stability. Lower wages, poorer working conditions, and job
insecurity characterize the secondary labor market (Davidsson & Naczyk, 2009). Over time, a
variety of political and economic institutions have reinforced the divide between markets in
advanced economies, creating two distinct groups of workers, labor market insiders and labor
market outsiders. Insiders are defined as employees in positions that are protected by various
job-preserving measures making it costly for firms to fire these individuals and hire replacements
to fill their positions, they are generally employed in the primary labor market. Insiders are more
likely to be employed in standard work arrangements involving full-time, permanent
employment for one employer at a time. Because this type of employment is the most typical,
various legal obligations and protections are strongly associated with this line of work.
Outsiders lack this protection and are either unemployed or employed in jobs offering little
security, therefore finding themselves employed in the secondary labor market or not at all.
While standard work indisputably remains the most prevalent work arrangement, since
the 1990s, on average, 40% of new job growth has been in the form of non-standard work
(OECD, 2015). Labor market outsiders typically find themselves employed in nonstandard work
arrangements which are defined as forms of work that fall outside of the scope of standard
employment relationships. These include jobs that are part-time, temporary, and ambiguous
(ILO, 2015). Across the OECD the number of individuals employed in part-time jobs constitutes
17% of the workforce, while the share of individuals employed in temporary jobs constitutes
11% of the workforce. It is important to note that there is some overlap between these two
categories (OECD, 2017). One-quarter of all workers are estimated to be employed in NSWA.
Individuals employed in NSWA are more likely to live in poverty, less likely to be able to access
workplace benefits, and are more likely to face employment insecurity.
One of the areas where one sees the starkest contrast between labor market insiders and
outsiders is in employment protection legislation. Employment protection legislation is a major
reason firms hire workers in NSWA. When employment protection legislation is strong for
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standard workers, it encourages firms to hire individuals in NSWA to circumvent employment
protection laws (Buddelmeyer, et al., 2008). The number of employees working under
temporary employment contracts, is evidence of this. Countries with more stringent labor
regulations and rules for dismissing employees, such as France, Spain, and Portugal, have higher
levels of workers hired under temporary contracts and have seen a large amount of employment
growth under such contracts (Bentolia & Dolado, 1994). Australia has a special class of “casual”
part-time worker that lacks certain rights such as notice of termination or severance pay
accounting for 23.9% of the working population (May, Campbell and Burgess, 2005). The
combination of strict employment protection for permanent workers and liberalization of
regulations for temporary workers is responsible for the growth of temporary work (Blanchard
and Landier, 2002).
Across the OECD, states also vary in terms of regulation for NSWA. While paid
holidays, paid sick leave, entitlement to unemployment insurance, entitlement to paid parental
leave, and participation in public pension schemes are statutory rights for workers in most
advanced industrialized countries, access to such provisions is conditional on minimum periods
of employment, working hours provisions, minimum earnings thresholds, and minimum
contribution periods. As some forms of NSWA are not based on the traditional 40-hour, fiveday work week, it is difficult for individuals in such positions to meet these minimum
qualifications. Furthermore, many states lack legislation requiring other forms of equal
treatment such as equal-pay and access to training for individuals employed in NSWA.
Within advanced economies, labor market segmentation or the division of labor into
secure and insecure jobs is a major source of inequality. As labor market segmentation has
become more institutionalized, the division of the workforce into labor market insiders and
outsiders becomes a pressing matter for the economic, social, and political health of advanced
economies. Labor market segmentation hampers productivity growth (Boeri 2011), reduces the
quality of life for outsiders, and reduces social cohesion (Benach et al. 2014, Berton et al.
2012). Most welfare-states have been ill-prepared to deal with high levels of labor market
outsiders because the eligibility criteria for social insurance benefits was built upon the
underlying assumptions of the post-war employment structure. Individuals with short and
interrupted work records face significant costs for not being able to find standard work
arrangements.
4

It is within the changing nature of the welfare state that the policy governing NSWA
takes center-stage. Specifically, why states differ in the protection and regulation of NSWA is a
crucial question to answer as massive changes in the way in which the labor market is structured
pushes more and more individuals into positions of precarious employment. This segmented
labor market creates an undue level of inequality within societies and fosters dissatisfaction with
political and economic institutions. States face a burgeoning crisis in the wake of their latecapitalist policies as extreme parties mobilize against the status quo. Employment regulation and
security play a key role in determining the quality of life for the electorate, as well as the stability
of political regimes.
Chapter Overview
This dissertation aims at enhancing the understanding of why different states have
adopted different policies to regulate non-standard employment. To that purpose, it is organized
into 5 substantive chapters. The first two chapters (Chapters 03 and 04) focus on defining
outsiders and their policy preferences. Chapter 03 examines the evolution of labor markets
throughout the post-war period and provides a new operationalization for labor market outsiders
to better match this change. Chapter 04 investigates how the preferences of labor market
outsiders differ from labor market insiders and the impact of those preferences on voting
behavior. Chapter 05 takes this new operationalization and uses panel to data to determine
which factors were significant in driving change for NSWA protections and regulations across
the OECD countries. Chapters 06 and 07 trace the causal pathways for NSWA reform in four
case countries. Chapter 05 examines the role of Social Democratic parties, unions, and
corporatist institutions in the rise of NSWA from 1980 to 1995. Chapter 06 investigates how
Social Democratic parties, unions, and corporatist institutions influenced NSWA reform from
1995 to 2016.
To preview each chapter, first, Chapter 03 provides a brief overview of the changes in the
labor markets of advanced industrialized countries including deindustrialization, globalization,
and rising levels of education which have tacitly influenced labor market segmentation. Taking
these historical changes into account, I then build a new operationalization of labor market
outsiders based on socioeconomic risk. This measurement differs significantly from the
previously used economic risk and employment status measurements of outsiderness. My
5

measurement focuses on both collective and occupational risk by calculating the rate of
nonstandard work for different occupational groups, sexes, and ages and testing if they are
statistically less advantaged in the labor market than individuals in their country. I conclude the
chapter by providing a demographic overview of labor market outsiders in advanced
industrialized countries based on my operationalization.
Chapter 04 examines the relationship between outsiderness, policy preferences, and
voting behavior. I find when compared to labor market insiders, labor market outsiders are more
likely to preference job security and level of socioeconomic risk is an essential variable in
explaining support for job creation. I also find there is not a significant difference between labor
market outsiders and insiders in terms of their support for redistribution, especially post-fiscal
crisis. I also find that outsiders are more likely to support spending on pensions than insiders,
but there is no divide on this issue when it comes to unemployment spending. Regarding voting
behavior, labor market outsiders are less likely to vote. When they do, they are more likely to
support parties on the far-left and left, including Social Democratic parties, and are less likely to
support parties on the right.
Chapter 05 uses panel data to explore the interactions between unions, institutions, and
party composition and competition for Social Democratic parties, on changes to the strength of
protection and regulation for temporary employment contracts, part-time work, and the
difference in protections between full-time and temporary workers. To measure this, I use the
content-coding of employment legislation to create a cross-national index of employment
regulation for part-time and temporary jobs. I find the mechanisms underlying temporary work
protections and part-time work protections are quite different. Part-time work protections are
likely to be higher when the country is an EU member, the composition of the government is
culturally less traditional and leans towards the left on the economic dimension, and union
members affiliate with left-parties. High unemployment rates in the short-term, higher levels of
wage coordination, union affiliation with right parties, and greater protections for standard work
are likely to lead to decreasing protections for part-time employment protection. Temporary
work protection is likely to be higher when there is either a greater concentration of labor market
insiders in Social Democratic parties in the long-term or the Social Democratic party faces an
alternative left-competitor in the long-term. However, when facing competition from a further
left challenger on the alternative-traditional cultural scale in the long-term, insider dominance of
6

Social Democratic parties decreases the strength of regulation for temporary work. Additionally,
ideological distance on the economic dimension between Social Democratic and right parties in
the long-term, as well as higher levels of deindustrialization, union density in the long-term,
union affiliation with left parties and corporatist institutions are found to lead to higher levels of
protection for temporary work. Less traditional right competitors and greater protections for
standard work are found to decrease protections for temporary employment.
Chapter 06 traces the political environment and policies that lead to an increase in parttime and temporary work in the selected case countries of Australia, the Netherlands, Spain, and
the United Kingdom during the early 1980s to mid-1990s. I find high levels of unemployment
prompted governments to add flexibility to their labor markets by making part-time and
temporary jobs attractive to employers through low levels of employment protection and
regulation. Unions and corporatist institutions further exacerbated the quality divide between
NSWA and permanent employment by allowing deregulation to occur at the margins while
fighting for stringent protections for permanent positions.
Chapter 07 builds upon the findings of Chapter 06 to examine the role of Social
Democratic parties, unions, and institutions in NSWA protection and regulation by tracing the
policy developments in the case countries from the mid-1990s to 2015. I find left-party
competition plays a vital role in the policies adopted by the state. However, how left competition
influences the Social Democratic party is tempered by the overall ideological orientation of the
Social Democratic party. Furthermore, while unions initially served to exacerbate the
insider/outsider divide, as part-time and temporary work became more prevalent within their
countries, they emerged as an influential proponent in advocating for higher levels of protection
for NSWA. This advocacy was highly influenced by the willingness of the party in power to
abide by social contracts and engage in reform. Finally, the EU is found to be an essential
component to NSWA reform, especially for part-time work. The EU served as an important
influence both in the Directives issued on NSWA and the policy goals set forth as a part of
European integration.
Overall this dissertation finds that the pathway for NSWA reform has been quite different
from that of standard employment protections. Temporary work regulations and protections are
far more politically motivated than part-time employment regulations and protections.
Temporary work protections and regulations are higher when there is more union density and
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stronger corporatist institutions. Electorally, Social Democratic parties play an important role in
temporary work reform and are motivated to advocate for increases in protections for temporary
work when facing an alternative-left competitor. However, when the Social Democratic party is
insider-dominated and faces an alternative left competitor, they are less likely to increase
temporary work protections and regulations. In this manner, Social Democratic parties make a
trade-off between protections for standard work and non-standard work, protecting their base at
the expense of labor market outsiders.
Part-time employment protection and regulation has been far less politically motivated
and is primarily the result of the European Union. The Directives issued by the EU in the mid1990s provided the impetus for part-time work reform. Left party in power was not an essential
factor in part-time work reforms, rather the overall orientation of the government determined
their strength with governments leaning culturally less traditional leading to overall higher rates
of part-time work protections.
This project contributes to the growing research calling into question the new politics of
the welfare state and the ability of governments to mediate inequality. There are two significant
technical contributions of my dissertation. Firstly, regarding labor market outsiders, this
dissertation contributes to the literature through the development of a definition of labor market
outsiders aligned with the cultural, societal, and institutional biases impacting the type of
employment individuals can find. This measurement provides a useful tool for examining how
demographic characteristics impact the ability of individuals to find secure employment.
Secondly, to study nonstandard work arrangements, I developed an index of employment
protection and regulation for part-time and temporary jobs. Through content-coding of pertinent
legislation, I created an index measuring equal treatment, access to social insurance, and
regulation of work contracts for nonstandard work. The creation of this new measure allows for
cross-country comparison of non-standard working arrangements.
This dissertation also sheds light on the political participation and partisan orientation of
labor market outsiders, finding they are less likely to vote than labor market insiders and when
they do vote, they are more likely to vote for far-left and left parties. When measuring socioeconomic risk, I find that as socioeconomic risk increases, individuals are more likely to vote for
extreme parties. As political parties become more polarized at the same time labor markets do,
this finding provides an interesting avenue for examining the emergence of populist feelings
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towards the state and the messaging from extreme parties of promoting the economic interests of
those with insecure employment. It also demonstrates the discontent felt by a growing proportion
of the electorate as more individuals retreat from political life and express dissatisfaction with
the political status quo.
Additionally, my dissertation explores the political issues that have arisen as a result of
the fragmentation of the left. Across Europe, Social Democratic parties have seen their seats in
government dwindle as voters realize that the economic promises made by the Social Democratic
parties were impossible to provide to everyone within an ever modernizing labor market. I find
that positive changes to NSWA policy is largely the result of left party competitors to Social
Democratic parties, as well as through the stability of SD coalitions. Additionally, a division of
ideology between the SD party and right party competitor provides an opportunity for the SD
party to differentiate themselves on the economic dimension, which gives them an electoral
advantage and leads to NSWA policy change. Unlike previous findings regarding the welfare
state, this study finds that left party in power does not explain the strength of NSWA policies.
However, the positioning of the Social Democratic party within the political space does provide
a more complete picture regarding the behavior of parties on the left. This dissertation also
reveals that the European Union served crucial intervening variable in explaining the behavior of
parties. In essence, the EU provided political cover to parties to enact labor market reforms,
regardless of their popularity or the endogenous demand for such policies. These findings work
to contribute to the literature of the new politics of the welfare state and uncover the role of
multiple actors, including supranational institutions, in the enactment of labor policy.
Finally, this dissertation finds mixed results for the effects of corporatist institutions and
unions. Overall, the impact of both appears to be constrained by the time period studied with
unions and corporatist institutions exacerbating the insider/outsider divide prior to the Great
Recession and serving as a less useful analytic tool post-Recession. This finding shows that
despite their relative decline, unions still play an important role in labor market regulations.
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CHAPTER II
A POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH TO LABOR MARKET SEGMENTATION
AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION AND REGULATION

Political and economic institutions are important for understanding the shape and
function of employment protection and regulation as well as a host of related policies that help to
insure workers against loss when shocks such as technological change and market demand for
skills shift. The purpose of this literature review is to identify and discuss the key theoretical
debates within the political economy literature on the politics of labor policy reforms in postindustrial economies. How these policies have been developed, adapted, and structured has been
of particular interest to scholars of the welfare state who have provided a rich background on
how political actors have mobilized in order to mitigate employment risk. The period of
transition from industrialization to post-industrialization has provoked a host of new tensions
among the various actors of the welfare state.
The literature on welfare states demonstrates strong labor unions, left-led governments,
and corporatist institutions among the state, unions, and employers play key roles in determining
the structure of labor market institutions. However, any examination of labor market policies
must be combined with literature on the new politics of the welfare state and labor market
segmentation. The labor markets of post-industrial societies are much different than the post-war
economies from which the welfare state emerged. Therefore, how the new politics of the welfare
state and labor market segmentation impact the ability of unions, left-led governments, and
corporatist institutions is particularly important to assess. The new politics literature proposes
labor policy reforms become increasingly difficult over time because the existence of the welfare
state itself has created constituencies that will oppose this change. The labor market
segmentation literature posits the crux of this opposition will occur between labor market
insiders and outsiders. It suggests the policy preferences of labor market insiders and outsiders
interact to determine how states govern the primary and secondary labor markets.
The new politics of the welfare state literature focuses on how the existence of the
welfare state itself has changed the politics governing it. As Pierson (1996) states “there is a
profound difference between extending benefits to large numbers of people and taking benefits
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away” (pg. 144). The new politics literature therefore argues the radical transformation of
existing welfare institutions is unlikely because of the political unpopularity of cutting such
programs (Pierson, 1994). Under this conceptualization, any adaptions to social and
employment policy are likely to occur at the margins. In passing policy, governments utilize
broad coalitions involving opposition parties, organized labor, and business associations in order
to institute reforms (Myles and Pierson, 2001). This in turn helps to spread the blame of
instituting programs such as austerity measures. Because broad coalitions become necessary, the
partisan left-right composition of the government matters less than competition between parties
(Kitschelt, 1994). How the actors interact to institute reform is structured by the already existing
institutions of the welfare state (Hicks 1999). The new politics literature highlights two factors
that are important in explaining why states will enact labor policy reform: Political competition
and the institutional environment in which policy is reformed.

Political Competition and Social Democratic Parties
Political competition involves parties offering positions along a policy dimension. The
spatial concept of party competition argues that individuals will vote for the parties that are
ideologically closest to them. The spatial model assumes voter preferences are exogenous while
parties vary their policy position in order to maximize their electoral appeal (Downs, 1957).
Parties attempt to maximize their appeal by following two dominant strategies. The first, the
general electorate model, states parties are responsive to the median voter. This, in theory, leads
to vote maximization and has a moderating influence on the positions the parties adopt. The
second, the partisan constituency model, argues parties are responsive to their own supporters.
When parties adopt this strategy, they are less likely to respond to shifts in public opinion or
moderate their policies (Ezrow, et al., 2011). In examining these models, mainstream parties are
more likely to adopt a general electorate strategy while niche parties are more likely to adopt a
partisan constituency model. When niche parties moderate their policies, they see their vote
shares decrease relative to the previous election (Adams, 2006; Meguid, 2005). The Downsian
model suggests that mainstream parties benefit from moderation and an emphasis on the median
voter.
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There is evidence to suggest, that not all mainstream parties are able to respond to shifts
in public opinion in the same manner. Specifically, parties on the “old” left, those arising from
the Social Democratic and Communist ideologies1, may not have the same agility in the policy
space as their competitors. Left parties are of particular importance to the provision of social
policy because, there is strong empirical evidence that left control of government increases
redistribution (Hicks & Swank, 1984; Huber & Stephens, 2001; Korpi, 1983). However, because
of their strong ties to social movements and unions, Social Democratic parties are especially
vulnerable to shifting their policies as they may lose the support of their core constituency
(Kitschelt, 1994). Adams & Somer-Topcu (2009) find Social Democratic parties are
ideologically inflexible compared to mainstream parties in the center and on the right. They are
less likely to respond in the short-term to shifts in public opinion and short-term changes in the
global economy. In this sense, Social Democratic parties differ from other mainstream parties in
that they adopt a partisan constituency model. Instead of responding to the electorate as a whole,
they respond to the preferences of their supporters (Steenbergen & Edwards, 2007).
This creates some interesting issues for the adoption of outsider-friendly policies.
Rueda’s (2006, 2007) insider-outsider model suggests Social Democratic parties, have strong
incentives to consider insiders their core constituency, which in turn leads to policies favorable
to insiders. This does not necessarily create an issue, unless insiders and outsiders diverge in
terms of their preferred policies because political parties serve as a conduit for the representation
of policy preferences (Powell, 2004). The literature indicates while both labor market insiders
and outsiders support increased social policy, what they emphasize differs greatly. Häusermann
and Schwander (2010) find insiders are more likely to support policies promoting strong
unemployment insurance, while outsiders are more likely to support policies promoting
redistribution, childcare services, and job creation. Rueda (2005) finds outsiders are more
concerned with active labor market policies while insiders are more concerned with employment
protection. While these policies are not diametrically oppositional, if Social Democratic parties
are following a partisan constituency model, they do create choices for Social Democratic parties
in terms of the policies they promote.

1

For this dissertation, I use the Social Democratic Party coding from the Comparative Manifesto project to identify
Social Democratic parties. While numerous scholars have identified different criteria for defining Social
Democratic parties, the Comparative Manifesto groups Social Democratic and Labor parties together.
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However, some scholars argue the partisan model is not always the dominant strategy
used by Social Democrats. Rather, the type of electoral strategy employed by the Social
Democrats and competition within the policy environment greatly impacts the policy positions
adopted by the party. The dynamic party competition model may help explain under what
conditions Social Democratic parties may adopt outsider-friendly policies. The dynamic party
competition model argues parties systematically respond to voters and change their positions in
the same direction as shifts in voters’ preferences (Stimson et al., 1995). Under this
conceptualization, parties deviate from the policy preferences of their traditional electorate when
it helps them to secure an electoral majority or when the shift in public opinion is
disadvantageous to the party (Adams et al., 2004). Under this model, Social Democratic parties
do change their policies to appeal to the median voter and are therefore responsive to the labor
market policy demands of the entire electorate, not just their core constituency.
Parties can adopt a strategy as either “policy-seeking” (position changes occur when the
voters of the party change their preferences), “vote-seeking” (position changes occur when the
median voter changes their preferences), or “office-seeking” (shifting towards the position of the
government when excluded from the government). While the partisan constituency model
argues Social Democrats will adopt a policy-seeking strategy, other cases seem to indicate this is
not always the norm. Schumacher et al (2012) find when the median voter shifts to the right and
Social Democrats adopt a vote-seeking or office-seeking strategy they are more likely to enact
retrenchment reforms, a policy direction directly in conflict with the desires of their base.
One factor impacting how Social Democratic parties will shift is the presence of leftparty, center-party, or right-party competitors. Social Democratic parties generally face
competitors on the far-left in the form of Communist or left-libertarian2 (Green) parties
(Przeworski and Sprague 1988). Using the logic of spatial competition, if a party emerges on the
radical left or right, more moderate parties should be under pressure to move their position to
more extreme ends of the spectrum in order to prevent the more extreme parties from
permanently stealing votes from them. Electoral defeat especially influences parties to modify
their policy profiles (Somer-Topcu, 2009). Lunz (2013) finds in the case of Germany, the Social
Democratic party was able to shift towards the center regarding labor reforms, reducing
2

While Kitschelt (1994) uses the terms libertarian and authoritarian to describe the cultural policy dimension, I elect
to use the terms alternative and traditional to remove jargon from my dissertation.
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employment protection, because they faced little competition from left party challengers, while
in the case of France, competition from the left made such as shift nearly impossible for the
Social Democratic party. Kitschelt (2001) argues Social Democratic parties engaging in officeseeking may adopt retrenchment reforms and shift rightward when facing competition from
liberal-market competitors to the center and right because they are able to position themselves as
the “lesser evil” and enjoy more credibility in “protecting the system.” Green-Pedersen (2001)
finds in the case of the Netherlands, the Social Democratic parties had to condone retrenchment
to regain governmental power after the Christian Democratic (Center Party) reached a consensus
on the issue. Without doing so, the Social Democratic party would have lost both seats and
votes.
The literature leaves a lot to unpack in terms of how Social Democratic parties will
behave towards outsider preferences. If Social Democratic parties are indeed engaging in policyseeking behavior and primarily concerned with protecting the interests of their core
constituencies, then the composition of Social Democratic parties matters for NSWA protection
and regulation. In states in which the Social Democratic party is primarily reliant on insider
voters, NSWA employment protection is expected to be weak because the party will focus on
passing policies to protect the insider status of its constituency. In states in which the Social
Democratic party has more outsiders in its constituency, stronger protections for NSWA are
predicted as these parties consider outsiders an important part of their electoral strategy.
However, the literature is mixed as to whether or not Social Democratic parties will
engage in policy-seeking behavior as there is evidence to suggest in some circumstances they
will trend towards the general-electorate model and engage in vote-seeking or office-seeking
behavior. When Social Democratic parties do this, the composition of the Social Democratic
party’s matters less and competition in the party space matters more. Under this model, party
competition becomes more important as the willingness of Social Democratic parties to shift to
the center and adopt less labor friendly policies, will be predicated on challenges from the far-left
as well as challenges from the center and right. When Social Democratic parties face challenges
on the left, the expectation is that they will adopt more labor-friendly policies because failing to
do so will lead to defection of voters from the party. When Social Democratic parties face
challenges from the center and right, the expectation is that they will adopt less labor-friendly
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policies because lack of far-left competition enables the party to shift rightward without facing
repercussions in terms of lost votes.
Unfortunately, the literature does not provide a clear picture as to how Social Democratic
parties will respond to NSWA regulation and protection explicitly. It is entirely possible that the
partisan and general electorate models combine to explain how these policies are formed. When
Social Democratic parties are composed primarily of labor market insiders and face left-party
competition, they may protect their core constituency at the expense of labor market outsiders,
enacting policy that strengthens protection and regulation for standard employment while
allowing flexibility to occur at the margins for part-time and temporary jobs. However, when
Social Democratic parties contain more outsiders, it is my expectation there will be higher levels
of employment protection and regulation for NSWA because failing to do so incentivizes the
core constituency of Social Democratic parties to defect to parties further on the left. When
Social Democratic parties face competition from the center and right, my expectation is that
protection for NSWA will be weaker regardless of the composition of the party because Social
Democratic parties can pivot towards more centrist policy without facing the same electoral
repercussions.

Outsider Political Alignment
The literature raises several unanswered questions that will impact the role Social
Democratic parties may play in promotion of regulation of NSWA. Firstly, are labor market
insiders the core constituency of Social Democratic parties? The new politics literature shows
there has been an emergence of cross-class coalitions that will defend the status quo of the
welfare state (Pierson, 1996). Traditionally, within power resource theory, the capacity for
working class collective action explains cross-national differences in the distributive outcomes,
size, and characteristics of social policies (Korpi, 1989; Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993; Hicks
1999; Huber & Stephens, 2001). However, with the emergence of labor market polarization and
the diminishment of the manufacturing sector, the concept of the “working class,” is quite
opaque within post-industrial societies as changes in the class structure have fundamentally
altered the scope of the traditional working class. Iversen & Soskice (2009) note in postindustrial societies, the working class voters previously politically linked to social-democratic
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based parties are increasingly dispersed across sectors of the economy meaning the broad-based
industrial worker coalitions that once supported the old left are growing more and more diverse.
Gingrich & Häusermann (2015), note this diversification has resulted in left parties now mainly
relying on voters from the educated middle-classes. Lindvall & Rueda (2006), suggest the
ability of left-parties to build new political coalitions mediates the impact of insider-outsider
divides.
Another question left unanswered in the literature, is how outsiders will align themselves
electorally. In any given election, citizens have the opportunity to choose from a menu of
choices offered by political parties. The spatial model argues the proximity between voters and
parties policy positions impacts whether or not individuals will turn out to vote and if so,
ultimately, who they choose to vote for. Within this framework, individuals vote for the parties
with the positions that align closest to theirs because they receive more benefit if those parties
win the election. There is strong empirical evidence that left control of government increases
redistribution (Hicks & Swank, 1984; Huber & Stephens, 2001; Korpi, 1983). Those with lower
incomes tend to prefer higher levels of welfare and redistribution (Cusack et al., 2008). Because
the poor are more likely to support government redistribution, they are expected to lean more
towards left parties (Cusack et al., 2008; Rehm, 2009, Giger, Rosset, & Bernauer, 2012). Labor
market outsiders tend to have lower incomes than their insider counterparts because outsiders
lack access to “good” jobs. The same logic that applies to low-income voters may also apply
labor market outsiders. This would suggest that labor market outsiders might align themselves
with parties on the left and far-left.
However, another compelling case is made for outsider alignment with right and far-right
parties. Facing both economic insecurity (threat of joblessness) and status insecurity (feeling left
behind by modernization) many working-class voters have moved towards the right (Betz &
Meret, 2012). Kurer (2016) finds working-class voters who remain in working class jobs are far
more likely to support right-wing populist parties than working-class voters that find themselves
unemployed or transitioning to service-sector work. He notes fear of status decline is a primary
motivator for these individuals rather than their actual economic status which prompts a stronger
association with identity politics. Kriesi (1999) finds that voters who fear a deterioration of their
economic status are more likely to support far-right parties. The same economic insecurity and
status insecurity also impacts outsiders who increasingly are unable to gain access to jobs located
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in the primary market. Rueda (2007) theorizes outsiders will support conservative parties when
Social Democratic parties do not attend to their interests.
Another potential behavior of outsiders is to engage in protest voting or abstain from
voting altogether. In his analysis of the 2009 German election, Marx (2014) shows that outsiders
hold the government responsible for their economic situation and therefore tend to punish the
incumbent party through protest voting or abstaining from voting. Protest voting is used to
signal dissatisfaction with the status quo (Rosenthal & Sen, 1973). In this context, outsiders may
vote for anti-establishment, extreme parties when none of the mainstream parties provide a
policy platform that is favorable to them. Individuals choose not to vote when they feel
indifference to or alienation from existing policy platforms (Adams et al., 2006). Alienation
occurs when there is a large difference between the policy position of the voter and the closest
party. This may pose a problem for democracy because it excludes individuals from the political
process creating a situation where electoral democracy does not serve as an effective medium for
policy representation for some individuals (Lefkofridi et al., 2014).
One reason outsiders may feel alienated is because of their lower income levels. Giger et
al (2013) find the poor are systematically underrepresented by political parties and governments
in comparison to middle-income and high-income citizens. When there is a disagreement in
policy direction between lower and higher income groups, parties are tremendously more likely
to promote policy that benefits the higher income groups (Gilens, 2012). This creates a feedback
loop in terms of political participation because higher income groups receive constant benefits
from the political system which in turn encourages them to participate in the political system. As
the inequity becomes more pervasive, low income individuals, recognizing the system is
unresponsive to their preferences regardless of which party is in power become disillusioned and
less likely to participate in the political process. This leads to economic and social inequalities
being reinforced through biases in political representation (Bartels, 2008).
Overall, the literature leads in a variety of directions as to how labor market outsiders
may behave electorally. Labor market outsiders may back Social Democratic parties. However,
this will be contingent on the composition of Social Democratic parties and their ideological
congruence with outsiders. Outsiders may support redistributive policies and therefore vote for
other parties on the left or far-left. Another possibility is that outsiders fearing a deterioration in
economic and social status may align with parties on the right or far-right. And yet another
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potential behavior for labor market outsiders is they will abstain from voting altogether. Overall,
the literature is unclear as to the direction of outsider voting behavior.

Institutions
The new politics literature also suggests institutions are important in determining labor policy
reform. As North (1990) states institutions are the “rules of the game” which guide the manner
in which various political actors are able to engage in policy development. In this context,
political institutions themselves shape the bargaining power of rival groups. The varieties of
capitalism (VOC) literature is based on the premise that countries develop different types of
production regimes because of their institutional configurations. Within the literature, two
separate production regimes are examined. The first are business-coordinated market economies
(CME’s) in which there is a great deal of coordination between companies with the state playing
a framework setting role. The second are the liberal market economies (LME’s) in which there
is little coordination between companies, an exclusion of labor, and the state plays virtually no
role in their interaction.
As all CME’s have to some extent a consensus political system, this is predicted to be
important to the passage of legislation protecting NSWA. The consensual political system is
found in CME’s because different groups such as firms and unions need to be able to negotiate
with each other to enact policy change, especially under conditions of changing
sociodemographic characteristics (Soskice, 2005). Consensual decision-making institutions
help to incorporate a wider range of interests in the policy making process. This is achieved by
centralizing bargaining structures among nationally represented interest groups (Schmitter,
1977). Firms in coordinated market economies benefit from the political and economic
institutions encouraging collective control of policy, which in turn encourages policy stability.
Policy stability then reinforces firm decisions to invest in longer term commitments and product
strategies (Wood, 2001). Policies, such as protection against job loss, reduces future uncertainty
of wage premiums which are generally considered beneficial to both firms and employees
(Schettkat, 1993).
Consensual decision-making institutions are expected to influence the type of NSWA
policies promoted by the state. In CME’s, neoliberal responses such as weakening labor
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institutions, deregulating markets, and reducing wages has not been a preferred policy goal. The
same is not true in LME’s (Kitschelt et al. 1999). In CME’s, the business community is less
likely to call for deregulation because firms draw competitive advantage from the regulatory
regime supporting them. Because of this, firms are more likely to reach compromises with trade
unions to support high-quality, high value-added production (Hall & Soskice, 2001). Genre et al
(2003) found a high level of coordination between unions, business, and the state lead to
improvements of working conditions for part-time employees which encouraged their
willingness to take such positions.
However, Rueda (2007) argues these corporatist institutions magnify the impact of
insider-outsider differences which will lead to less employment protection for individuals
employed in NSWA. This is because corporatist structures can be used to promote inequality,
especially when the groups accessing them are not representative (Rueda, 2007). The impact of
corporatism is therefore dependent on how much insiders are represented by strong interest
groups (such as unions) than outsiders are. In this sense, labor market insiders have access to
institutional mechanisms to foster collaboration and to negotiate with employers collectively.
When outsiders lack these mechanisms, they are less likely to solve their collective action
problem and therefore more likely to face fewer protections regarding their employment.

Labor Unions
How labor unions will utilize corporatist institutions is therefore an additional question
raised by the literature. While labor unions provided a powerful counterforce to capital in the
early emergence of the welfare state, in the post-industrial era they carry far less clout than
before. At their peak in the 1970s 42% of all workers in the OECD belonged to a labor union, by
2015 that number had declined to 17% (OECD, 2015). Changes in the labor market have
prompted many reforms for labor unions such as the decentralization of bargaining structures.
As employers have demanded more flexibility, unions have had to compromise their maximalist
policies in order to focus on their core members.
Job security is key to furthering the power and strength of the union itself. When union
members have more employment protections, they are more willing to participate in union
activities which in turn reinforces the strength of the union (Daviddson & Emmengger, 2012).
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While unions have been unsuccessful in preventing a decline in membership (Blanchflower &
Oswald, 2005), they have been successful in insulating their member’s wages, working hours,
and employment protections from the impact of external forces. As a result, there is a selfreinforcing relationship between unions and labor market insiders. Belonging to a union
provides for increased job security and protection. As a result, labor market insiders are more
likely to be represented by unions. Therefore, the primary job of unions becomes to oppose
reforms that specifically disadvantage labor market insiders. As outsiders tend to be
underrepresented in unions, there is more of an incentive for unions to push against reforms that
add flexibility to the labor market at the expense of outsiders (Rueda, 2007).
It is expected the role of labor unions in providing for employment protection and
regulation for NSWA is conditional on the relative strength of labor and the composition of its
members. When unions are encompassing and include workers employed in NSWA, it is
predicted to lead to more employment protection and regulation for such positions. However,
the lower the representation of NSWA workers within unions, the more likely unions are to
protect the privileged insider status of union members therefore leading to less employment
protection and regulation for NSWA. In terms of union strength, the more powerful labor is, the
more likely it will protect the interests of its members. Furthermore, the less powerful labor is,
the less likely there will be strong levels of employment regulation or protection for workers in
the first place.

Theoretical Model
Labor market segmentation impacts policy preferences and mobilization as occupational
and demographic factors divide workers into insiders and outsiders and magnify the
vulnerabilities associated with participation in the labor market. This increase in risk has a
profound impact on how parties must respond to the concerns of their constituents. Prior to the
1980s, the industrial coalitions of welfare states held strongly together to promote favorable
levels of employment protection and regulation. However, as the industrial base eroded, and the
cross-class coalitions of the early welfare state wore away, parties found they needed to respond
to an electorate discovering itself more and more divided by insider/outsider status. This causes
a dilemma for parties. Do they support policies that benefit insiders therefore risking the exodus
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of the growing constituency of outsiders to other parties? Or, do they support policies that benefit
outsiders, potentially isolating insiders within their party if there is disagreement over policy
direction? The existing labor market institutions, the power of organized labor, and the
composition of Social Democratic parties is expected to play a large role in determining the
ability and willingness of states to promote legislation for NSWA. Compounding this, party
competition may impact how far parties are able to pivot to provide encompassing policies that
do not abjectly favor insiders or outsiders.
From the literature, it is possible to derive several hypotheses concerning the behavior of
labor market outsiders and insiders as well as the response of parties, unions, and the role of
corporatist institutions. Based on the review of the relevant literature, I have several
expectations concerning employment protection and regulation for non-standard work:

Labor market insiders and outsiders will have different policy preferences which influence the
willingness and ability of parties to support NSWA protection and legislation.

H1: Labor market insiders will prefer policies that support employment protection.

H2: Labor market outsiders will prefer policies that support job creation.

H3: Labor market outsiders will prefer policies that support redistribution and reject policies
that support social insurance.

Labor market insiders and outsiders will support different political parties and engage in varying
levels of political participation.

H4: Labor market outsiders are more likely than labor market insiders to vote for left parties.

H5: Labor market outsiders are more likely than labor market insiders to vote for right
parties.

H6: Labor market outsiders are more likely than labor market insiders to abstain from voting.
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H7: Labor market outsiders are more likely to vote for parties on the far-left or far-right.

The heterogeneity of both Social Democratic parties as it relates to insider/outsider divides will
be an important determinate of employment protection and regulation for NSWA. The ability of
the SD parties to cater to any one constituency will be tempered by party competition.

H8: Ideological distance between Social Democratic Parties and other left parties will be
associated with higher levels of employment regulation and protection for NSWA when Social
Democratic Parties are outsider dominated.

H9: Ideological distance between Social Democratic Parties and other left parties will be
associated with lower levels of employment regulation and protection for NSWA when Social
Democratic Parties are insider dominated.

H10: Ideological distance between Social Democratic Parties and center parties will be
associated with lower levels of employment regulation and protection for NSWA.

H11: Ideological distance between Social Democratic Parties and right parties will be
associated with lower levels of employment regulation and protection for NSWA.

Consensual decision-making institutions are expected to influence the type of NSWA policies
promoted by the state and will interact with labor.

H12: Strong Corporatist institutions will result in stronger employment protection and
regulation for NSWA.

H13: Strong Corporatist institutions will result in weaker employment protection and
regulation for NSWA.

H14: The impact of corporatist institutions will be mediated by the make-up of unions.
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The role of labor unions in providing for employment protection and regulation for NSWA will
be conditional on the relative strength of labor and the composition of its members.

H15: The greater the composition of outsiders in unions, the stronger employment protection
and regulation for NSWA will be.

H16: The greater the composition of insiders in unions, the weaker employment protection
and regulation for NSWA will be.

Empirical Strategy
This dissertation uses multiple methodologies to explain why NSWA employment
legislation varies across countries. I utilize both quantitative and qualitative analysis to answer
the proposed questions. These methodologies work to complement each other and strengthen my
overall conclusions.
For the cross-national statistical analysis of insider/outsider preferences and voting
behavior, I draw upon individual-level data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP)
The ISSP provides panel data on a variety of topics concerning government policies for 45
countries around the world (however, data is not available for every country every year). It is
one of the most comprehensive datasets available to study individual preferences and the only
dataset with survey data available covering the variables of part-time employment and
occupational group during my time frame. I use this data for three purposes. Firstly, I use it to
estimate the proportion of insiders and outsiders in left, center, and right parties. Secondly, I use
the 1996/1997, 2005/2006, and 2015/2016 waves of the survey to examine the policy preferences
of insiders and outsiders concerning expectations of state policies governing work and
redistribution. Finally, I use the 2015/2016 wave of the survey to test the impact of outsiderness
on voting and party choice.
For the cross-national statistical analysis of employment regulation and protection for
NSWA, I use data from a variety of different datasets including the Comparative Manifesto
Project (CMP), the ISSP, OECD, Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions,
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Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS), and Comparative Political Data
Set (CPDS). I use the data from the CMP to calculate ideological distance between the different
parties in my model. The CMP provides content coding on a variety of different topics that
enable me to situate political parties in their economic left/right and cultural authoritarian/liberal
policy space. From the ISSP, I am able to gather data on party homogeneity with special regard
to the insider/outsider divide. The OECD provides data for many of my control variables. The
ICTWSS provides data on corporatist institutions and union density. And the CPDS provides
data on Party in Power as well as consensus institutions.
For my dependent variable, I construct a time-series index of employment regulation for
part-time and temporary workers. I do this by content-coding pertinent legislation on measures
related to part-time and temporary work including measures of equal treatment; access to social
insurance, and regulation of work contracts. To analyze the data, I run an error-correction model
with panel corrected standard errors.
For the qualitative analysis of my data, I use process tracing to validate the findings of
the quantitative portion of my dissertation. I use secondary data analysis, as well as primary
analysis of legislative debates, to examine how part-time and temporary work became a
dominant form of employment in my case countries. I then build upon these findings in order to
test my hypotheses on partisanship, party competition, unions, and institutions in order to tease
out the pathways by which states have addressed the issue.
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CHAPTER III
LABOR MARKET SEGMENTATION AND THE CONCEPT OF OUTSIDERS

The previous chapter outlined a broad theoretical approach to the study of employment
protection and regulation for labor market outsiders and hypothesized close linkages between
unions, left-parties, and corporatist institutions. This chapter ties together national and
international changes that have occurred within the welfare state leading to the emergence of
outsiders as a relevant political group. The main purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, this
chapter provides background information on how deindustrialization, globalization, and
increases in educational levels have fundamentally altered labor markets within advanced
industrialized countries. Secondly, using the theoretical explanations for labor market change, I
construct a socioeconomic risk-based operationalization for measuring labor market outsiders.

From Secure to Insecure: How Labor Market Segmentation Evolved in Advanced
Economies
The emergence of welfare states in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s took place under unique
and highly favorable conditions. Europe’s productive capacity was decimated by WWII leading
to capital scarcity. The conservative political parties and organizations that served as an
opposing force to organized labor were largely discredited by their compliance with the Nazi war
effort. Finally, the looming specter of the Cold War and threat posed by the Soviet Union
prompted a concerted effort by the governments of the West to develop national policies that
would spur economic growth. While the eventual outcome and delivery of these policies would
vary across countries, the primary mechanism for their development came in the form of
centralized bargaining structures in which labor, employers, and the state worked cooperatively
in order to coordinate wages and create social welfare arrangements. Healthcare, unemployment
insurance, and pension schemes were provided by many governments to incentivize workers to
train in specific rather than general skills which would have been risky to develop without the
state providing insurance against loss of employment. Unions worked to negotiate for high
levels of job protection and regulations on working hours and overtime. Employers benefited
from this system as wages were determined collectively meaning investment in their firms did
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not automatically translate into worker demands for higher wages. This assurance, in turn, lead
to higher levels of investment both in capital and vocational training (Eichengreen & Iversen,
1999).
These institutions thrived because of several key factors. Firstly, the post-war time
period featured an unprecedented level of economic growth. The economic destruction wrought
by WWII meant most economies in Europe were operating below capacity. Economic growth
was spurred by repairing wartime damage, rebuilding capital stock and putting to commercial
use new technologies developed during the war (much of which was imported from the United
States). Secondly, the adoption and continued growth of a large stable manufacturing sector and
the Fordist model of production, which relies on division of labor and semi-skilled workers
provided for a homogenous workforce. This enabled centralized bargaining to have an
egalitarian impact where most workers benefited from wage coordination. This led to political
coalitions between the working-class and middle-class and the emergence of strong unions that
pressed effectively for benefits and services to meet the specific needs of workers. Finally, labor
markets based on a single-male breadwinner model helped to reinforce nuclear families and
provided for a tidy gender division between paid and domestic work (Taylor-Gooby, 2004).
The initial structures of the welfare state were built upon a particular perception
concerning how work operated. Full-time employment, for a single employer, with many states
creating welfare structures that would incentivize long job tenures, was the standard form of
employment. Therefore, the eligibility criteria for most social insurance benefits was built upon
the assumption that workers would have long, uninterrupted work records. It is important to note
the conditions enabling states to create such systems were extraordinarily unique and based upon
social, cultural, and demographic features that were exclusive to this time period in particular.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the global economy faced a series of economic shocks combined
with slowed productivity growth which lead to high levels of unemployment and inflation.
Institutional features such as wage bargaining, legislation on working hours, and strong
employment protection that previously served the welfare state during its expansion, now
worked against the labor market encouraging high unemployment rates. Systems such as
generous unemployment benefits, now viewed as discouraging the finding work, were seen to
need major reform. Job protection, once viewed as providing incentives for workers to invest in
specific skills, was now viewed as a costly proposition for firms who found the onerous
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regulations to be impediments to shifting firm needs. It quickly became clear, the present
economic structures were obstructing the creation of enough jobs for all workers to have fulltime employment (Cordova, 1986). As a result, the 1980s ushered in an era of welfare state
reform in which many benefits schemes were restructured or had eligibility criteria added to
them (such as minimum hours worked). and labor protections relaxed.
The 1970s and 1980s also marked the emergence of several key influences on labor
markets. Firstly, globalization became a dominant feature of advanced industrial countries. The
opening of markets around the world worked to erode the power of labor because capital owners
could now move their enterprises to places with more favorable conditions. This in turn allowed
firms to engage in “social dumping” whereby they could either move or threaten to move to
nations with lower labor costs, lower taxes, more flexible working regulations, and fewer social
protections (Mishra, 1999). Because this strategy was available to them, capital owners were
able to enhance their bargaining power over government and labor therefore constraining the
ability of government to execute redistributive policies leading to overall reductions in social
expenditures (Bonoli et al., 2000). Workers in developed countries were made more insecure as
market integration rendered them more interchangeable. The less educated, less skilled workers
became easier to replace (Rodrik, 1997).
Secondly, deindustrialization, the transition from a manufacturing-based economy to one
based on services, began to accelerate in the 1980s. This led to the breakdown of the Fordist
model as more decentralized systems of manufacturing (such as just in time production) and
automation begin to dominate the industrial structure. Automation led to a large amount of
displacement for industrial workers who found that their routine labor was replaced by
technological processes. This led to a hollowing out of the middle of the wage distribution as
good paying, middle-class jobs were replaced by machines (Autor, Levy, & Murnane, 2003).
Between 1980 and 2014, the OECD countries lost 43% of their manufacturing jobs.
Service industries are unable to match the productivity of the manufacturing sector
because services are themselves comprised of labor (Baumol, 1967). Replacing labor with
technology benefits the manufacturing process as machines allow for the same or greater
productivity than a single person could accomplish. The service sector is different in that
additional productivity requires the additional input of labor. In order for many service sector
positions to be profitable, they need to have low wages because lower wages in the service sector
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translate into cheaper prices which in turn promotes higher demand for said services. As a result
of this, a majority of the jobs generated in the service sector are either low-skilled, low-paying
and temporary or high-skilled, high-paying, and permanent, there is very little middle-ground
(King & Rueda, 2008; Pontusson, 2005).
Finally, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed the increased participation of women within the
workforce. Cultural shifts in the 1960s and 70s enabled women to have greater access to
contraceptives which allowed women to have greater efficacy over when and if to have children.
Consequently, many women were able to delay starting families instead focusing on their
education and careers. The burgeoning service sector provided women opportunities to enter
into employment and the expansion of public sector employment in some countries particularly
favored women as these occupations were primarily in fields already dominated by women. For
women with children, part-time work became more prevalent and was seen as an attractive
option because it allowed for flexibility in their work schedule, provided supplemental income,
and acted as a substitute when they were not able to find a full-time job (Christensen & Staines,
1990). For many working women with young children, the shortage of childcare facilities made
part-time work a particularly attractive option (Visser et al., 2004). Part-time work structures
helped to mobilize many women, especially those that were married or had children, into the
labor force who otherwise may not have sought employment.
Figure 3.1 shows employment growth in the employment changes in manufacturing,
services, and information and communications technology since the 1980s. The 1990s and early
2000s saw a compounding of the trends started in the 1980s because of increased adoption of
technology. Improvements in ICT and the use of computers allowed firms to more efficiently
produce goods both domestically and abroad. Routine jobs, those that can be codified into
repetitive step-by-step procedures such as production and clerical work, were the primary targets
of automation. As manufacturing jobs declined and the service sector employment grew,
employment growth began to shift from nearly equal growth rates among different occupations
to a more divergent pattern with the largest share of growth among high-wage and low-wage
occupations. Termed “job polarization,” the increasing concentration of employment at opposite
ends of the earning spectrum signaled the disappearance of the middle-skill occupations, upon
which welfare structures had been built (Acemoglu & Autor, 2010; Goos, Manning, &
Salomons, 2014).
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Figure 3.1. Percentage Change by Type of Employment in OECD Countries Since 1980
The adoption of information communications technology increased demand for better
skilled employees, especially in decentralized firms (Bresnahan & Malerba, 1999). This skillbiased technological change was accompanied by an increasing upskilling of the workforce. In
1995, 23.3% of 25 to 34 year old’s in the OECD had a university degree, by 2016 that number
had increased to 43.3% (OECD, 2017). As advanced industrialized countries moved into their
post-industrial period, professional and skilled occupations were highly in demand. Semi-skilled
and middle-skilled occupations had largely been replaced by technology. And the demand for
low-skilled labor was primarily driven by the ability to keep wages down for such positions
(Esping-Andersen, 2000).
The 1990s also ushered in several prominent neoliberal reforms to reduce trade barriers
and increase the mobility of capital. The European single market was formalized in 1992
guaranteeing the free movement of goods, capital, services, and labor throughout the Euro zone.
In 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) eliminated many tariffs on goods
sold between the U.S, Canada and Mexico. The formation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Council
(APEC) reduced the cost of business transactions among Pacific Rim countries. While
automation was the primary driver of middle-skill job loss, in advanced economies, trade, on
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average, contributed to about 20% of the decline of manufacturing employment (Rowthorn &
Ramaswamy, 1999).
As Figure 3.2 demonstrates external economic shifts prompting many countries to engage
in employment protection reforms in the 1990s and 2000s. The bulk of these reforms targeted
deregulation of labor-markets “at the margins.” As a result, while non-standard work
arrangements lost many of their protections, such as time-limits and renewals of temporary
contracts, standard employment contracts largely remained unchanged (Van Vliet & Nijboer,
2012).
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Figure 3.2. OECD Average of Strictness of Employment Protection Legislation (19952013)
The ease of hiring and firing individuals in part-time and temporary work arrangements
lead to large increases in individuals hired under such contracts. Since 1995, on average the
proportion of individuals employed in non-standard work has increased by 2% per year.
Roughly 56% of all jobs created between 1995 and 2013 were part-time or temporary (OECD,
2015).
The Great Recession created another employment crisis for advanced economies wherein
the unemployment rate increased from 5.4% to 8.3% between 2007 and 2010. By the end of
2012, in what many pundits dubbed a “jobless recovery,” the unemployment rate had only
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declined to 8.0% (Blanchard et al. 2014). Men were more impacted by the recession than
women as the male dominated construction industry shed jobs. Young workers (15-24) were
also particularly disadvantaged as many of them were working on fixed-term contracts. Their
unemployment rate was on average twice as high as overall unemployment (Pissarides, 2013).
Many workers who were able to hold on to their jobs experienced a reduction in their
work hours, wages, and benefits as firms attempted to reduce labor costs in order to stay afloat.
As part of fiscal stimulus packages, most OECD countries devoted greater resources to labor
market and social policy measures in order to cushion workers from the negative effects of the
crisis. This included additional funding for unemployment benefits and active labor market
policies, use of short-term working arrangements wherein the government subsidizes part of the
forgone income of employees who have their working hours reduced and employer-initiated
reductions in average hours allowed within collective bargaining agreements. These measures
served to avoid excessive layoffs for many workers, especially in continental Europe (OECD,
2013). However, for those already employed in part-time and temporary jobs, the impact of the
Great Recession was particularly devastating. A large proportion of temporary workers were
laid off, in countries such as Portugal and Slovenia, this accounted for 30% and 40% of the total
drop in employment (OECD, 2015). In some countries, such as Ireland and Japan, part-time
workers were unable to access the unemployment benefits.
The Great Recession led to the destruction of many standard jobs and an accelerated
growth of part-time and temporary employment. This also helped to accelerate job polarization
as the destruction of middle skill occupations accelerates during recessions. Routine workers,
the majority of which were once employed in standard jobs, now needed to find suitable
employment in other sectors of the economy (Jaimovich & Siu, 2012). A large portion of these
workers were forced to downgrade to low-wage service sector jobs resulting in a loss of both
status and wage (Cortes, 2016). Consequently, the shrinking job opportunities in routine jobs
resulted in higher unemployment for such workers (Jung & Mercenier, 2014). Secondly, the
Great Recession increased the skill demands of firms. Realizing they could hire better qualified
applicants, the skill requirements for many jobs remained high which increased the education
needed to obtain them. Post-Great Recession, many occupations that would have required less
education and training, now required more education and training to obtain entry into the
occupation (Hershbein & Kahn, 2016).
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From the Post-War to the Post-Recession period a variety of political and economic
forces have encouraged the division of the labor market into separate sub-markets distinguished
by discrete employment protections and work characteristics. The industrial structure upon
which labor protection laws were built has largely been dismantled and the ascendant service
sector has become the primary source of employment for most people. The demographic
composition of workers has shifted to become more equitable among the sexes. And
globalization, adoption of new technologies, and tertiarization have produced labor market
polarization. The post-industrial labor market, especially following the Great Recession, is one
that is characterized by higher levels of atypical work, labor market segmentation, and a greater
amount of economic insecurity for those in nonstandard work positions. This labor market
dualization is best distinguished by the primary market in which jobs are protected and have
relatively high wages. And the secondary market where jobs are insecure and have relatively
low wages (Reich et al., 1973). A variety of political, economic, and institutional barriers stand
in the way of reforming labor market segmentation leading to an increasing clear division
between labor market insiders, those with secure employment, and labor market outsiders, those
with insecure employment.
The rising number of labor market outsiders is expected to have far-reaching
consequences for welfare states. Yet understanding those consequences, first means
understanding who labor market outsiders are. Identifying who is most likely to find themselves
disadvantaged in the labor market is an important step in comprehending what policies may work
in reducing this inequality.

Measuring Outsiderness in Segmented Labor Markets

How labor market outsiders are operationalized plays an important role in understanding
the economic and social risk accompanying labor market segmentation. Currently, there is no
clear, consistent, universally accepted definition of labor market insiders and outsiders. Instead,
there are several competing operationalizations within the contemporary political science
literature. These measurements of outsiders fit into two dominant categories, those that use
employment status as proxies for measuring outsiderness (Lindbeck & Snower, 1988; Rueda
2006, 2007; Emmenegger, 2009; Guilliard & Marx, 2014). And those that employ occupational
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class groups to calculate social risk (Häusermann & Schwander, 2010, Rehm, 2009, Hense,
2017).
Within the employment status measurement scheme, individuals classified as working in
part-time or temporary positions, or those that are unemployed are considered outsiders. Those
working full-time are considered insiders. Employers (also referred to as “upscales”) and the
self-employed are sometimes classified as their own separate category, but not always. The
employment status measurement assumes that one’s current labor market position is indicative of
their policy preferences.
There are several issues with using this type of classification for examining preferences
of outsiders. Firstly, it is quite crude and neglects greater cultural, societal, and institutional
biases that may impact the type of employment individuals are able to find. This makes deriving
preferences based on the nature of work one is currently doing at a single point in time an
unrewarding undertaking. Secondly, it fails to recognize job volatility based on life trajectory.
Working in an “outsider” position may be a temporary issue. For example, a new labor market
entrant may take an internship to gain job skills. Based on the level of skill of the person in this
temporary position, this type of outsider employment may be of short duration. A recent college
graduate is more likely to find full-time employment in the future than a recent high-school
graduate. However, being in short-term outsider employment is less likely to have an impact on
overall preferences, especially if there is an assumption of future reward based on temporary
hardship.
The second type of measurement scheme for outsiderness focuses on occupational class
and social risk. Häusermann & Schwander’s (2010) research on labor market insiders and
outsiders makes a convincing argument that “outsiderness” within the labor market should not be
measured based on current employment status, but rather on overall employment risk. They note
other social and economic characteristics are important to the classification of outsiders,
including occupational class, age, and sex. These demographic characteristics help to shape
preferences because employment risk is extensively shaped by the social group to which one
belongs. Rehm (2009), also calculates risk exposure based on occupational class, looking at the
rate of unemployment for nine different occupational categories and calculating the probability
of becoming unemployed. Using employment risk rather than employment status allows for an
analysis that considers the socio-cultural landscape in which outsiderness occurs.
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Under the social risk measurement scheme, individuals employed in occupations with
many part-time/temporary workers and/or high-levels of unemployment are considered outsiders
even if they are working in standard jobs. Therefore, it is country specific group-based
workforce characteristics and not an individual’s current status that determine outsiderness. As
Rovny & Rovny (2017), point out, this may lead to an ecological fallacy in classifying labor
market outsiders as inferences about their risk position is based on characteristics of the group
rather than their individual life circumstances.
As the literature review demonstrates, the manner in which labor market outsiders are
classified is important in determining their political behavior. However, both the employment
status and social risk classifications contain some major issues in terms of how they categorize
workers. Essentially, this tension lies in what “outsiderness” means. Is someone an outsider
based on what they are doing? Or are they an outsider based on what they will have the
opportunity to do? There is an elegant simplicity of the employment status categorization.
However, what is traded is an understanding of the institutional biases that permit labor
segmentation to occur. Because the sociological and cultural environment in which the labor
market operates is ultimately expected to be important, I intend to use a social risk
operationalization in order to categorize labor market insiders and outsiders.
There are two primary categorizations of labor market outsiders based upon social risk
found in the literature. First, is the social risk categorization derived by Häusermann &
Schwander (2010) who take into account age, sex, and occupational class in defining labor
market outsiders. In order to categorize individuals based on occupational class, they use
Oesch’s (2006) classification of jobs based on post-industrial class schemes. Oesch classifies
post-industrial jobs along two different levels, firstly separating occupations based on the level of
marketable skills attached to an occupation and secondly along the different type of work logics
(technical, organizational, and interpersonal). This leads to 17 different economic classes who
share a common economic position. Häusermann & Schwander then follow Kitschelt and Rehm
(2004) to aggregate these economic classes into five occupational class groups based on similar
qualities of job autonomy within the occupational categories. Under their classification, capital
accumulators include professionals and large employers, socio-cultural professionals include
high-skilled professionals such as teachers and doctors, blue-collar workers include production
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workers, low service functionaries include service and sales workers, and mixed-service
functionaries include office workers and technicians.
Rehm (2009) uses the unemployment rate of an individual’s occupation at the first-digit
ISCO-88 level in a given country and year in order to determine their level of economic risk.
Rehm assumes risk exposure is high for those employed in occupations with high unemployment
rates. While the measurement created by Häusermann & Schwander (2010) is binary, the
measurement created by Rehm is continuous and measures degree of risk. However, while
Häusermann & Schwander (2010) divide their demographic groups based on age and gender,
Rehm categorizes all individuals within the occupational category assigning the same economic
risk level to men and women, older and younger workers. Rehm also does not calculate parttime or temporary employment in his measure.
While both operationalizations contain elements that are important, neither fully provides
a comprehensive measure of labor market outsiders. My primary issue with the categorization
created by Häusermann & Schwander is their use of class as a demographic grouping. As the
workplace has become less structured and the classes have diversified, this type of combination
becomes problematic because individuals employed in different occupations within the same
class structure are likely to face different levels of overall employment risk. In fact, this was one
of the factors that lead Oesch (2006) to create a new grouping of occupations. However, while
the initial 17 categories differentiate these factors nicely, regrouping the occupations into broader
categories adds some noise to the model. For example, Häusermann & Schwander categorize
shop keepers, engineers, and office workers into one singular category. While this class may
share similarities in terms of their working conditions, this does not necessarily translate into
their level of economic risk as these groups span a variety of different skill levels and work
logics. Another issue, I find with this grouping is the mixture of the self-employed and
employers into the occupational classes. As Emmenger (2009) and Rueda (2005) argue, these
groups cannot be insiders or outsiders because they are in not in an employment relationship.
Because they have almost complete control of their working conditions, designating them into a
separate category provides a more appropriate distinction.
Because of these issues, I follow Rehm in calculating the rate of unemployment and parttime work for each occupation based on their 2-digit ISCO-88 code, rather than grouping
individuals into social classes. Focusing on economic risk at the occupational level allows for
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neutral cross-country comparisons and provides a standard measure for occupations along a
vertical grouping of skill. However, strictly using Rehm misses some major components
pointed out in the literature by not recognizing labor markets are different for women and
younger workers. Therefore, I also divide my occupational groups into two different age
categories, following Häusermann & Schwander I use under 40 and over 40, as well as by sex,
female and male.
Table 3.1. Comparison of Outsiders Based on Author’s Definition

% OF
LABOR
FORCE
OUTSIDERS
% OF
WOMEN
OUTSIDERS
MEDIAN
AGE OF
OUTSIDERS

Bolter
(2019)

Häusermann &
Schwander (2010)

Rehm*
(2009)

Rueda
(2007)

Emmenger
(2008)

29.0%

46.1%

48.09%

23.25%

31.38%

52.7%

82%

51%

55%

47%-80%

40.6

47.5

49.6

39.1

36-44

Source: Rovny & Rovny, 2017

*based on a binary scoring with a cut-off at the median.

In comparing my measure with the other dominant operationalizations, it is apparent that
it falls into the more conservative estimation of labor market outsiders. While I use an economic
risk approach, I find my measurement in terms of total outsiders is far more in line with the
estimates made by the employment status scholars. Furthermore, my gender divide falls more in
line with the majority of scholars, suggesting that Häusermann & Schwander may be the outliers
in terms of their operationalization. My measurement also skews younger than the other
economic risk scholars aligning a bit more with what the literature suggests in terms of the risks
facing younger workers.
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Outsider Operationalization
I define a labor market outsider as an individual with a high probability of being
employed in nonstandard work arrangements. To operationalize this, I examine if an individual
has a higher than average risk of finding themselves in part-time work and/or unemployment
based on their occupational group, sex, and age. Ideally, I would also include individuals
employed in temporary employment in this measure. However, my dataset does not include this
variable. Unemployment does serve as a decent proxy measure for temporary work as workers
on temporary-contracts are more likely to move into unemployment than workers on permanent
contracts (OECD, 2006; Houseman & Polivka, 2000). It is important to note, under this
operationalization an individual may be working full-time, yet still be considered an outsider
because of other factors (type of occupational group, age, sex) putting them in the high-risk
category.
One area in which I diverge from previous studies, which categorize insiders and
outsiders in a binary manner is to explicitly classify only individuals with a lower than average
risk of finding themselves in part-time work and/or unemployment as insiders. This
classification does not presume that because you are not an outsider you are an insider. In using
this ordering, I also identify a third category of economic risk for workers, those I dub the “semisecure.” This category includes those that are neither at high risk or low risk of atypical
employment, but somewhere in-between. These may entail groups that are transitioning between
outsiderness and insiderness and vice versa or those with weak but existing institutional
protections for secure employment. For example, “elementary workers” in the United Kingdom
comprise occupations that are low-skilled. Most of these workers belong to demographic groups
that are labor market outsiders. However, some of these demographic groups are not outsiders,
but statistically they are not insiders either i.e. older female elementary workers are classified as
outsiders, but older male elementary workers are classified as the semi-secure. As they are the
semi-secure, they do not belong to an occupational group with a high probability of being
employed in nonstandard work arrangements. However, they also do not belong to a
demographic group with a lower probability of being employed in nonstandard work
arrangements. In this sense, they are not particularly advantaged or disadvantaged in the labor
market, they are semi-secure.
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As Figure 3.3 demonstrates, in the past twenty years, individuals in the semi-secure group
have grown the most out of any of the other labor market positions. While insiders are still the
dominant group, they have seen the most decline. As insider work becomes less and less secure,
this semi-secure group increases. I expect this group to be important in evaluating policy
adoption as they serve as a bit of a “swing” voter. Aligning with insiders or outsiders may help
to tip policy direction in some countries. Furthermore, including this group in my assessment,
helps to pull my analysis more in line with what has been documented within the changing labor
market. Insecurity has increased all around and assuming that if one is not an outsider, they are
an insider can lead to some erroneous conclusions concerning the divides within the labor
market.
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Figure 3.3. Change in Labor Market Position for 20 OECD countries* (1996-2016).
Methodology
To define my labor market insiders, outsiders, and semi-secure, I use individual-level
data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). The ISSP uses the International
Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO). developed by the International Labour
Organization (ILO). to organize jobs into clearly defined sets of groups. ISCO-88 groups jobs
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together based on their skill level, range and complexity of the tasks involved, and skillspecialization (ILO, 2017). Using data for the ISSP survey years 1996 through 2016, I classify
individuals into their occupational groups based off their 1-digit ISCO-88 reported occupation.
For years 2013 through 2016 I use a crosswalk provided by the ILO to translate the ISCO-08
variable to ISCO-88. Years 2008 through 2012 provide ISCO-88 categorizations for all
countries. Years 1996 & 1997 require crosswalks from ISCO-68, French National Occupational
Codes, Swedish National Occupational Codes, UK National Occupational Codes, and US
National Occupational Codes. In order to reclassify, I use the coding utilized by Iversen (2005).
After categorizing individuals in the datasets into their occupational groups, I then further
divide everyone into demographic categories based on their age and gender. I do this because
the literature has shown young workers and women, especially those who have incurred an
employment interruption i.e. leaving the workforce to care for children, are at the highest risk
for atypical employment (Mills et al., 2005, Kitschelt and Rehm, 2006, Schwander &
Häusermann, 2009, Emmenegger, 2010). For many labor force participants factors out of their
control expose them to insecure positions within the labor market. I define younger workers as
those who are 40 and under and older workers as those who are 41 and over. I breakdown the
category of sex between male and female workers. This distinction leads to a combination of 9
occupational categories, 2 sexes, and 2 age groups giving me a total of 36 demographic groups to
calculate if they have an above average risk of finding themselves in insecure employment.
Table 3.2 shows the socioeconomic risk score for each demographic group over the
period of study. I use these demographic groups to compare the group-specific rate of part-time
work and unemployment with the average rate within the workforce. I calculate part-time work
based on the national definitions for part-time work as defined by labor legislation for a country
(See APPENDIX A). I derive this value from the WRKHOURS variable present as a
demographic question on the ISSP surveys3. I define unemployment as currently not being
employed but searching for work. I derive this value from the MAINSTAT (years 2015-2010).

3

Up until 2009, the ISSP surveys contained the variable WRKST which allowed individuals to specify if they were
working full-time, part-time or less than part-time. Initial coding of the rate of non-standard work using this
measure yielded a correlation of .98 between classification of the individuals within the labor force using WRKST
and classification of individuals within the labor force using WRKHRS. A high degree of correlation suggests that
either definitions is a good measure for determining the rate of non-standard work. I use WRKHRS as my
measurement because it is available for all years of interest.
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and WRKSTAT (years 2009-1996) variable also present as a demographic question on the ISSP
surveys.

Table 3.2. Demographic Groups for Calculating Economic Risk and Percentage of
Outsiders in each Demographic Group (1996-2016)
Male
ISCO-88 Classification

Female

Young

Older

Young

Older

1.29%

0.35%

0.71%

0.0%

2.54%

0.27%

47.53%

66.19%

1.38%

0.95%

53.03%

52.94%

3.91%

1.3%

59.30%

63.52%

17.16%

3.68%

84.80%

71.95%

0.0%

1.82%

11.79%

14.01%

2.87%

14.97%

18.61%

37.74%

5.72%

6.94%

21.89%

33.24%

36.57%

29.03%

81.43%

89.18%

01-Legislators, Senior Officials, & Managers

02-Professionals

03-Technicians & Associate Professionals

04-Office Clerks

05-Service Workers and Sales Workers

06-Skilled Agricultural and Fishery Workers

07-Craft and Related Trades Workers

08-Plant & Machine Operators and Assemblers

09-Elementary Occupations

Source: ISSP

To calculate the group-specific and country-specific rates of non-standard work and
unemployment, I combine 7 years of survey cycles into one sample. I do this to increase my
sample size and reduce my sampling variability (Dillman, Smyth, & Christian, 2009). Because I
am dividing the population into 36 different demographic groups, using single years of survey
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data results in having some demographic groups where there are not enough respondents to
conduct a meaningful analysis. For example, in the continental countries, the number of young
women in craft and related trades jobs tends to be low year to year. Making a judgement about
probability of nonstandard work is likely to be biased for this group because the sample is small.
Instead, pooling surveys from multiple years and then disaggregating into the individual
countries and demographic groups helps to increase the precision of the results. This method of
disaggregation is used frequently in studying public opinion data when samples are collected at
the national level, but the researcher wishes to study a smaller unit of analysis (Erikson, Wright,
and McIver, 1993; Gelman & Little, 1997; Brace et al., 2002; Clinton 2006; Lax & Phillips,
2009).
Using this method, two assumptions guide my analysis. One, as this is a randomly
collected survey, I am assuming that respondents are unique and one person did not answer
multiple waves of the survey. Unfortunately, because the survey is reported anonymously, there
is no way to validate this. Although, the probability of this occurring is exceptionally low.
Secondly, I am assuming that the rate of outsiderness of different demographic groups changes
slowly. This is also a fair assumption to make as the annual rate of part-time employment in my
7-year bands fluctuates less than 1% between years. The unemployment rate is more volatile
changing more than 5% between years in some cases, however because the purpose of this
classification is to identify demographic groups that face persistent economic risk, this works in
my favor by normalizing the results of economic downturns over time and not misclassifying
groups that have faced economic shocks, but recovered.
Using the seven-year bands (2010-2016, 2003-2009 & 1996-2002), I calculate the groupspecific and country-specific rates of part-time work and unemployment for each country in the
sample. I use a t-test to determine if a particular demographic group has a significantly higher
rate (p<0.05) of non-standard work or unemployment as compared to the country average.
Demographic groups that have a significantly higher rate of non-standard work or unemployment
as compared to the country average are classified as “outsiders.” Demographic groups that have
a significantly lower rate of non-standard work or unemployment as compared to the country
average are classified as “insiders.” Groups that are not significantly one or the other are
classified as “semi-secure.”
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In this categorization all members of the demographic group regardless of their current
employment status are classified as outsiders, insiders, or semi-secure because they share a
similar risk profile. For example, in Germany, older, female workers employed as a service
worker (for example, a waitress) consistently have a higher rate of non-standard work or
unemployment than the country average. Using an economic risk classification means that all
older women that fall into that demographic category are classified as labor market outsiders.
So, an older female waitress working full-time and an older female waitress working part-time
are both classified as labor market outsiders. While the full-time waitress may be in standard
employment now, if she loses her job, she faces a much higher probability of finding herself in
non-standard work or remaining unemployed. As a result, she and the part-time waitress share
the same level of economic risk and therefore the same level of outsiderness.

The Outsiders
Across the OECD, there has been a steady growth of individuals in the labor force who
are outsiders. From 1996 to 2016, the overall growth rate for labor market outsiders was 26.8%.
The Eastern European and Southern states experienced by far the highest growth of outsiders
with percentage changes of 76.6% and 71.4%. The Continental states experienced the next
highest amount of growth (33.5%), followed by the Liberal states (26.8 %). During this time
period, the Nordic states actually experienced a drop in labor market outsiders (-13.8 %). The
time period after the Great Recession (2008/2011) shows the greatest amount of growth for labor
market outsiders. Figure 3.5 shows the growth in labor market outsiders over the time period.
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Source: ISSP

Figure 3.4. Outsiders as a Percentage of the Labor Force (1996-2015)
Table 3.3 shows the percent of outsiders in each regime by sex, age, and skill-level.
Women, the young, and low-skilled workers are the groups most likely to find themselves
involved in non-standard work arrangements (de Vries & Wolbers 2005, Gash and McGinnity
2006, Blossfeld & Hofmeister, 2006). In examining the demographics of outsiders, the majority
of women in the labor force are labor market outsiders. However, across the OECD, the number
for female outsiders diverges quite a bit with women more likely to be outsiders in Continental
and Southern regimes and less likely to be outsiders in Nordic and Eastern European regimes.
The likelihood of young workers (under 40) entering the workforce as outsiders also varies
across the regions. High youth outsider rates are seen in the Southern countries, while the
Nordic countries have seen a decrease in the number of young outsiders. Conservative and
Eastern European states have both seen increases, while the Liberal states have seen more
variation. Finally, individuals employed in low-skill occupations are more likely to find
themselves labor market outsiders. This trend holds steady across the different regimes and
across time.
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Table 3.3. Percent of Outsiders in Associated Groups for Twenty OECD Countries (1996–
2015)
1996/1999

2000/2003

2004/2007

2008/2011

2012/2015

WOMEN

54.1

51.7

60.1

56.9

56.5

Liberala

53.6

57.0

66.9

58.7

57.7

Conservativeb

69.5

71.5

81.3

79.4

81.5

Nordicc

62.7

49.0

55.9

49.4

46.5

Southernd

65.3

61.0

62.4

66.5

65.2

E. Europeane

25.4

23.1

27.4

30.2

38.3

YOUNG
WORKERSf

29.0

29.4

33.9

33.8

34.4

Liberal

32.2

35.9

40.7

37.0

39.6

Conservative

32.6

35.1

42.3

46.3

47.8

Nordic

32.0

26.7

31.6

25.0

18.3

Southern

29.5

33.3

36.5

46.7

51.2

E. European

19.3

15.7

15.2

17.6

24.3

LOW-SKILLg

62.1

62.7

63.7

64.3

62.9

Liberal

69.1

72.1

69.7

72.1

72.4

Conservative

66.2

67.2

79.7

80.5

75.6

Nordic

78.3

65.8

62.7

59.6

62.7

Southern

54.3

61.6

58.2

65.1

65.5

E. European

44.4

43.9

45.1

44.2

47.6
Source: ISSP

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

Australia, Great Britain, Ireland, New Zealand, USA
France, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden
Spain, Portugal
Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
Includes workers under 40 years old.
Includes workers in ISCO occupations 05-Service Workers & 09-Elementary Occupations
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There are many recent trends throughout the OECD that are likely contributors to the
composition of labor market outsiders. For women, in the welfare regimes that emphasize
family-centered childcare (Conservative and Southern) women are more likely to be labor
market outsiders. Women often accept more flexible forms of employment, so they can meet
familial obligations when other measures to promote care/work compatibility are lacking within
a country (Blossfeld et al., 2009). While this keeps women in the labor force, it does not
necessarily improve their labor market position and women disproportionately bear the
employment costs of care work.
Another factor impacting the quantity of women in the pool of outsiders is occupational
segregation. Figure 3.5 shows the gender composition of the different occupational groups in the
OECD. Women form the minority in senior management positions, craft and related trades, and
plant and machine operators, all occupations whose work requirements, structure of work, and
traditional protections reduce the likelihood of contingent work. Instead, women dominate
occupations such as clerks and service workers, occupations with a higher likelihood of nonstandard work arrangements.
04-Clerks
05-Service workers and shop workers
03-Technicians and associate professionals
09-Elementary occupations
02-Professionals
01-Legislators, Senior Officials, Managers
06-Skilled agricultural and fishery workers
08-Plant and machine operators and assemblers
07-Craft and related trades workers
0%

10%

20%

Women

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Men
Source: ISSP

Figure 3.5. Occupational Segregation of the Labor Force in 20 OECD countries (19962015)
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The continued growth of young outsiders is a direct consequence of the previously
mentioned shifts within the labor market. Employers continue to create new jobs that are
contingent in nature, and the young are more likely to accept these new positions. Older workers
who, have the benefits of job protection, generally through grandfathered contracts, are not as
susceptible to outsiderness. Newer workers are more likely to enter a job market where low
levels of job protection are the norm, especially as states continue to institute policies adding
flexibility to the labor market. They are therefore more likely to face nonstandard working
arrangements. Younger workers who find themselves in temporary work face lower
opportunities for regular employment and higher unemployment risks, but only in countries
where employment protection for standard workers is high. In more liberal markets, temporary
work often functions as an intermediary step between education and standard work (Fervers &
Schwander, 2015). For young people, being segregated into atypical employment has the
negative side-effects of delaying a transition into adulthood and family formation (Barbieri,
2015). This particularly disadvantages young workers who begin their careers with lower wages
than their older counterparts and reduces the opportunities for these workers to accumulate
experience and training which can help develop their careers.
Finally, low-skill workers find themselves particularly disadvantaged by the changes in
the labor market. Exposure to globalization, deindustrialization, and tertiarization of the
workforce have reduced the demand for low-skill workers and organizational restructuring has
incentivized employers to cut costs by deskilling and subcontracting low-skill jobs (Kalleberg,
2009). While the general trend for low-skill workers has remained relatively steady, lack of
education and employment in low-skill positions across the advanced industrialized countries
greatly increases the level of outsiderness in these positions.

Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the economic and labor market changes that have come to
define the post-industrial labor markets of the advanced economies. The emphasis has been on
tracing how globalization, deindustrialization, and demographic changes have led to labor
market polarization and consequently labor market segmentation. Using the historical narrative
of welfare regimes as a guide, I then provide a new conceptualization of outsiderness based upon
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the socioeconomic risk profile of particular demographic groups. This conceptualization shows
that women, the young, and low-skilled workers are particularly vulnerable to being labor market
outsiders. I also show the number of labor market outsiders have grown as a proportion of the
labor force.
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CHAPTER IV
LABOR MARKET OUTSIDERS AND POLITICAL PREFERENCES

Across the OECD, the proportion of labor market outsiders, defined as individuals most
at risk for nonstandard work, has steadily increased. The political economy literature
demonstrates exposure to labor market risks helps to shape political preferences. As job
vulnerability increases, workers are more likely to demand the safeguarding of redistributive
policies and lean towards political parties that promote them (Garrett, 1998; Burgoon, 2001).
Because labor market risks inflict uncertainty on future income, this leads individuals to demand
insurance against future income losses (Moene & Wallerstein, 2001). While the literature has
shown that level of skill specificity (Iversen & Soskice, 2001), occupational risk profile (Rehm,
2009), & exposure to globalization (Burgoon, 2001) help to spur demand for redistribution, the
impact of being an outsider on political preferences is less understood. The main questions
addressed in this chapter are how outsiderness is translated into preferences for employment
protection, job creation, social insurance, redistribution and patterns of party support.
The presence of job security marks an important distinction between labor market
insiders and outsiders. Labor market insiders are assumed to possess a relatively high level of
job security, while labor market outsiders do not. Labor market insiders use employment
protection to their advantage in order to bargain for beneficial working conditions. Because of
this, labor market insiders have a vested interest in maintaining the status-quo. Rueda (2005)
finds outsiders are more concerned with active labor market policies while insiders are more
concerned with employment protection. However, the literature on this effect is mixed as
Guillaud & Marx (2014) demonstrate permanent and temporary workers do not have
significantly different preferences in terms of employment protection. Employment protection
serves as both a protective measure for workers against dismissal and a barrier for entry to the
primary labor market. Outsiders are expected to view employment protection negatively as it
stands as an impediment for them in terms of obtaining better employment. Therefore, it may be
hypothesized that labor market outsiders will have a weaker preference for maintaining
employment protection than labor market insiders (H1). Conversely, labor market outsiders are
expected to view policies promoting job creation more favorably (H2).
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Several authors have found that labor market outsiders have increased preferences for
redistribution (Alt & Iverson, 2013). While insiders benefit from a social welfare state based on
contribution-based insurance. Outsiders are more likely to support policies compensating them
for their disjointed labor market attachment or policies supporting their incorporation into the
labor force (Häusermann et al., 2014). This is an important distinction to make because social
insurance is based on the idea that social benefits are proportional to contributions. As a result,
the social insurance an individual qualifies for is strongly linked to their employment history.
Benefits are conferred to those continuously employed full-time, a policy benefitting insiders to
the detriment of outsiders. Outsiders are therefore expected to view redistributive policies, those
providing benefits and services independent from their contributions positively, and social
insurance policies negatively (H3).
Finally, the insider/outsider theory hypotheses within post-industrial societies, political
conflict occurs between insiders and outsiders. Some scholars find because left-parties focus on
redistribution and workers’ rights, outsiders are equally likely to preference Left-parties
(Emmengger, 2009) (H4). However, other scholars have found left-parties, traditionally
supporters of labor market reforms and working rights side with labor market insiders. This is
especially true for Social Democratic parties who primarily focus on insider interests (Rueda,
2008, 2009). In this scenario, because their interests are not well represented by left-parties,
outsiders are expected to not support left-parties and rather support parties on the right (H5).
Still, other studies find labor market outsiders are often excluded from the political
process and likely to not vote at all (H6). King & Rueda (2008) note that it is difficult to
mobilize outsiders as greater salience is given to sources of identity, such as ethnicity, race, or
gender, than to their status as workers. This in turn distances outsiders from insiders who are
more connected to existing parties and mechanisms for integration into the political process. As
a result, outsiders may turn away from mainstream parties and instead align themselves with
parties on the far left or right (H7).

Data
I use multiple waves of data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) to
assess my hypotheses. The ISSP is a collaborative annual survey which provides cross-national
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research on a variety of topics relevant to the social sciences. To examine the impact of
increases in labor market outsiders and changing labor market conditions, I limit my study to 11
OECD countries4 that participated in all six years of the study. I do this to make sure the results
are comparable across time. Fortunately, the 11 countries in my sample provide for good
representation of the different welfare regimes.

Dependent Variables
To assess support for employment protection, I use a question available in years 1997,
2005, and 2015 of the ISSP survey: “How important is job security?” The answer scales range
from 1 “Very important” to 5 “Not at all important.” In order to evaluate support for job creation.
I use a question available in years 1996, 2006, and 2016 of the survey which asks respondents if
they agree or disagree that the government should finance projects for new jobs. The answer
scales range from 1 “Strongly Agree” to 5 “Strongly Disagree.” I analyze support for job security
and job creation with a multiple linear regression model with robust standard errors.
To examine support for redistribution, I use a question on government responsibility
available in years 1996, 2006, and 2016 of the survey which asks whether or not it is the
government’s responsibility to reduce income differences between the rich and poor. The
answer scales range from 1 “Definitely should be” to 4 “Definitely should not be.” To assess
support for social insurance programs, I use a 2 spending questions available in years 1996,
2006, and 2016 of the survey which ask whether the respondent would like to see more or less
government spending on unemployment benefits and pensions. The answer scales range from 1
“Spend much more” to 5 “Spend much less.” As part of the question, each respondent was
warned that more spending may require an increase in taxes. I analyze support for redistribution
and social insurance with a multiple linear regression model with robust standard errors. I
reverse code all dependent variables so that higher numbers indicate more agreement and lower
numbers indicate less agreement.
In order to review voting behavior I use data from 2015/2016 on whether or not a
respondent voted. I then use the PARTY_LR variable to determine the left-right orientation of
the party vote. This variable was developed by the International Social Survey to facilitate
4

Czechia, France, Germany, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, UK, USA
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comparison of party support across countries. It is based on expert classification of parties. The
2015/2016 variable is based on which party a respondent voted for. I use a logit model to
analyze voting and partisanship.

Independent Variables
To define my labor market insiders, outsiders, and semi-secure, I use individual-level
data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). To operationalize labor market
outsider, I examine if an individual has a higher than average risk of finding themselves in parttime work and/or unemployment based on their occupational group, sex, and age. It is important
to note, under this operationalization an individual may be working full-time, yet still be
considered an outsider because of other factors (type of occupational group, age, sex) putting
them in the high-risk category. Using data for the ISSP survey years 1996 through 2016, I
classify individuals into their occupational groups based off their 1-digit ISCO-88 reported
occupation. After categorizing individuals in the datasets into their occupational groups, I then
further divide everyone into demographic categories based on their age and gender. I define
younger workers as those who are 40 and under and older workers as those who are 41 and over.
I breakdown the category of sex between male and female workers. This distinction leads to a
combination of 9 occupational categories, 2 sexes, and 2 age groups giving me a total of 36
demographic groups to calculate if they have an above average risk of finding themselves in
insecure employment.
Using seven-year bands (2010-2016, 2003-2009 & 1996-2002), I calculate the groupspecific and country-specific rates of part-time work and unemployment for each country in the
sample. I use a t-test to determine if a demographic group has a significantly higher rate
(p<0.05) of non-standard work or unemployment as compared to the country average.
Demographic groups that have a significantly higher rate of non-standard work or unemployment
as compared to the country average are classified as “outsiders.” Demographic groups that have
a significantly lower rate of non-standard work or unemployment as compared to the country
average are classified as “insiders.” Groups that are not significantly one or the other are
classified as “semi-secure.”
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Outsider: Labor market outsiders are defined as individuals belonging to a demographic that has
a higher than average probability of finding themselves in non-standard work arrangements.
According to my operationalization, this does not mean they are necessarily employed in parttime or temporary work. Labor market outsiders are expected to view job security negatively,
view job creation positively, support redistributive programs and not support social insurance
programs. They are expected to support either left, right, or extreme parties (the far left or far
right), although they are also expected to be less likely to vote overall.

Semi-Secure: Semi-secure workers are defined as individuals belonging to a demographic group
that does not have a higher than average or lower than average probability of finding themselves
in non-standard work arrangements. Because the literature has not studied the semi-secure as a
group, the findings concerning their behavior are exploratory in nature.

Insider: Labor market insiders are defined as individuals belonging to a demographic group that
has a lower than average probability of finding themselves in non-standard work arrangements.
This does not necessarily mean they are employed in permanent full-time contracts. Within the
regressions, labor market insiders serve as the reference group for labor market outsiders and the
semi-secure.

Socio-economic Risk: In addition to measuring labor market outsiders and the semi-secure as a
binary measurement, I also create a continuous measure of outsiderness combining rate of
unemployment and part-time work and assigning that rate to the members of the various
demographic groups. The continuous measurement allows for a finer measurement of labor
market vulnerability and is designed to measure socioeconomic risk exposure. It assumes
socioeconomic risk levels are high for those belonging to demographic groups with greater levels
of non-standard work and unemployment.
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Control Variables5

Part-Time Employment: Part-time employees are often in vulnerable labor market positions
which is expected to impact their views on job security and redistribution. In terms of job
security, part-time employees may either view it positively because it reduces their employment
risk or negatively because they benefit from more flexible labor markets. Part-time employees
are expected to align with outsiders and view job creation and redistribution positively and social
insurance programs negatively. Part-time employees, however are expected to align with left
parties and be less likely to vote.

Unemployed: The unemployed are expected to support job security, creation of new jobs,
redistribution, and government spending on unemployment insurance, but not pensions. The
unemployed are expected to support left parties but be less likely to vote.

Self-Employed: The self-employed benefit from flexible labor markets and therefore are
predicted to favor low levels of job security, social insurance, and redistribution. They are
unlikely to favor government sponsored job creation. The self-employed are expected to align
with right parties and be less likely to vote.

Employers: Employers also benefit from flexible labor markets and have costs imposed upon
them by social welfare programs. They are expected to view job security, social insurance, and
redistribution negatively although they are likely to favor government sponsored job creation.
Employers are expected to align with right parties and be more likely to vote.

Non-Employed: The non-employed represent a very heterogeneous group including retirees,
students, the disabled, and homemakers. They are included to control for the likely possibility
that they have different attitudes than the employed.

5

The control variables for this study are modelled from Iversen (2005) for their study of social preferences and skill
regimes.
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Public Employment: Public employees benefit from larger welfare states. They are included
because it is possible that the preferences of private sector workers diverge from those of public
sector workers. They are expected to view job security, job creation, redistribution, and social
insurance positively. They are expected to align with left parties and be more likely to vote.

Age: Older workers are expected to be more concerned with job security than younger workers
because their ability to find new employment will be limited. Younger workers are expected to
view job creation and redistribution favorably. Older workers are expected to view social
insurance more positively. Younger workers are expected to be less likely to vote and will vote
for left parties. Older workers are expected to be more likely to vote and will vote for right
parties.

Gender: Because women face greater institutional barriers to full-time continuous employment,
they are expected to view job security more favorably. Women are also expected to be more
likely to support job creation and redistribution and less likely to support social insurance
programs. Women are expected to vote more and for left parties.

Union Membership: One of the main functions is ensure job security for their members,
therefore, they are likely to view job security positively. Union members are also expected to be
pro-job creation, pro-redistribution, and pro-social insurance. They are expected to align with
left parties and be more likely to vote.

Partnership Status: It is possible that individuals who are in multi-people households view job
security, job creation, redistribution, and social insurance differently than individuals in single
person households. This is controlled for in this variable.

Income: Higher-wage earners do not necessarily benefit from job security as much as low
earners and are therefore expected to view job security less favorably. In terms of job creation,
low earners are expected to view this more favorably than high-wage earners. As those they
derive a cost from welfare programs high wage earners are likely to view redistribution and
social insurance programs negatively. High-wage earners are expected to support right parties
54

while low-wage earners are expected to support left parties. High-wage earners are expected to
be more likely to vote than low-wage earners.

Education: The more education an individual has, the less favorably they are expected to view
job security. Low-educated individuals are expected to view job creation and redistribution more
favorably. Highly educated individuals are expected to view social insurance positively, be more
likely to vote for left parties and more likely to vote.

Partisanship: Attitudes concerning economic policy and social spending may be a reaction of
people’s ideological leanings (Gerber & Huber, 2009). Several studies have shown that
partisanship influences individual’s perceptions of economic issues which influences their
support of different initiatives (Rudolph 2003, Marsh and Tilley 2010, Tilley & Holbolt, 2011).
This possibility is controlled for using the respondents declared support for political parties.
Information: It is possible that higher levels of political knowledge will impact individual’s
perceptions concerning redistribution, social insurance, party position, and voting (Iversen,
2005). The ISSP survey provides a variable to measure information in the 1996, 2006, and 2016
surveys only.

Controlling for these variables is intended to ensure my measurement of labor market
outsiderness captures one’s level of vulnerability in the labor force. While being a woman,
young worker, or low-skilled (measured by proxy by education and income) is likely to increase
one’s chances of socioeconomic risk, possessing these demographic traits does not explicitly
make someone an outsider. People in partnerships are likely to have dual-incomes and union
members and public sector employees are likely to have increased job protections which
influence their level of risk. I also include type of job because I am measuring socioeconomic
risk and not current employment status. My operationalization of outsider means one can be in a
standard job yet still be a labor market outsider. Finally, including partisanship and level of
information are well demonstrated as impactful in explaining policy preferences. All models
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were testing for multicollinearity and none was present6. All models were also testing for
heterogeneity which was found and corrected for by specifying robust standard errors. All
models were also run with dummy variables to control for country level effects. The results of
country-level dummies are not reported.

Results
Table 4.1. Regression Estimates for Job Security for 11 OECD countries*
Independent Variables

Outsider

1997

1997

2005

2005

2015

2015

.016

--

.075***
(.022)

--

.052**
(.019)

--

.066**
(.025)

--

-.002
(.031)

--

.047 (.026)

--

--

.115
(.073)

--

.301***
(.073)

--

.256***
(.061)

-.166***
(.027)

-.176***
(.029)

-.100***
(.025)

-.109***
(.025)

-.059**
(.021)

-.068***
(.021)

-.049
(.031)

-.052
(.031)

-.051
(.041)

-.051
(.041)

-.111***
(.031)

-.119***
(.031)

-.234***
(.074)

-.228**
(.074)

-.216***
(.038)

-.214***
(.038)

-.293***
(.039)

-.291***
(.039)

-.018
(.056)

-.022
(.056)

-.178***
(.041)

-.176**
(.040)

-.274***
(.059)

-.271***
(.059)

-.063***
(.023)

-.055**
(.027)

-.044
(.026)

-.011
(.029)

-.060**
(.023)

-.026
(.026)

.034

.031
(.021)

.034
(.017)

.032
(.017)

.073***
(.015)

.073***
(.015)

.081***
(.018)

.149***
(.020)

.149***
(.020)

.089***
(.018)

.087***
(.018)

(.018)
Semi-secure
Socioeconomic
Risk
Part-Time
Unemployed
Self-Employed
Employer
Inactive
Public

(.021)
Union Member

.081***
(.018)

6

Test of the variance inflation factor (VIF) show no correlation among the dependent or independent
variables. Mean VIF for all models was below 2. Correlation tables are available in the
APPENDIX.
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Table 4.1. - continued
Age

.000
(.005)

.000
(.005)

.001
(.006)

.001
(.005)

-.007
(.005)

-.007
(.005)

.057***
(.016)

.052**
(.017)

.029
(.018)

.025
(.017)

.063***
(.015)

.051***

.019
(.016)

.019
(.016)

.032**
(.015)

.032
(.015)

-.007
(.021)

-.008
(.014)

Income

-.029***
(.006)

-.028***
(.006)

-.026***
(.006)

-.024***
(.006)

-.018**
(.006)

-.017**
(.006)

Education

-.052***
(.007)

-.053***
(.007)

-.059***
(.007)

-.056***
(.007)

-.051***
(.007)

-.048***
(.007)

Far Left

-.053
(.074)

-.057
(.097)

.039
(.041)

.038
(.041)

.004
(.030)

.006
(.030)

Left

-.009
(.024)

-.010
(.024)

.014
(.023)

.015
(.023)

.047**
(.018)

.048**
(.018)

Center

-.071**
(.027)

-.072**
(.028)

-.034
(.025)

-.029
(.025)

-.037
(.027)

-.036
(.027)

Right

-.037
(.026)

-.036
(.027)

-.024
(.023)

-.022
(.023)

-.005
(.021)

-.003
(.027)

Far Right

.190**
(.075)

.187***
(.057)

-.046
(.089)

-.047
(.089)

.064
(.058)

.063
(.057)

Adjusted R2

.036

.036

.054

.055

.0697

.0702

N

7,628

7,628

8,705

8,705

8,874

8,899

Female

Partnered

(.015)

** Significant at the .05 level, ***Significant at the .001 level, one-tailed test (standard errors in parentheses).
*
Czechia, France, Germany, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, UK, USA
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Table 4.2. Regression Estimates for Job Creation for 11 OECD countries*
Independent Variables
1996

1996

2006

2006

2016

2016

Outsider

.012
(.030)

--

.069**
(.028)

--

.051 (.027)

--

Semi-secure

.023
(.037)

--

.066
(.041)

--

.111***
(.038)

--

Socioeconomic
Risk

--

.183
(.095)

--

.305**
(.088)

--

.212**
(.093)

Part-Time

.004
(.037)

-.008
(.037)

-.032
(.034)

-.041
(.034)

-.038
(.035)

-.045
(.036)

Unemployed

.175***
(.052)

.181***
(.052)

.015
(.058)

.015
(.058)

.041
(.044)

.036
(.044)

Self-Employed

.038
(.057)

.040
(.056)

-.153***
(.047)

-.153***
(.047)

-.085
(.047)

-.084
(.047)

Employer

-.186***
(.071)

-.184**
(.071)

-.107
(.057)

-.111
(.057)

-.024
(.064)

-.023
(.064)

Inactive

.043
(.032)

.069
(.035)

.003
(.032)

.036
(.036)

-.057
(.032)

-.042
(.036)

Public

.016
(.023)

.015
(.023)

-.021
(.022)

-.024
(.022)

.008
(.022)

.008
(.022)

Union Member

.084***
(.023)

.084***
(.023)

.099***

.098***
(.024)

.077***
(.027)

.076***
(.027)

Age

-.025***
(.007)

-.025***
(.007)

-.010
(.058)

-.009
(.006)

.004
(.007)

.004
(.006)

Female

.070***
(.023)

.054**
(.023)

.056**
(.022)

.051**
(.021)

.014
(.021)

.010
(.021)

Partnered

-.017
(.021)

-.018
(.021)

-.007
(.019)

-.008
(.019)

-.022
(.018)

-.022
(.019)

Income

-.040***
(.023)

-.039***
(.009)

-.033***
(.009)

-.032***
(.009)

-.046***
(.009)

-.046***
(.009)

Education

-.033***
(.010)

-.031***
(.010)

-.027**
(.009)

-.025***
(.009)

-.013
(.009)

-.014
(.009)

Interest

.000
(.010)

.000
(.010)

.002
(.009)

.002
(.009)

.014
(.009)

.014
(.009)

Far Left

.154**
(.056)

.152**
(.056)

.099**
(.048)

.099**
(.048)

.109***
(.039)

.109***
(.039)

(.024)
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Table 4.2. – continued
Left

.153***
(.026)

.152***
(.026)

.106***
(.026)

.106***
(.026)

.110***
(.026)

.111***
(.026)

Center

.002
(.031)

.002
(.031)

-.050
(.027)

-.051
(.027)

-.058
(.032)

-.056
(.032)

Right

-.113***
(.029)

-.113***
(.029)

-.138***
(.030)

-.139***
(.103)

-.071**
(.027)

-.070**
(.027)

Far Right

-.014
(.098)

-.014
(.098)

-.128
(.103)

-.133
(.103)

-.069
(.071)

-.069
(.071)

Adjusted R2

.132

.132

.098

.099

.104

.104

N

8,481

8,481

9,731

9,731

8,480

8,480

** Significant at the .05 level, ***Significant at the .001 level, one-tailed test (standard errors in parentheses).
*

Czechia, France, Germany, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, UK, USA

Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 present the results of regressions of importance of job security
and job creation as well as a range of control variables7. Regarding outsiders, the findings do not
support the hypothesis derived from the insider-outsider literature that labor market outsiders are
less-likely to preference job security, at least following the 2000/2001 recession. In fact, I find
the opposite, that being a labor market outsider is an important factor in explaining the
importance of job security across the countries in the sample. It is interesting to note, using only
current part-time status or unemployment as the measurement for outsider status would present
the opposite results, lending further evidence to the earlier assessment that how outsiderness is
measured is important. However, these results are not surprising and indicate there is a
difference in how one’s current labor market status impacts preferences versus exposure to
systematic biases and risk within the labor market. Both my measurements of outsiderness
capture the preferences of individuals who face an uphill battle for “good” jobs within the labor
market. It makes sense that they would value job security, especially since procuring standard
work is more difficult for them.
Employers view job security more negatively. As noted in the previous chapter
globalization and tertiarization have decreased the benefits employers derive from long job
tenures. Post-recession, being a public sector worker has become an important variable in terms

7

Both logit and ordered logit models were also run on the data and produced similar results, although they are not
reported in the dissertation. Logit models dummy variables were coded “1” for strongly agree and “0” for all other
responses.
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of rating job security importantly. It is likely this is due to the retrenchment efforts adopted by a
variety of governments following the 2008 market crash, as well as the general lack of
governmental growth in the past decade. The more educated and more income an individual
earns is negatively associated with personal importance of job security, this may be because
better educated and skilled workers have more employment security. In the knowledge-based
economy, the distinction between employment security and job security is an important division
to make. While job security refers to the ability to remain within a job within a company,
employment security refers to the ability to stay in secure employment for the duration of a
career, but not necessarily within the same job with the same employer (Muffels & Withagen,
2012). Highly skilled employees have a better chance of finding replacement employment at the
same level if they lose their job. As a result, staying in the same job is less important.
In terms of job creation, there are mixed results regarding how outsiders differ from
insiders. Based upon the findings I am unable to confirm the hypothesis that labor market
outsiders prefer job creation more than labor market insiders. There seems to be a time when
this division occurred, in the 2006 sample. However, in 2016 the division seems to have
manifested between the semi-secure and labor market insiders. It is possible that because the
Great Recession caused a great amount of unemployment among insiders themselves, they
would additionally like to see job creation, therefore eroding this division. Why the semi-secure
now view job creation favorably, is a bit more mysterious. It is possible the semi-secure prefer
job creation in lieu of unemployment. The question does not specify what type of new jobs
would be created. It is feasible that the semi-secure view any employment better than no
employment.
The continuous measurement of socio-economic risk suggests another interpretation of
the results, as one’s precariousness increases the likelihood of supporting governmental creation
of new jobs increases. In this interpretation, it is fair to say the more socioeconomic risk one
faces in the labor market, the more an individual is willing to support governmental intervention
towards the creation of new jobs. As socioeconomic risk captures both the rate of part-time
work and unemployment for the various demographic groups, it is possible a similar logic to the
semi-secure applies as well, having any job is better than unemployment. However, it is also
worth noting being unemployed does not increase support for creation of jobs. Also, in contrast
to job security, being employed part-time has little impact on support for job creation. Being
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better educated or earning a higher income is negatively associated with support for these
policies.
Labor market outsiders support job security and the higher one’s level of socioeconomic
risk, the more likely an individual is to support the creation of more jobs. In this sense,
outsiderness is a more significant in terms of explaining support for job security than it is for the
creation of more jobs. Breen (1997). argues that employers are less interested in long-term
commitments to their employees regardless of skill level. Instead, employers will elect to
provide secure jobs to highly skilled workers while transferring market risks to those who are
less qualified and well trained. The creation of more jobs does not necessarily equate to the
creation of high quality jobs, but having any job is preferable to many people than having no job.
In comparing the policy preferences of labor market outsiders to insiders, employment security is
a more important policy goal than simply providing more opportunities for employment, unless
one already faces a large degree of socioeconomic risk and then employment is a better option
than being unemployed.

Table 4.3. Regression Estimates for Redistribution for 11 OECD countries*
Independent Variables
1996

1996

2006

2006

2016

2016

.051
(.031)

--

.071**
(.028)

--

.050
(.028)

--

.115***
(.038)

--

.070
(.042)

--

.105**
(.042)

--

--

.289***
(.097)

--

.285***
(.091)

--

.288***
(.093)

-.041

-.057

-.038

(.038)

(.038)

(.034)

-.045
(.034)

-.035
(.036)

(.036)

Unemployed

.007
(.052)

.010
(.052)

.160***
(.050)

.160**
(.051)

.047
(.044)

.039
(.044)

Self-Employed

-.057
(.062)

-.054
(.062)

-.122**
(.055)

-.122**
(.049)

-.072
(.048)

-.069
(.048)

Outsider
Semi-secure
Socioeconomic
Risk
Part-Time
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-.047

Table 4.3. – continued
Employer

-.286***
(.065)

-.284***
(.065)

-.273***
(.055)

-.278***
(.055)

-.199***
(.063)

-.195***
(.064)

Inactive

-.061
(.034)
.101***
(.023)

-.039
( .037).
.098***
(.023)

-.081**
(.032)
.090***
(.022)

-.053
(.036)
.087***
(.022)

-.039
(.031)
.046**
(.022)

-.006
(.035)
.046**
(.021)

Union Member

.162***
(.023)

.164***
(.023)

.139***
(.024)

.139***
(.024)

.133***
(.026)

.131***
(.026)

Age

.044***
(.008)

.043***
(.008)

.039***
(.007)

.040***
(.007)

.040***
(.007)

.039***
(.007)

Female

.063**
(.024)

.051**
(.024)

.009
(.022)

.007
(.022)

.003
(.021)

-.007
(.020)

Partnered

-.050**

-.051**
(.021)

-.060***
(.019)

-.061***
(.019)

-.071***
(.019)

-.072***
(.019)

(.009)

-.131***
(.009)

-.106***
(.009)

-.105***
(.009)

-.091***
(.009)

-.090***
(.009)

-.142***
(.010)

-.141***
(.010)

-.078***
(.009)

-.076***
(.009)

-.048***
(.010)

-.048***
(.010)

Interest

.006
(.010)

.006
(.010)

.004
(.009)

.005
(.009)

.007
(.097)

.0076
(.009)

Far Left

.410***
(.055)

.408***
(.055)

.430***
(.041)

.426***
(.041)

.349***
(.034)

.349***
(.034)

Left

.256***
(.026)

.255***
(.026)

.124***
(.026)

.124***
(.026)

.147***
(.025)

.147***
(.025)

Center

-.050
(.032)

-.048
(.032)

-.093***
(.028)

-.093***
(.028)

-.059
(.033)

-.056
(.033)

Right

-.415***
(.030)

-.415
(.030)

-.418***
(.029)

-.417***
(.029)

-.451***
(.028)

-.450***
(.028)

-.000
(.090)

.0004
(.090)

-.230***
(.088)

-.235***
(.088)

-.244***
(.070)

-.244***

Adjusted R2

.251

.253

.204

.205

.193

.193

N

8,340

8,340

9,642

9,642

8,454

8,454

Public

(.021)
Income

Education

Far Right

-.131***

(.070)

** Significant at the .05 level, ***Significant at the .001 level, one-tailed test (standard errors in parentheses).
*
Czechia, France, Germany, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, UK, USA
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Table 4.4. Regression Estimates for Pension Spending for 11 OECD countries*
Independent Variables
1996

1996

2006

Outsider

.018
(.026)

--

.014
(.024)

.056**
(.025)

Semi-secure

-.012
(.034)

--

.052
(.039)

.036
(.039)

--

.079
(.081)

--

.233***
(.078)

--

.401***
(.089)

Socioeconomic
Risk

2006

2016

2016

Part-Time

-.031
(.031)

-.033
(.032)

-.063**
(.030)

-.077**
(.030)

-.114***
(.035)

-.133***
(.035)

Unemployed

.052
(.046)

.055
(.046)

.027
(.045)

.028
(.045)

-.052
(.042)

-.062
(.042)

Self-Employed

-.005
(.049)

-.004
(.049)

-.096**
(.039)

-.095**
(.039)

-.135***
(.041)

-.130***
(.041)

-.104**
(.052)

-.103**
(.052)

-.193***
(.044)

-.193***
(.044)

-.189***
(.056)

-.179***
(.056)

Inactive

.035
(.028)

.046
(.030)

-.018
(.027)

.021
(.030)

-.091***
(.028)

-.029
(.032)

Public

.043**
(.019)

.044
(.019)

.021
(.019)

.018
(.019)

.001
(.020)

.003
(.020)

Union Member

.079***
(.019)

.078***
(.019)

.015
(.021)

.014
(.021)

.043
(.024)

.041
(.024)

Age

.051***
(.006)

.051***
(.006)

.069***
(.005)

.069***
(.005)

.062***
(.006)

.061***
(.006)

Female

.069***
(.020)

.066***
(.020)

.051***
(.019)

.032
(.018)

.064***
(.018)

.047**
(.019)

-.029
(.017)

-.030
(.017)

-.053***
(.016)

-.053**
(.016)

-.051***
(.017)

-.051***
(.017)

Income

-.048***
(.008)

-.047***
(.008)

-.051***
(.007)

-.050***
(.007)

-.081***
(.008)

-.078***
(.008)

Education

-.113***
(.008)

-.112***
(.008)

-.081***
(.007)

-.080***
(.007)

-.079***
(.009)

-.078***
(.009)

Interest

-.032***
(.008)

-.032***
(.008)

-.025***
(.007)

-.025***
(.007)

.005
(.008)

.005
(.008)

Employer

Partnered
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Table 4.4. - continued
Far Left

.217***
(.047)

.217***
(.047)

.127***
(.039)

.123***
(.039)

.064
(.038)

.062
(.038)

Left

.119***
(.022)

.119***
(.022)

-.017
(.023)

-.017
(.022)

-.047**
(.024)

-.047
(.025)

Center

.006
(.027)

.005
(.027)

-.114***
(.024)

-.115***
(.024)

-.097***
(.030)

-.095
(.030)

Right

-.050**
(.024)

-.050**
(.024)

-.088***
(.024)

-.089***
(.024)

-.122***
(.025)

-.120
(.025)

.129
(.085)

.128
(.086)

-.027
(.079)

-.030
(.079)

.237***
(.054)

.235
(.054)

Adjusted R2

.172

.172

.125

.125

.154

.155

N

8,466

8,466

9,802

9,802

8,531

8,531

Far Right

** Significant at the .05 level, ***Significant at the .001 level, one-tailed test (standard errors in parentheses).
*
Czechia, France, Germany, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, UK, USA

Table 4.5. Regression Estimates for Unemployment Benefits for 11 OECD countries*
Independent Variables
1996

1996

2006

2006

2016

Outsider

.038
(.031)

--

.024
(.027)

.027
(.029)

Semi-secure

.024
(.042)

--

.023
(.043)

.073
(.043)

Socioeconomic
Risk

--

.261***
(.095)

Part-Time

-.016
(.037)

Unemployed

.123

2016

--

(.090)

--

.145
(.101)

-.029
(.037)

.025
(.033)

.022
(.033)

.013
(.036)

.008
(.037)

.478***
(.051)

.487***
(.510)

.474***
(.051)

.474***
(.051)

.395***
(.049)

.391***
(.049)

Self-Employed

-.139**
(.060)

-.136**
(.060)

-.135***
(.042)

-.135***
(.042)

-.099**
(.046)

-.099**
(.046)

Employer

-.332***
(.059)

-.329***
(.059)

-.253***
(.050)

-.255***
(.050)

-.254***
(.059)

-.253***
(.059)

Inactive

-.066
(.035)

-.032
(.037)

-.050
(.030)

-.035
(.034)

-.010
(.031)

.003
(.036)
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Table 4.5. - continued
Public

.012
(.024)

.012
(.024)

-.017
(.021)

-.019
(.021)

.029
(.022)

.029
(.022)

Union Member

.119***
(.024)

.118***
(.024)

.077***
(.023)

.076***
(.023)

.107***
(.026)

.106***
(.026)

Age

.012
(.008)

.011
(.008)

.052***
(.006)

.052***
(.006)

.048***
(.007)

.048***
(.007)

Female

.045
(.025)

.029
(.025)

.007
(.022)

.004
(.021)

-.010
(.021)

-.015
(.021)

Partnered

-.050**
(.022)

-.051**
(.022)

-.084***
(.018)

-.084***
(.018)

-.085***
(.019)

-.085***
(.019)

Income

-.075***
(.009)

-.074***
(.009)

-.066***
(.008)

-.065***
(.008)

-.062***
(.009)

-.061***
(.009)

Education

-.071***
(.010)

-.069***
(.010)

-.032***
(.008)

-.031***
(.008)

-.023**
(.010)

-.023**
(.010)

Interest

.005
(.010)

.005
(.010)

-.005
(.008)

-.005
(.008)

.003
(.010)

.003
(.010)

Far Left

.431***
(.063)

.429***
(.063)

.275***
(.048)

.2737***
(.048)

.185***
(.042)

.185***
(.042)

Left

.168***
(.026)

.168***
(.026)

.157***
(.025)

.157***
(025)

.068**
(.028)

.069**
(.028)

Center

-.094***
(.033)

-.093***
(.033)

-.109***
(.027)

-.109***
(.027)

-.115***
(.034)

-.113***
(.034)

Right

-.204***
(.029)

-.205***
(.029)

-.199***
(.027)

-.199***
(.027)

-.245***
(.028)

-.244***
(.028)

Far Right

-.117
(.103)

-.119
(.102)

-.279***
(.094)

-.281***
(.094)

-.181***
(.068)

-.181***
(.068)

Adjusted R2

.159

.160

.246

.246

.233

.233

N

8,441

8,441

9,723

9,723

8,469

8,469

** Significant at the .05 level, ***Significant at the .001 level, one-tailed test (standard errors in parentheses).
* Czechia, France, Germany, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, UK, USA

Table 4.3, Table 4.4, and Table 4.5 present the results of regressions concerning
redistribution and social insurance. In terms of redistribution, being a labor market outsider is
not currently a significant variable in explaining support for redistribution. In the 2006 wave of
the survey it did represent a significant division. Again, as the Great Recession eroded the
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economic security of insiders disproportionately to outsiders, it is likely this division has become
less stark than in the past. Olivera (2014), finds following the Great Recession support for
redistribution significantly increased among the total population in most European countries
regardless of labor market status.
It is interesting to note the semi-secure have gone through waves where they face a
division between themselves and insiders. It is possible that when their economic security is
questioned, they are more apt to support redistribution. Support for redistribution helps
individuals absorb income shocks and keep a minimum level of income even in uncertain times.
This is supported by the significance of level of socioeconomic risk level. As level of
socioeconomic risk increases, support for redistribution also increases. This finding is further
supported in literature as even the anticipation of unemployment increases support for
redistribution (Frey & Stutzer, 2002).
Partisanship plays a large role in support for redistribution with left-party allegiance
increasing support for redistribution and right and far-right-party allegiance decreasing support
for redistribution. Again, higher levels of income and education are negatively associated with
support for redistribution while being a union member and working in the public sector are all
positively associated with support for redistribution. This finding is in line with the literature
showing support for redistribution is the best single predictor of partisan preferences (Kitschelt
& Rehm, 2004).
Support for social insurance is more mixed as labor market outsiders view some forms
(pensions). more favorably than other forms (unemployment benefits). This is likely a result of
the restructuring of many unemployment insurance schemes in the early 2000s as benefits were
tightened and restrictions added as to who could access such benefits. While many outsiders
now are able to access such benefits, how they are compensated for employment loss varies from
country to country. Increases in funding for pensions are viewed favorably by labor market
outsiders most likely for how they reallocate resources. The payout in retirement for most
pension systems is based on the annual income of the retiree and in many cases the consecutive
employment of the individual. It is possible the affirmative answer to this question had to do
with increasing funding and therefore the amount paid to outsiders as their labor market position
means they earn less throughout their work history than their insider counterparts. Insurancebased welfare states make life-time earnings dependent on a favorable entry into the labor
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market, something particularly disadvantaging individuals entering highly segmented workforces
(Chauvel & Shroder, 2014).
Level of socioeconomic risk is also a significant factor in explaining support for
pensions, but not for unemployment insurance. As socioeconomic risk increases, the likelihood
of remaining in stable employment and therefore qualifying for unemployment benefits
decreases (many countries require a certain amount of time that one has to be in a job before they
can qualify for unemployment benefits). However, in most countries pensions are paid out to
those who qualify based on age. Although the amount will significantly lower if one’s income
was low during their employment tenure. The increasing number of older individuals finding
themselves in an outsider position may also be a factor. Increases in age is also positively
associated with support for increased pension funding. While being in a semi-secure position is
positively associated with support for redistribution, it does not have an impact on support for
social insurance.
The above regressions demonstrate labor market outsiders have policy preferences that
differ from their insider counterparts. Labor market outsiders indicate job security is important
and level of socioeconomic risk increases support for job creation. Higher levels of
socioeconomic risk are associated with support for redistribution and some forms of social
insurance, but not all. What is left to understand is how these policy preferences manifest in
terms of partisanship. Is the insider/outsider divide a salient variable in explaining voter
mobilization and preferences? Table 4.6 summarizes the coefficient directions for partisan
support of the variables of interest.
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Table 4.6. Direction of Coefficients for Outsider and Partisan Support of Dependent
Variables (2015-2016)
Variable

Outsiders

Socioeconomic
Risk

JOB SECURITY

+

+

Far left

Left

Center

Right

Far
Right

+

JOB CREATION

+

+

+

-

REDISTRIBUTION

+

+

+

-

-

-

-

+

-

-

PENSIONS

+

+

UNEMPLOYMENT
BENEFITS

+

+

-

Based upon the preferences of labor market outsiders, there is no clear party they are
likely to support. Additionally, the literature is quite mixed on what parties labor market
outsiders are predicted to vote for suggesting labor market outsiders will vote for either left
parties, right parties, or parties in the far-left and far-right. This may be an indication that parties
are not specifically appealing to outsider demands, or at least tailoring their platforms around
pleasing outsiders. There may be other reasons for this, but most notably the finding that labor
market outsiders, regardless of how they are defined, are much less likely to vote than labor
market insiders. This may reduce the desire of parties to cater to outsider demands (Rovny &
Rovny, 2017).
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Table 4.7. Regression Estimates for Voter Mobilization and Partisan Support (2015-2016)
for 27 OECD Countries*
Independent
Variables

Vote

Far Left

Left

Social
Dem

Center

Right

Far Right

Outsider

-.111**
(.043)

.193**
(.091)

.099**
(.046)

.113**
(.051)

.081
(.052)

-.195***
(.045)

.053
(.123)

Semi

.000
(.050)

.006
(.129)

.119**
(.056)

.263***
(.062)

.100
(.057)

-.142***
(.053)

-.033
(.153)

Part-Time

.063
(.051)

.246***
(.098)

.002
(.053)

-.092
(.059)

-.000
(.061)

-.025
(.052)

-.268
(.150)

Unemployed

-.151**
(.062)

.076
(.129)

.207***
(.076)

.152
(.084)

-.122
(.091)

-.138
(.080)

-.179
(.211)

Self-Employed

.227***
(.067)

.041
(.138)

-.122
(.073)

-.297***
(.085)

-.048
(.075)

.102
(.063)

-.001
(.193)

Employer

.197**
(.096)

-.240
(.212)

-.343***
(.102)

-.436***
(.119)

.130
(.100)

.351***
(.080)

-.378
(.269)

Inactive

-.011
(.047)

-.036
(.095)

.114**
(.049)

.097
(.054)

.019
(.056)

-.014
(.047)

-.289**
(.127)

Public

.267***
(.033)

.282***
(.066)

.232***
(.032)

.170***
(.036)

-.016
(.037)

-.281***
(.032)

-.188**
(.087)

Union Member

.314***
(.042)

.296***
(.075)

.342***
(.038)

.422***
(.042)

-.084
(.043)

-.330***
(.037)

-.054
(.102)

Age

.311***
(.009)

-.009
(.021)

.049***
(.011)

.075***
(.012)

.000
(.012)

.038***
(.010)

-.101***
(.030)

Female

.109***
(.031)

-.420***
(.068)

.033**
(.033)

.034
(.037)

.044
(.037)

.021
(.032)

-.448***
(.090)

Partnered

.301***
(.028)

-.278***
(.058)

-.151***
(.030)

-.025
(.033)

.063
(.034)

.274***
(.029)

-.193**
(.081)

Income

.143***
(.012)

-.160***
(.026)

-.009
(.012)

-.021
(.014)

.059***
(.014)

.074***
(.012)

-.161***
(.035)

Education

.307***
(.015)

.227***
(.031)

-.061***
(.016)

-.098***
(.017)

.194***
(.019)

-.067***
(.015)

-.201***
(.044)

Adjusted R2

.132

N

35,478

.122

.078

.106

.083

.063

.189

20,794

27,178

27,178

27,178

27,178

17,516

** Significant at the .05 level, ***Significant at the .001 level, one-tailed test (standard errors in parentheses).
*Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Japan,
South Korea, Latvia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom,
United States.
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Table 4.8. Regression Estimates for Voter Mobilization and Partisan Support (2015-2016)
for 27 OECD Countries*
Independent
Variables

Vote

Far Left

Left

Social
Dem

Center

Right

Far Right

Socioeconomic
Risk

-.802***
(.150)

.850***
(.290)

.478***
(.164)

.182***
(.080)

-.306
(.195)

-.720***
(.159)

1.19***
(.449)

Part-Time

.092
(.053)

.231**
(.098)

-.009
(.053)

-.112
(.060)

.028
(.061)

-.009
(.052)

-.343**
(.150)

Unemployed

-.114
(.062)

.059
(.128)

.201***
(.075)

.141
(.083)

-.106
(.090)

-.128
(.079)

.231
(.204)

Self-Employed

.209***
(.069)

.062
(.137)

-.115
(.073)

-.292***
(.084)

-.059
(.075)

.098
(.063)

.002
(.190)

Employer

.163
(.100)

-.212
(.212)

-.338***
(.102)

-.437***
(.118)

.103
(.100)

.349***
(.080)

-.350
(.271)

Inactive

-.155***
(.055)

.105
(.109)

.174***
(.056)

.145**
(.063)

-.101
(.065)

-.079
(.053)

-.089
(.145)

Public

.287***
(.035)

.287***
(.065)

.232***
(.032)

.169***
(.036)

-.015
(.037)

-.283***
(.032)

-.197**
(.087)

Union Member

.335***
(.043)

.294***
(.075)

.342***
(.038)

.421***
(.042)

-.084**
(.043)

-.330***
(.037)

-.060
(.100)

Age

.326***
(.009)

-.012
(.020)

.049***
(.010)

.075***
(.012)

.003
(.012)

.037***
(.010)

-.098***
(.028)

Female

.187***
(.033)

-.437***
(.067)

.065
(.033)

.017
(.037)

.093**
(.038)

.028
(.032)

-.559***
(.095)

Partnered

.321***
(.029)

-.275***
(.058)

-.150***
(.030)

-.025
(.033)

.062**
(.034)

.274***
(.029)

-.193**
(.079)

Income

.145***
(.013)

-.150***
(.026)

-.005
(.012)

-.018
(.014)

.052***
(.014)

.071***
(.012)

-.153***
(.033)

Education

.316***
(.016)

.232***
(.031)

-.059***
(.016)

-.096***
(.017)

.190***
(.019)

-.069***
(.015)

-.191***
(.042)

Adjusted R2

.142

.122

.077

.105

.083

.063

.193

N

35,478

20,793

27,178

27,178

27,178

27,177

17,516

** Significant at the .05 level, ***Significant at the .001 level, one-tailed test (standard errors in parentheses).
*Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland,
Israel, Japan, South Korea, Latvia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.

Tables 4.8 and 4.9 present the results of a logistic regression model explaining
participation in voting and partisan orientation. I use data from the 2015 and 2016 ISSP survey
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to examine the partisan orientation of outsiders and include all OECD countries in the sample.
One significant impact of being a labor market outsider is an increased likelihood of voter
absenteeism. This is a significant difference between labor market outsiders and insiders as well
as those exposed to higher degrees of socioeconomic risk. This confirms the hypothesis that
labor market outsiders are more likely than labor market insiders to abstain from voting. The
reasons for this are not explicitly made clear in the data. Labor market outsiders may face more
institutional hurdles to voting. Not receiving their preferred policy goals, they may not view the
benefits of voting as outweighing the costs. Or they may be signaling their dissatisfaction with
the current state of affairs by not voting, as suggested by some scholars.
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75%

70%

65%

60%

55%
03
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Outsiders
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Semi-Secure

11

12
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Insiders

Source: ISSP
*Australia, Great Britain, Ireland, New Zealand, USA, France, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark,
Finland, Norway, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia

Figure 4.1. Labor Market Outsider, Semi-secure, and Insider Voter Turnout in 20 OECD
countries* (2003-2016)
Since 2003, the ISSP survey has asked if respondents voted in the last general election.
For the most part, on average, voter turnout for labor market outsiders has been lower than that
for labor market insiders. It should be noted that outsider absentia from voting appears to be an
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increasing trend. As labor market outsiders have diversified and grown in numbers, the number
of outsider individuals who refrain from voting has increased. This has the potential to have
ramifications for parties, especially if labor market outsiders are expressing discontent with
current systems.
In terms of partisanship, there is evidence that labor market outsiders are more likely to
support far-left parties and left parties, including Social Democratic parties, and are less likely to
support right parties. This confirms the hypothesis that labor market outsiders are more likely
than labor market insiders to vote for left parties and disproves the hypothesis that labor market
outsiders are more likely than labor market insiders to vote for right parties. It also partially
confirms the hypothesis that labor market outsiders are more likely to vote for parties at the
extreme. While the insider/outsider measurement and socioeconomic risk variables both show
outsiders prefer far-left parties, the socioeconomic risk variable alone shows that as risk level
increases, support for far-right parties is more likely. Overall, the preference seems to be geared
towards parties of the far-left rather than the far-right. However, the far-right finding for higher
levels of socioeconomic risk is important, especially as a signal that outsiders may vote for
parties at the extreme. Voters facing high levels of socioeconomic insecurity face conflicting
electoral choices in the era of deindustrialization. As the labor market segments and the
employment opportunities available to those with limited skill sets becomes increasingly
insecure, the migration to parties that promise a mitigation of risk for those in the labor market,
becomes an increasingly seductive choice.
As Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 show, across time, labor market outsiders have consistently
supported left-parties above the other party choices. However, post-Great Recession there has
been a trend towards polarization for labor market outsiders. There have been small increases in
the number of outsiders supporting either far-right or far-left parties, support for parties in the
center has vastly declined, and there is increased support for right parties. However, this may
also reflect a difference in how the ISSP survey collected data as they used party affiliation prior
to 2011 and party voting post 2011. Another way of interpreting this Figure is that outsiders who
considered themselves centrist are more likely to vote for right parties.
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Figure 4.2. Labor Market Outsider Partisan Preferences in 20 OECD countries* (1996 to
2015)
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Figure 4.3. Labor Market Insider Partisan Preferences in 20 OECD countries* (1996 to
2015)
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Comparing the partisan preferences of labor market outsiders to labor market insiders,
one sees that while labor market outsiders have traditionally supported left parties, this has not
always been the case for labor market insiders. For much of the 00s, labor market insiders
supported both left and right parties equally. However, post-recession there appears to be a trend
towards greater support of parties on the right. Both support for left and center parties have
declined for labor market insiders. There appears to be a bit of polarization occurring with labor
market insiders supporting parties on the center and right and labor market outsiders supporting
parties on the left.

Discussion
The proliferation of labor market outsiders in advanced industrialized countries poses
some significant issues in terms of the policy direction of welfare states. At their very core,
outsiders represent a group of people disadvantageously exposed to the risks of globalization and
the changing nature of work. They find themselves employed in jobs with lower pay, fewer
protections, and greater insecurity than their insider counterparts. Welfare states, designed to
protect the rights of workers with full-time, long-term jobs have found themselves ineffective in
designing policies protecting such workers from globalization, automation, and tertiarization.
While such workers had previously found themselves apathetic to the situation at hand, the postGreat Recession time period has awakened a collective fervor demanding change within the
current political system.
In many regards, the differences between labor market insiders and outsiders have
softened in the past twenty-years, however, some divisions remain. Firstly, labor market
outsiders are far more likely to view job security as a priority. For labor market insiders this is
less important. This is likely due to labor market insiders having a higher level of skills than
labor market outsiders. As a result, they have less of a need to retain jobs that provide for their
needs as they will have less difficulty procuring employment that provides the same benefits.
Non-standard workers on temporary and part-time contracts, with fewer job protections have less
efficacy in moving from one position to another. For some workers, especially low-skill
workers, finding a job that provides benefits and decent pay can be akin to winning a lottery.
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Conversely, losing such a position can be a devastating blow leading to a prioritization of job
security.
Redistribution and job creation are two priorities that labor market outsiders have waned
on in terms of their support. For better or worse, the Great Recession has fundamentally changed
the way labor markets are structured and organized. However, while belonging to the outsider
group is not a significant variable in support for these policies, level of socioeconomic risk is.
As workers belonging to demographic groups that have higher levels of part-time work and
unemployment are far more likely to support these policies. As insiders feel more and more
vulnerable within the labor market the divide between these groups’ decreases. It is important to
note that belonging to a group that was semi-secure was an important variable in explaining
policies preferences.
Social insurance also plays an interesting role in terms of outsider preferences as
pensions, across time have become more important than unemployment insurance. This is likely
because the amount of money paid out to pensioners is based on the amount of money earned
during one’s productive years. Labor market outsiders, already disadvantaged in their
employment opportunities, do not want to be similarly disadvantaged in retirement. It stands to
reason they would prefer policies that ameliorate these occupational disadvantages.
In regard to partisanship, the data show labor market outsiders are less likely to vote than
their insider counterparts. This creates some major issues that will explored in the next chapter.
Namely, as labor market outsiders become more disenfranchised, what does this mean for the
adoption of policies that benefit outsiders? I have shown that when labor market outsiders do
vote, they favor far-left and left parties and disfavor right parties. As level of socioeconomic risk
increases, individuals are more likely to preference far-right parties as well. How left parties
respond to this is expected to be an important factor in explaining why outsider-friendly policies
get adopted. However, there lies a large conundrum for the parties of the left, especially Social
Democratic parties, in terms of how much of their policy platform they should base on appeasing
a group of unreliable voters, even if this group is one that this growing in numbers.

75

Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was three-fold. Firstly, I set out to determine if labor market
outsiders and insiders have different policy preferences in regard to job security, job creation,
redistribution, and social insurance. I found that outsiders are more likely to preference job
security than insiders, but not job creation. In terms of social insurance, the type of program
matters in terms of outsider support. Pensions are more supported than unemployment insurance
and there is no difference between the groups in terms of support for redistribution. Secondly, I
wanted to examine if outsiderness has become a more salient feature in explaining preferences
over time. I found that for job security being a labor market outsider has become a more
significant variable in determining support for such policies, however for redistribution it has
become a less important variable. Finally, I aspired to look at how policy preferences
manifested in terms of voter mobilization and party support. I found that labor market outsiders
are less likely to vote. When they do, they are more likely to prefer far-left and left parties than
insiders and less likely to prefer right parties. As level of socioeconomic risk increases, so does
the likelihood of voting for far-right parties.
Labor market outsiders comprise a growing segment of the population. Those at risk of
insecure employment are increasingly feeling the compressing vice of limited job opportunities,
decreased pay, and scarce benefits. The economy that has emerged from the Great Recession is
mired in unstable employment and reactionary political alignments that could have far reaching
impacts on the welfare state, especially as the proportion of outsiders within advanced
industrialized countries continues to grow.
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CHAPTER V
LABOR PROTECTION AND REGULATION FOR NONSTANDARD WORK

The purpose of this chapter is to test if labor unions, corporatist institutions, and left
parties had an influence on the regulation and protection of non-standard work. I use a panel
error-correction model to examine the short-term and long-term effects of these variables on
employment regulation for part-time and temporary work arrangements. I find support of a
hybridization of the dynamic party competition model and partisan model in explaining
temporary employment protections and strong evidence of an impact of the European Union and
partisan affiliation of the government impacting part-time employment regulations.
The proportion of individuals employed in nonstandard work arrangements has grown
across the advanced industrialized world putting pressure on governments to address the decent
work deficits between those in standard employment and those in nonstandard work.
Nonstandard work carries with it many penalties including lower pay, lack of social protections,
and reduced opportunities for advancement. As nonstandard work becomes more ubiquitous,
there has been an increased demand to address the inequality perpetuated by such working
arrangements. The response of states in addressing this issue has been, at best, mixed. Forces
such as globalization and deindustrialization make it difficult for countries to strengthen their
labor policies. Lack of social cohesion, especially labor market insider/outsider divides, make
many of the preferred policy goals unclear. In an era of insecurity, states face dwindling options
for resolving such divisions.
Labor markets and employment relationships operate within economic, political, and
ideological contexts that are country specific and vary across nations. These contexts reflect
various historical and socio-political institutions which regulate the interaction between the
family, state, and market (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The intervention of governments in the labor
market occur for a variety of reasons. Employment regulation is often implemented to alleviate
discrimination of workers belonging to groups with little power, decrease inadequate information
between workers and employers including health and safety hazards, and provide insurance
against risks such as unemployment, disability, and old age. Additionally, the nature of
employment protection is quite similar across countries requiring the termination of individual
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employees to be motivated and that workers are given reasonable notice of their firing or
financial compensation in lieu of notification.
Labor regulations are established to protect the interests of workers and ensure a
minimum standard of living for the individuals within a country. Freeman & Rogers (1993).
argue there are two primary approaches to viewing labor market regulation. The institutionalist
approach views labor market regulation as providing important social protection for workers
through training and job security. In this conceptualization, employment protection is designed
to protect workers from unfair behavior, counter economic shocks, and preserve firm-specific
human capital. The distortionist approach underscores how labor market regulation impedes
adjustments to economic shocks, discourages the hiring of standard workers, and favors insiders
at the detriment of outsiders by providing better job protections for already existing positions. In
this viewpoint, the rules governing employment regulation and protection can interfere with the
ability of firms to adjust to overall economic conditions creating adverse consequences for
employers. In this vein, relaxing employment regulation and protection legislation is often
suggested as a policy for reducing joblessness.
Over the past few years, many labor market reforms have been targeted at reducing the
gap in employment regulation and protection between standard and nonstandard work. While
some reforms were directed at reducing the restrictions on firing individuals employed in
standard work, most reforms were directed at easing the restrictions on the use of temporary
contracts. These reforms served to maintain regulations and protections for those in permanent
jobs, while creating the incentive for firms to create temporary, less regulated, jobs. In the 1990s
nine OECD countries deregulated employment protection for temporary workers. Only three
relaxed protections for permanent contracts. In the 2000s eight countries eased protections on
temporary contracts and four countries eased protections on permanent contracts. Only five
strengthened protection for temporary contracts (Martin & Scarpetta, 2010).
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Figure 5.1. Change in Employment Protection Full-time and Temporary Contracts (1996
to 2015)

The literature suggests there are several possible reasons why countries have responded
differently to labor market reforms. Firstly, Social Democratic8 parties are expected to be
important in the passage of labor friendly reforms. Traditionally, Social Democratic parties have
shared close ties to social movements and unions. Power resources theory shows these ties are
important variables in leading to larger, more generous welfare states (Korpi, 1989, Huber,
Ragin, and Stephens 1993; Hicks 1999; Huber & Stephens, 2001). Yet, while Social Democratic
parties are an important component to understanding the development of the welfare state, their
place in preserving the welfare state in an era of deindustrialization, globalization, and
tertiarization has been called into question (Green-Pedersen, 2002, Ward, 2015, Clements, 2017).
While Social Democratic parties may have once been able to push for broad, blanket labor

8

For this dissertation, I use the Social Democratic Party coding from the Comparative Manifesto project to identify
Social Democratic parties. While numerous scholars have identified different criteria for defining Social
Democratic parties, the Comparative Manifesto groups Social Democratic and Labor parties together.
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reforms, today, they are far more constrained and must make difficult political choices in policies
they promote.
The willingness of Social Democratic parties to support employment protection and
regulation for NSWA is predicted to be based on two factors, the composition of Social
Democratic parties and the policy space in which they operate. The insider-outsider model
argues that labor itself is not a homogenous group, rather it is divided into labor market insiders,
individuals employed in positions that are protected by various job-preserving measures and
outsiders, those that lack those protections. Regarding employment protection and regulation for
NSWA, whether Social Democratic parties are insider-dominated or outsider-dominated is
expected to impact the policies they promote. Rueda (2005, 2006) argues that Social Democratic
parties are expected to consider labor market insiders their core constituency and will implement
policies to benefit insiders at the expense of outsiders. However, as the traditional electoral
constituencies that supported the Social Democratic parties have broken down, especially with
the decline of manufacturing employment, left parties have been forced to expand their
constituencies. Some expansion has occurred among the educated middle-classes (Kitschelt,
1994). While other expansion has occurred among lower-income groups who are less likely to
be labor market insiders (Cusack et al., 2008; Rehm, 2009, Giger, Rosset, & Bernauer, 2012).
The previous chapter of this dissertation showed an alignment with labor market outsiders and
left parties. The partisan constituency model argues that political parties will work towards
promoting the policy preferences of their core constituencies. If this model holds true, then the
composition of Social Democratic parties in terms of labor market insiders and outsiders matters
when examining the strength of employment protection and regulation for nonstandard work.
However, the behavior of parties does not occur in a vacuum, the dynamic party
competition model argues the ability of political parties to shape their policies is mediated by the
type of competition they face. The literature shows that when Social Democratic parties face
competition on the left, they are more likely to support labor regulations (Lunz, 2013). Who
regulations benefit is expected to be based on the composition for the Social Democratic party.
Additionally, the degree of ideological distance is expected to be a salient variable in terms of
how far a Social Democratic party is pressured to pivot towards more leftist or liberal policy, one
that is likely to support protection for NSWA. Greater ideological distance between Social
Democratic Parties and other left parties is expected to be associated with higher levels of
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employment regulation and protection for NSWA, but only when Social Democratic Parties are
outsider dominated (H8). However, when Social Democratic Parties are insider dominated, the
employment protection and regulation for NSWA is expected to be lower (H9). However, when
facing center and right challengers, Social Democratic parties are at a smaller risk from defection
and can shift their policies to the right (Schumacher et al., 2013). In this case, the composition of
the party is less likely to matter. Social Democratic parties have been shown to institute reforms
at opposition with their base when they are less likely to be blamed for unpopular policy changes
(Ross, 2000). In some cases, with lack of political competition from the left, Social Democratic
parties have been more successful than right parties at cutting back entitlements (GreenPedersen, 2001). In this case, it is expected that ideological distance between Social Democratic
and center parties will lead to less employment regulation and protection for NSWA (H10).
Ideological distance between right parties is equally expected to reduce NSWA protection and
regulation (H11).
Another factor that is likely to have an influence on the strength of protection and
regulation for NSWA are political and welfare state institutions. Institutions act as constraints on
the decisions individual actors can make. Ljiphart (1984) finds consensus democracies are more
likely to be generous welfare states because their institutional framework allows for a more
accurate and inclusive representation of minority interests, something that is beneficial for labor
market outsiders. Skocpol (1992) supports this, finding both the rules of electoral competition
and the institutional features of government determine the policy outcomes of the welfare state.
Consensual decision-making institutions also help to incorporate a wider range of interests in the
policy making process. Corporatist institutions are expected to play a role in NSWA regulation
as the ability of actors to shape policy outcomes is mediated by the institutionalized bargaining
structures between labor, business, and bureaucrats (Hicks, 1999). Corporatist institutions may
work in two ways, firstly they may play an important role in mediating the power of different
political actors leading to greater levels of employment protection and regulation for NSWA
(H12). Or, as Rueda (2007) suggests, they may be coopted by insider protecting unions leading
to lower rates of protection and regulation for NSWA (H13). For this reason, the make-up of
unions is expected to impact how corporatism influences NSWA protection (H14). When
outsiders comprise a large proportion of unions, protections for NSWA is expected to be high
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(H15). When insiders comprise a large proportion of unions, employment regulation and
protection for NSWA is expected to be weaker (H16).

Methodology
I test if homogeneity of SD parties, party competition, corporatism/cooperative
institutions, and labor unions are important variables in determining the strength of regulation
and protection for NSWA. I use the 34 OECD countries as the initial starting point for the study,
however, because of data availability only 21 countries9 are part of the final analysis. These
countries were selected because advanced industrialized countries have a greater scope of
NSWA and therefore policy governing it. Among the OECD countries, there is substantial
variation in the regulation and protection of NSWA. I use the time-period between 1996 and
2015 for the study. 1996 is used as the base year and 2015 is chosen as an endpoint because of
data availability.
Like many datasets in comparative political economy, my dataset is hampered by the few
cases, many variables problem. This creates several issues that must be addressed in determining
the model and type of analysis to be conducted. In comparative political economy, the analysis
of time-series cross-section data (TSCS) are highly susceptible to the type of model used. TSCS
data have repeated observations on fixed units (in this case countries) and time period’s that
range from 20 to 50 years (Beck & Katz, 1995). Misspecification of the model may lead the
researcher to erroneous conclusions. Therefore, great care must be taken in determining model
selection (Beck, 2006).
The first issues to remedy in my data are those of autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, and
cross sectional dependence, all of which are present. Autocorrelation occurs when there is
observed correlation between the error terms across observations in the model. When present,
autocorrelation violates the assumptions of the OLS model and effects the efficiency of the
standard errors. Autocorrelation is a common issue in TSCS as both the time series and
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Australia, Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Japan,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom,
United States
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geographic units have the potential to be related. Heteroskedasticity occurs when the variance of
the error term is not constant across observations. This again violates the assumptions of OLS
and leads to biased OLS estimators. Again, heteroskedasticity is very common in TSCS data,
especially when country-level observations are used.
To resolve the issue of autocorrelation, I follow the frame-work set up by Beck and Katz
(1995) to introduce a lagged dependent variable to my regression (DVt-1). However, simply
introducing a lagged dependent variable to my model does not work to solve the issue of
autocorrelation meaning I must resolve this issue another way. Autocorrelation with a lagged
dependent variable leads to a situation where the OLS estimators are not consistent (Greene,
2000). Additionally, adding a lagged dependent variable with autocorrelation and country
dummies at the same time leads to endogeneity in the model (Nickell, 1981).
One reason this autocorrelation may exist is because of stationarity in the model. To test
for this, I use the Fisher-type unit-root test to determine if my dependent variables have a unit
root, or if they are stationary. I use the Fisher-type test over other unit root tests because the
assumptions made in the test best fit my data, namely that I have a fixed number of units (N)
while the time dimension of my data (T) trends towards infinity. The Fisher-type unit-root test
shows my dependent variables have a unit root and are not stationary. According to the
literature, utilizing an error correction model will work well in this situation because it can
estimate non-stationary data and correct for autocorrelation (Beck, 1991, Iversen & Cusack,
2000, DeBouef & Keele, 2008). The error correction model (ECM) assumes the dependent and
independent variables are in a long-run equilibrium, but there are also short-term or temporary
effects impacting the dependent variable. Theoretically, this works well for my data as the
previous chapters have demonstrated that shocks (such as the Great Recession) have had impacts
on how countries structure their labor markets. Additionally, the literature is unclear as to when
the variables of interest may impact the policy process, the error correction model allows me to
test these relationships by estimating the short-run impacts on the dependent variable, as well as
their long-term impacts.
The general version of the error-correction model looks like this (Segura-Ubiergo, 2007):
∆𝑌𝑖, 𝑡 = 𝐷𝛼 + 𝑌𝑖, 𝑡 − 1∙ Φ +∆X𝑖, 𝑡 − 1 ∙ 𝛽𝑘 + 𝑋𝑖, 𝑡 − 1 ∙ 𝛽𝑗 + 𝑇𝜆 + 𝜀𝑖, 𝑡
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Where D represents a vector of country dummies (fixed effects) and T represents a vector
of time effects. The dependent variable is measured as the first-difference and the independent
variables are measured as the lagged-level of each independent variable, as well as yearly
changes (∆). The benefit of this model over the more familiar Beck and Katz (1995) model is
that it allows for an uninflated r-squared as the lagged dependent variable does not overestimate
the total amount of variance explained in the model. The ECM overcomes the issue of
autocorrelation because it includes the dynamics directly in the model. This, in turn works to
correct for endogeneity because it controls for autocorrelation and introduces lags for the slow
moving dependent variables. Theoretically, the ECM also provides several benefits because the
literature is extremely mixed on the impact of the variables of interest. Using the ECM allows
me to see if changes in NSWA policy result from short-term or long-term trends. This allows for
a very nuanced empirical story and the ability to determine at which point in the policy process
the casual variables are influencing changes in NSWA policy.
Interpreting the error-correction model is a bit different than the interpretation of a
stationary OLS model. The first-difference estimates measure the short-term changes in the
variable and the levels estimates measure the long-term changes of the variable. For example,
change in Left-government from year to year would be measured by the first-differences while
the overall impact of Left-government in power over the time-period would be captured by the
levels estimate. In this sense, the interpretation has less to do with the strength of the Leftgovernment and more to do with the presence and change in its power. An increase in the
strength of the left government is assumed to be associated with an increase in NSWA regulation
and protection, the absolute power of the left-party is not factored into the analysis. A
significant coefficient for the differences measurement indicates that the variable impacts NSWA
policy in the short-run. A significant coefficient for the levels measurement indicates the
variable impacts NSWA policy in the long-term.
While use of the error correction model works to address the issues of autocorrelation and
unit roots, I still must address the issues of heteroskedasticity and cross sectional dependence.
Because I have corrected for autocorrelation in my model, to correct for heteroskedasticity, I
follow Beck and Katz (1995) and use panel corrected standard errors (PSCE). PCSE is shown to
produce accurate standard errors in the presence of heteroskedasticity. I additionally test my
data for cross-sectional dependence using the Pasaran CD (cross-sectional dependence) test.
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While there is initially cross-sectional dependence found in the model, the use of PCSE also
works to correct for this bias in the estimation. For data that are heteroskedastic, cross
sectionally dependent, and autocorrelated, the PCSE model is the correct estimator to address
these issues in the data (Hoechle, 2007).

Dependent Variables
For the dependent variables, I use employment protection and regulation for part-time
and temporary employment as proxies for NSWA policy. I choose these because they have
definitions that can be standardized across OECD countries and have the most systematic and
complete information that are collected on them by national governments. To measure
employment regulation and protection I have created an index of employment regulation for both
part-time and temporary work by content coding pertinent legislation on part-time and temporary
work regulations and protections. I follow the same index creation procedure used by the OECD
in the design of their Employment Protection Index wherein each of the inputs is expressed in
either unit of time (e.g. number of hours needed before eligible for maternity leave), or as a
score on an ordinal scale specific to each item (0, 1, 2, 3 or yes/no). To begin, I coded the firstlevel measures. Next, I converted the measures into cardinal scores normalized from 0 to 6 with
higher scores representing more regulation. Both indexes are restricted to language and
permissions contained within the legislation. Data was accessed from two ILO databases. The
TRAVAIL legal database contained information pertinent to part-time work and EPlex contained
information pertinent to protections for temporary workers (For detailed coding scheme, see
APPENDIX C).

Independent Variables
To measure left-party competition, I use data from the Comparative Manifesto Project
(CMP). The CMP uses content analysis of electoral manifestos to derive party positions on a
variety of topics ranging from attitudes on foreign relations to civic mindedness to agriculture.
To operationalize competition between Social Democratic parties and competitors, I measure the
ideological difference between the dominant Social Democratic party (SD) (measured by total
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votes in the preceding election) and the next largest (as measured by total votes in the preceding
election) competing left, center, and right party. To remain consistent with the data from the
ISSP surveys, I use the expert-coding of each party from the surveys to place parties within the
ideological spectrum from left to right i.e. determine if they are left, center, or right competitor.
However, the ISSP survey does not explicitly code for Social Democratic parties, therefore, to
determine if a party is considered Social Democratic, I use the party groupings provided by the
CMP (please see APPENDIX D).
As the economy has dramatically changed over the past 25 years, SD parties have
presided over deregulation, privatization, and retrenchment of the welfare state. Unable to fully
halt the charge of economic change, SD parties have, at best, blunted the full force of reform. As
the literature suggests, the ability of parties to do so is predicated on party competition. From
where this party competition comes, is expected to be important in explaining the policies SD
parties support. Following Kitschelt’s (1994) seminal work on the European Social Democracy,
I elect to measure party competition both on the economic issues (left-right) and cultural issues
(libertarian-authoritarian10) measures. The left-right alignment of parties corresponds to the
traditional debate among parties with those on the left arguing for greater governmental
regulation and mechanisms for redistribution and those on the right advocating for a more
laissez-faire economy with minimal governmental intervention. Yet, with the transformation of
the political landscape and waning of class politics, this political cleavage is not sufficient for
fully explaining party competition (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987; Kriesi 1989; Flanagan and Lee
2003).
Scholars have found globalization and the integration of markets has constrained the
ability of parties to differentiate themselves from each other in terms of economic policy
(Hellwig & Samuels, 2007; Steiner, 2010, Ward et al., 2015) and regulatory policy (Ganghof,
2006; Plumper, Troeger, & Winner, 2009, Wilson & Wildasin, 2004). As a result, this leads to
convergence in the adoption of neoliberal positions to remain competitive within the global
economy (Adams et al., 2009; Burgoon et al. 2017; Haupt, 2010). Because of this, cultural
divisions among the alternative/traditional alignment have become a more salient division among
the parties. The alternative pole finds parties emphasizing progressive issues, tolerance, and
10

While Kitschelt (1994) uses the terms libertarian and authoritarian to describe the cultural policy dimension, I
elect to use the terms alternative and traditional to remove jargon from my dissertation.
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personal autonomy. Traditional parties are more likely to endorse conservative values and
protectionist viewpoints.
Competition on both axes are important to measure because they underpin the logic by
which parties view labor regulation. The economic dimension determines to what extent a party
prefers governmental regulation of the labor market i.e. the strength of regulation. The culturalvalue dimension defines to whom this regulation should be endowed i.e. the scope of the
regulation. The dynamic party competition model argues that unless SD parties face competition
from the left and/or liberal parties, they are less likely to advocate for labor market reforms that
go beyond their core demographic. Being ideologically further away from center and right
parties is likely to lead to lower levels of regulation as Social Democratic parties can pivot
towards the right with little consequence.
To measure where each party falls on the left/right, alternative/traditional dimension, I
utilize the construction of the Economic Left/Right and alternative/traditional scale derived by
McDonald & Mendes (2001). One issue that arises with left/right coding is a lack of consensus
on what variables should be included to determine a party’s policy position. To create
ideologically different categories, McDonald & Mendes use factor analysis to derive which
categories belong in the different dimensions. In doing so, they develop scales in which there are
two distinct dimensions and no overlap between the CMP variables used (See APPENDIX D for
coding). Next, I calculate where each party is located in the multidimensional party space using
the election preceding the time period of interest, so for the United States in the 2011 timeperiod, I use the party platforms from the 2008 election.
As an example of how ideological distance is calculated, compare the German election results
from 2009:
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Source: Comparative Manifesto Project

Figure 5.2. Ideological position of German Parties (2009)
Based on the election results, there was both a left (Alliance ’90), center (Free
Democratic Party), and right (Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union). competitor
to the Social Democratic Party of Germany. To calculate the ideological distance of each, I first
compute the left/right and alternative/traditional score based on the variables in the manifesto
project. The Social Democrats have an economic left/right score of -29.61 and a cultural value
alternative/traditional score of -1.22 meaning they are solidly to the left in terms of their
economic leanings and slightly lean towards traditional values. The CDU/CSU right competitor
has an economic left/right score of -.01 and a cultural values alternative/traditional score of -.17
meaning they do not significantly lean towards the left or right regarding economic issues but do
lean towards traditional values. To compute the ideological difference between each party, I
subtract the alternative/traditional score of the right party competitor from the Social Democratic
party (-8.17-(-1.22)). and get an ideological difference score of -6.95. I interpret this to mean
the right party competitor leans 6.95 points more towards traditional values than the Social
Democratic party. I perform the same calculation for economic dimension to reach a score of
29.5. I interpret this score to mean the CDU/CSU party leans 29.5 points more to the right on
economic issues than the Social Democratic Party.
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One of the challenges with this operationalization is how to account for states in which
there is no left-party. For example, the United States is a two-party system in which the
Democrats occupy the Center and the Republicans occupy the Right. The manifesto project only
codes parties that have won seats in the legislature making challenges from Green candidates, for
example, something that is not included in the data. To account for this, I code any election
cycle in which there is no challenger as a 0. Coding a missing party as missing in the data
removes almost half of my observations and biases the sample to only states that have multiparty systems. The logic behind using 0 is that if there is no challenger, there is also an absence
of ideological difference. Essentially, there is no divide and no alternative for individuals to vote
for. Since they are absent, they are considered to not be a threat to the Social Democratic party.
Since they do not occupy the party space, they then cannot have an ideological divide between
themselves and the Social Democratic party. If there is no ideological divide, they occupy the
same space on the ideological spectrum and are therefore assigned as score of 0, there is no
ideological challenge to the Social Democratic party.
The literature also suggests the make-up of Social Democratic parties’ matter, but only
when there is a left challenger. To operationalize the make-up of the SD party, I use data from
the ISSP and my insider/outsider operationalization from Chapter 03 to calculate the ratio11 of
labor market insiders to outsiders and the semi-secure in Social Democratic parties. From 1996
to 2010, this percentage ratio to party affiliation. From 2011 onwards, this ratio refers to which
party an individual indicated they voted for in the survey. A higher ratio indicates the party is
more insider dominated.
To measure labor union density, I use union membership as a percentage of employed
wage and salary earners taken from the OECD (Brady, Huber & Stephens, 2014). In order to
measure labor union composition, I again calculate the ratio of labor market insiders to outsiders
and semi-secure in labor unions. A higher ratio indicates the labor union is more insider
dominated. I additionally control for union member partisanship, which I operationalize as the
percentage of union members in left, center, and right parties. Rueda (2006) suggests that the
close ties between Social Democratic parties and unions leads to worse outcomes for labor
market outsiders. Controlling for union partisanship helps to explore this linkage and determine

11

Using the percentage of insiders as opposed to the ratio of insiders to outsiders yields similar results.
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of this is an additional avenue for unions to influence NSWA reform. Additionally, Rueda
(2007) finds that the insider-outsider divide is exacerbated by the overall level of protections for
standard work, I additionally control for employment protections for standard workers in the
models taken from the OECD Indicators of Employment Protection Database.
In operationalizing corporatism, there are two primary meanings from which to choose.
Schmitter (1979) argues that corporatism represents a system of interest representation, in this
case the ability of labor market insiders and outsiders to have a voice in policy-making. The
other usage of corporatism refers to the institutions of policy formation that work to shape the
economy (Lehmbruch, 2003). While many scholars have cited the underlying importance of
corporatism, few have given it a comprehensive definition (Siaroff, 1999). Ideally, I would be
able to use the same measure of corporatism that Rueda (2008) uses, the Martin and Swank
(2004) cross-national index of employer organization. However, this database has not been
updated since 2004 and using it would require me to remove a significant number of
observations from my study to end at that time period. Instead, I must interpret the literature to
determine appropriate measures of corporatism. Because I am looking at the institutional
environment of labor policy reform and the ability of outsiders to enact policy reform that is
favorable to them, I must include measures of corporatism that encapsulate interest
representation. Because the literature suggests unions are the primary proponents of labor
market reform and the actors using corporatist institutions in order to influence policy, I
operationalize corporatism by using the measures of coordination of wage-setting and
government intervention (a measure that indicates the degree of Tripartite organization) taken
from the Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State
Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS). The coordination measure provides a categorical
variable measuring to what degree firms, unions, and the state work together to set wages. And
the government intervention variable provides a measure of how involved the state is in setting
wages. High levels of wage coordination are expected to lead to higher levels of protection for
union members which may harm outsiders if they are not represented in unions. Higher levels
of governmental intervention are expected to foster cooperation among interest groups which, if
labor market outsiders are well represented in unions, may serve to their benefit by increasing
regulations on NSWA.
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The institutions of policy formation may also be important to understanding how NSWA
is regulated. This is because consensus institutions help to foster collaboration in the policy
process, something that could be advantageous for outsiders in having their interests met.
Additionally, I also employ a measure of the Executive-parties dimension from Ljiphart (1994).
The Executive-parties dimension measures how easily a single party may take control of the
government. It is the dimension that serves as measure of coordination and cooperation needed
to enact policy. Political institutions are important because they shape the bargaining power of
rival groups and help to foster complimentary industrial regimes. The more a country leans
towards consensus democracy, the more likely I expect there to be higher levels of regulation for
NSWA.
Additionally, I add a variable measuring the political ideology of the government on the
left-right economic dimension and alternative/traditional cultural dimension. I calculate this by
measuring each parties’ location on these dimensions according to the data from the
Comparative Manifesto Project and then weighting the party orientation by the number of seats
each party has in the government. I include this measure because the overall orientation of the
government has been shown to be an important determinant of labor market policy, not simply
the party in power (Hieda, 2013). Additionally, the willingness of parties to form policy within
corporatist institutions is not simply a reflection of the type of party they are, but also where their
policy preferences fall. Regini (2001), shows social pacts are based on the will of those
involved, simply having a left party in power is no guarantee social pacts will be adhered to. In
the institutional competition model, I control for left party in power operationalized as the share
of seats in parliament won by left parties in the most recent government as a percentage of seats
needed for a parliamentary majority (Brady, Huber & Stephens, 2014).
I also control for EU membership, which I measure as a binary variable. In the late 90s
the EU required member countries to institute reforms to improve the quality of life for part-time
and temporary workers, so its inclusion is important. I also control for globalization which I
operationalize as level of trade openness and use the total exports and imports of goods and
services as a percentage of GDP (Iversen & Cusack, 2000). Deindustrialization is
operationalized as service-sector employment relative to overall employment (Iversen & Cusack,
2000). Unemployment rate, GDP growth, and immigration rate are also controlled for. All
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models were also run with dummy variables to control for country level and time effects. The
results of country-level and time dummies are not reported.

Results
Table 5.1. Regression Estimates for Part-time protection and regulation – Partisan Model
Independent Variables

Model 1
DV=∆Part-time
Employment
Protection

Model 2
DV=∆Part-time
Employment
Protection

Model 3
DV=∆ Part-time
Employment
Protection

-0.287*** (.040)

-0.346*** (.040)

-0.346*** (.041)

∆Insiders SD Parties

-0.029 (.073)

0.0109 (.069)

0.0186 (.087)

Insiders SD Parties (t-1)

-0.010 (.101)

0.0624 (.100)

0.0311 (.118)

∆Insiders Center Parties

-0.062 (.043)

-0.083 (.043)

-0.079 (.043)

Insiders Center Parties (t-1)

-0.042 (.050)

-0.060 (.052)

-0.059 (.052)

∆Insiders Right Parties

-0.038 (.049)

-0.041 (.048)

-0.047 (.049)

Insiders Right Parties (t-1)

-0.044 (.058)

-0.046 (.060)

-0.054 (.060)

∆Median Voter

--

-0.000 (.006)

-0.001 (.006)

Median Voter (t-1)

--

-0.006 (.004)

-0.005 (.004)

Ideological. Distance Economic
Dimension
∆SD & Left Competitor (LC)

--

-0.001 (.003)

0.0005 (.006)

SD & Left Competitor (LC) (t-1)

--

-0.010 (.003)

-0.002 (.007)

∆SD & Center Competitor (CC)

--

-0.000 (.003)

0.0000 (.003)

SD & Center Competitor (CC) (t-1)

---

0.0029 (.002)

0.0025 (.002)

∆SD & Right Competitor (RC)

--

0.0055 (.003)

0.0051 (.003)

SD & Right Competitor (RC) (t-1)

--

0.0048 (.002)

0.0048 (.002)

∆Median Voter

--

0.0314 (.012)

0.0299** (.012)

Median Voter (t-1)

--

0.0106 (.008)

0.0090 (.008)

Employment Protection(t-1)
Partisan Variables

Ideological. Dimension Economic

Ideological. Dimension Cultural

92

Table 5.1. - continued
Ideological. Distance Cultural
Dimension
∆SD & Left Competitor

--

0.0028 (.006)

0.0092 (.014)

SD & Left Competitor (t-1)

--

0.0166 (.004)

0.0237 (.018)

∆SD & Center Competitor

--

0.0040 (.008)

0.0041 (.008)

SD & Center Competitor (t-1).

--

0.0053 (.005)

0.0049 (.005)

∆SD & Right Competitor

--

-0.005 (.006)

-0.007 (.007)

SD & Right Competitor (t-1).

--

-0.000 (.005)

-0.002 (.005)

--

--

Interaction Terms
∆Insiders SD * Ideological
Distance SD/ LC Economic
Insiders SD * Ideological Distance
SD/ LC Economic (t-1).
∆Insiders * Ideological Distance
SD/ LC Cultural
Insiders * Ideological Distance SD/
LC Cultural (t-1).
Control Variables

-0.001 (.005)
--

--0.007 (.005)

--

--

--

--

-0.006 (.013)
-0.006 (.016)

∆EU Membership

0.7071*** (.239)

0.7299*** (.227)

0.7576*** (.228)

EU Membership (t-1).

0.5507*** (.207)

0.6920*** (.212)

0.7139*** (.214)

∆Deindustrialization

0.0101 (.079)

-0.044 (.076)

-0.050 (.076)

Deindustrialization (t-1).

-0.011 (.031)

0.0017 (.033)

0.0069 (.034)

∆Globalization

-0.007 (.006)

-0.008 (.006)

-0.009 (.006)

Globalization (t-1).

-0.005 (.004)

-0.005 (.004)

-0.006 (.004)

∆GDP Growth

-0.021 (.017)

-0.025 (.016)

-0.027 (.016)

GDP Growth (t-1).

-0.020 (.021)

-0.020 (.021)

-0.025 (.021)

∆Immigration Rate

0.0701 (.172)

0.0054 (.164)

0.0102 (.164)

Immigration Rate (t-1).

-0.000 (.117)

0.1802 (.119)

0.1684 (.119)

∆Unemployment Rate

-0.076** (.033)

-0.066 (.032)

-0.071** (.032)

N=

-0.003 (.014)
243

-0.001 (.014)
241

-0.005 (.015)
241

R2

.35

.45

.45

Unemployment Rate (t-1).
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Table 5.2. Regression Estimates for Temporary Employment protection and regulation –
Partisan Model
Independent Variables

Model 4
DV=∆Temp
Employment
Protection

Model 5
DV=∆Temp
Employment
Protection

Model 6
DV=∆Temp
Employment
Protection

-0.571*** (.046)

-0.586*** (.047)

-0.577 (.046)

∆Insiders SD Parties

0.0699 (.040)

0.0748 (.040)

0.0655 (.048)

Insiders SD Parties (t-1)

0.0731 (.056)

0.0924 (.058)

0.1730*** (.066)

∆Insiders Center Parties

-0.027 (.023)

-0.023 (.025)

-0.017 (.024)

Insiders Center Parties (t-1)

0.0092 (.027)

0.0065 (.029)

0.0080 (.029)

∆Insiders Right Parties

-0.008 (.027)

-0.012 (.027)

-0.035 (.027)

Insiders Right Parties (t-1)

-0.011 (.032)

-0.000 (.034)

-0.020 (.034)

∆Median Voter

--

0.0053 (.003)

0.0054 (.003)

Median Voter (t-1)

--

0.0049 (.002)

0.0064** (.002)

Ideological. Distance Economic
Dimension
∆SD & Left Competitor (LC)

--

0.0005 (.002)

0.0011 (.003)

SD & Left Competitor (LC) (t-1)

--

-0.001 (.001)

0.0021 (.003)

∆SD & Center Competitor (CC)

--

0.0001 (.001)

0.0009 (.001)

SD & Center Competitor (CC) (t-1)

---

-0.000 (.001)

-0.000 (.001)

∆SD & Right Competitor (RC)

--

0.0009 (.001)

0.0010 (.001)

SD & Right Competitor (RC) (t-1)

--

0.0042*** (.001)

0.0047*** (.001)

∆Median Voter

--

0.0021 (.007)

0.0032 (.007)

Median Voter (t-1)

--

0.0102** (.004)

0.0079 (.004)

Ideological. Distance Cultural
Dimension
∆SD & Left Competitor

--

-0.000 (.003)

0.0025 (.008)

SD & Left Competitor (t-1)

--

0.0036 (.002)

0.0343*** (.009)

∆SD & Center Competitor

--

0.0002 (.004)

0.0028 (.004)

SD & Center Competitor (t-1)

--

-0.000 (.003)

0.0006 (.003)

Employment Protection(t-1)
Partisan Variables

Ideological. Dimension Economic

Ideological. Dimension Cultural
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Table 5.2. - continued
∆SD & Right Competitor

--

-0.000 (.003)

-0.004 (.004)

SD & Right Competitor (t-1)

--

-0.002 (.002)

-0.006** (.003)

--

--

--

--

Interaction Terms
∆Insiders SD * Ideological
Distance SD/ LC Economic
Insiders SD * Ideological Distance
SD/ LC Economic (t-1)
∆Insiders * Ideological Distance
SD/ LC Cultural
Insiders * Ideological Distance SD/
LC Cultural (t-1)
Control Variables

-0.000 (.003)
-0.002 (.003)
--

--0.003 (.007)

--

--0.028** (.009)

∆EU Membership

0.0012 (.133)

-0.060 (.132)

0.0086 (.129)

EU Membership (t-1)

-0.127 (.114)

-0.199 (.120)

-0.130 (.117)

∆Deindustrialization

0.0506 (.044)

0.0808 (.044)

0.0723 (.042)

0.1509*** (.020)

0.1603*** (.022)

0.1666*** (.021)

∆Globalization

-0.000 (.003)

-0.001 (.003)

-0.004 (.003)

Globalization (t-1)

0.0041 (.002)

0.0065 (.002)

0.0045 (.002)

Deindustrialization (t-1)

∆GDP Growth

0.0189** (.009)

0.0159 (.009)

0.0133 (.009)

GDP Growth (t-1)

0.0140 (.012)

0.0125 (.012)

0.0118 (.012)

∆Immigration Rate

0.1336 (.095)

0.1007 (.095)

0.1345 (.092)

Immigration Rate (t-1)

0.0689 (.068)

0.1223 (.073)

0.0977 (.071)

∆Unemployment Rate

0.0005 (.018)

0.0010 (.018)

-0.004 (.018)

N=

-0.017** (.007)
243

-0.011 (.008)
241

-0.014 (.008)
241

R2

.55

.58

.62

Unemployment Rate (t-1)

Partisan and Dynamic Party Competition Models
Table 4.1 and 4.2 show the results of Models 1-6 testing the hypotheses that ideological
distance between Social Democratic Parties and other left parties will be associated with higher
levels of employment regulation and protection for NSWA when Social Democratic Parties are
outsider dominated and lower levels of employment regulation and protection for NSWA when
Social Democratic Parties are insider dominated. It additionally tests the hypotheses that
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ideological distance between Social Democratic parties and center and right parties will be
associated with lower levels of employment regulation and protection for NSWA.
Having a left competitor in the prior election cycle that embraces more alternative
cultural values than the Social Democratic party and a greater number of labor market insiders in
the Social Democratic party is associated with higher levels of employment protection for
temporary work. However, in combination, an ideologically distant alternative-left competitor
and an insider dominated Social Democratic party, lead to less favorable temporary employment
protections. This interaction effect is likely a reaction to Social Democratic parties being
unwilling to pivot too far away from their base. This supports the hypothesis the dynamic party
competition model and partisan competition model combine to impact regulation of temporary
work arrangements. Although, this model does not explain increases in part-time employment
regulation.
Additionally, a less traditional right party competitor on the alternative/traditional
dimension in the long-run, leads to decreases for temporary employment regulation while more
rightward oriented right parties on the economic dimension lead to increases in temporary
employment protection. This suggests that when Social Democratic parties and right parties are
closer together ideologically on the cultural dimension, there are weaker protections for NSWA.
However, when they are further apart on the economic dimension there are stronger protections
for NSWA. The mechanism for why this occurs is not clearly spelled out in the data and
warrants further examination, although it is possible that the hypothesis needs refinement as to
the source of the ideological distance between parties. Combined with the findings regarding
left-party competition, there is evidence that when it comes to temporary employment regulation,
SD parties engage more in a vote-seeking strategy, protecting their base of insiders at the
expense of outsiders.
For part-time protections, the dynamic party competition model does not provide a good
explanation for part-time employment protections. Median voter is significant in the third
model, indicating that the less traditional the orientation of the median voter, the higher
regulation for part-time employment will be. A higher unemployment rate is found to reduce
part-time employment protections. But perhaps the most significant variable is EU membership
which exerts a large influence on the protections and regulations for part-time work.
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Table 5.3. Regression Estimates for part-time regulation and protection – Corporatist
Model
Independent Variables

Model 7
DV=∆Part-Time
Employment
Protection

Model 8
DV=∆Part-Time
Employment
Protection

Model 9
DV=∆Part-Time
Employment
Protection

∆Employment Protection

-0.237*** (.036)

-0.248*** (.045)

-0.312*** (.046)

Union Variables
∆Union Density

-0.015 (.030)

-0.017 (.033)

0.0067 (.038)

Union Density (t-1)

0.0139 (.011)

0.0120 (.012)

0.0272** (.013)

∆Insider Dominated Unions

-0.032 (.045)

-0.001 (.003)

-0.003 (.003)

Insider Dominated Unions (t-1)

-0.027 (.050)

-0.003 (.003)

-0.006 (.003)

--

0.0085** (.003)

Union Partisanship
∆Union Partisanship – Left

--

Union Partisanship – Left (t-1)

--

--

0.0167*** (.004)

∆Union Partisanship –Center

--

--

-0.001 (.002)

Union Partisanship – Center (t-1)

--

--

0.0023 (.003)

∆Union Partisanship – Right

--

--

-0.010 (.005)

Union Partisanship – Right (t-1)

--

--

-0.018** (.007)

--

-1.119*** (.255)

-1.334*** (.279)

Existing Job Protections
∆Employment ProtectionStandard Work
Employment Protection-Standard
Work (t-1)
Corporatist Institutions
∆Wage Coordination

--0.161** (.063)

-0.065 (.160)

-0.046 (.202)

-0.145** (.074)

-0.060 (.089)

Wage Coordination (t-1)

-0.094 (.052)

-0.066 (.054)

-0.107 (.069)

∆Governmental Intervention

0.1166 (.088)

0.0676 (.088)

0.0659 (.095)

Governmental Intervention (t-1)

0.1230 (.074)

0.0323 (.071)

0.0789 (.076)

Control Variables
∆EU Membership

0.976*** (.224)

0.9599*** (.234)

1.0002*** (.241)

EU Membership (t-1)

0.745*** (.175)

0.6956*** (.178)

0.8770*** (.193)

∆Deindustrialization

0.0282 (.068)

0.0203 (.068)

0.0096 (.077)

Deindustrialization (t-1)

-0.023 (.031)

-0.018 (.033)

-0.032 (.037)
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Table 5.3. - continued
∆Globalization

-0.005 (.005)

-0.005 (.005)

-0.008 (.005)

Globalization (t-1)

-0.004 (.003)

-0.005 (.003)

-0.005 (.004)

∆GDP Growth

-0.023 (.016)

-0.018 (.015)

-0.001 (.016)

GDP Growth (t-1).

-0.039 (.021)

-0.023 (.022)

-0.001 (.024)

∆Immigration Rate

0.1101 (.144)

0.0893 (.127)

0.1401 (.154)

Immigration Rate (t-1).

0.0317 (.105)

-0.008 (.094)

-0.102 (.125)

∆Unemployment Rate

-0.077** (.032)

-0.076** (.037)

-0.074 (.040)

N=

-0.021 (.014)
276

-0.025 (.014)
276

-0.030** (.015)
276

R2

.31

.35

.45

Unemployment Rate (t-1).

Table 5.4. Regression Estimates for temporary regulation and protection – Corporatist
Model
Independent Variables

∆Employment Protection

Model 10
DV=∆Temp
Employment
Protection

Model11
DV=∆Temp
Employment
Protection

Model 12
DV=∆Temp
Employment
Protection

-0.507*** (.045)

-0.499*** (.054)

-0.584*** (.056)

Union Variables
∆Union Density
Union Density (t-1)

-0.003 (.019)
0.0161** (.007)

-0.003 (.021)

0.0291 (.020)

0.0143** (.007)

0.0255** (.008)

∆Insider Dominated Unions

0.0199 (.028)

0.0020 (.002)

0.0007 (.001)

Insider Dominated Unions (t-1)

0.0552 (.032)

0.0020 (.002)

0.0041 (.002)

Union Partisanship
∆Union Partisanship – Left

--

--

0.0031 (.001)

Union Partisanship – Left (t-1)

--

--

0.0051** (.002)

∆Union Partisanship –Center

--

--

-0.002 (.001)

Union Partisanship – Center (t-1)

--

--

-0.000 (.002)

∆Union Partisanship – Right

--

--

-0.000 (.003)

Union Partisanship – Right (t-1)

--

--

-0.000 (.004)
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Table 5.4. - continued
Existing Job Protections
∆Employment ProtectionStandard Work
Employment Protection-Standard
Work (t-1)
Corporatist Institutions

--

-0.455** (.203)

-0.511** (.190)

--

-0.027 (.121)

-0.072 (.137)

∆Wage Coordination

0.0704 (.039)

0.0765 (.045)

0.1293*** (.041)

Wage Coordination (t-1)

0.0027 (.032)

0.0120 (.039)

0.0266 (.033)

∆Governmental Intervention

-0.079 (.054)

-0.091 (.058)

0.0027 (.055)

Governmental Intervention (t-1)

0.0075 (.046)

-0.023 (.048)

0.0312 (.043)

∆EU Membership

0.2324 (.139)

0.2328 (.165)

0.2152 (.139)

EU Membership (t-1)

0.0679 (.107)

0.0561 (.114)

-0.041 (.102)

0.0830** (.042)

0.0697 (.049)

0.0974** (.046)

0.144*** (.023)

0.1373*** (.025)

0.1569*** (.023)

Control Variables

∆Deindustrialization
Deindustrialization (t-1)
∆Globalization

0.0003 (.003)

0.0004 (.003)

-0.001 (.003)

Globalization (t-1)

0.0036 (.002)

0.0033 (.002)

0.0081 (.002)

∆GDP Growth

0.0198 (.009)

0.0204** (.010)

0.0271*** (.009)

GDP Growth (t-1)

0.0053** (.013)

0.0084 (.014)

0.0267** (.013)

∆Immigration Rate

0.1060 (.090)

0.0895 (.103)

0.1961** (.080)

Immigration Rate (t-1)

0.0728 (.069)

0.0408 (.076)

0.1147 (.066)

∆Unemployment Rate

-0.003 (.020)

-0.003 (.021)

0.0136 (.019)

N=

-0.018** (.009)
276

-0.021 (.009)
276

-0.016 (.008)
276

R2

.49

Unemployment Rate (t-1)

.50

.59

Corporatism and Unions
Table 4.3 shows the results of the regressions testing the hypotheses that strong
corporatist institutions will result in stronger or weaker employment protection and regulation for
NSWA and the greater the composition of insiders in unions, the weaker employment protection
and regulation for NSWA will be. For temporary employment, I find that higher levels of union
density are positively associated with greater protections for temporary employment in the longterm and wage-coordinating institutions are positively associated with higher levels of temporary
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work protections, but only when union partisanship is controlled for. The level of protection for
standard work exerts a negative influence on temporary work protections. Essentially, strong
protections are for standard workers, lead to decreases in the protections for temporary workers.
This supports the findings of the literature and the overall trend witnessed of flexibility at the
margins. Although, why this disparity exists does not appear to be supported by the
insider/outsider theory as insider domination of unions is not a significant variable in explaining
temporary employment protections.
For part-time work, higher levels of wage-coordination are negatively associated with
increases in part-time protections. Greater union partisan affiliation with left-parties is positively
associated with protections for part-time work while long-term union affiliation with right parties
is negatively associated with higher protections for part-time employment. Similar to temporary
work protections, higher levels of employment protection for standard workers, are associated
with decreases in protections for part-time work in the short-term.
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Table 5.5. Regression Estimates for NSWA protection and regulation – Institutional Model
Independent Variables

Model 13
DV=∆Part-Time
Employment Protection

Model 14
DV=∆Temp Employment
Protection

-0.227*** (.032)

-0.393*** (.035)

∆Left Party in Power

-0.000 (.000)

-0.000 (.000)

Left Party in Power (t-1)

-0.000 (.000)

0.0000 (.000)

∆Consensus Institutions

0.0515 (.135)

0.0978 (.089)

Consensus Institutions (t-1)

-0.061 (.070)

0.0402 (.047)

-0.009** (.003)

-0.001 (.002)

-0.001 (.002)

0.0016 (.001)

0.0133** (.006)

-0.006 (.004)

-0.000 (.004)

0.0029 (.003)

∆EU Membership

0.6063*** (.211)

0.1502 (.139)

EU Membership (t-1)

0.3190** (.131)

-0.038 (.086)

∆Deindustrialization

∆Employment Protection

∆Government Orientation (Econ Dim.)
Government Orientation (Econ Dim.) (t-1)
∆ Government Orientation (Cult. Dim.)
Government Orientation (Cult. Dim.) (t-1)
Control Variables

0.1642*** (.057)

0.0941** (.038)

Deindustrialization (t-1)

0.0262 (.023)

0.0751*** (.017)

∆Globalization

-0.001 (.004)

0.0002 (.002)

Globalization (t-1)

-0.004 (.002)

0.0018 (.001)

∆GDP Growth

-0.007 (.010)

0.0082 (.007)

GDP Growth (t-1)

0.0013 (.015)

-0.018 (.010)

∆Immigration Rate

-0.029 (.109)

0.0673 (.072)

Immigration Rate (t-1)

0.0172 (.086)

-0.011 (.057)

∆Unemployment Rate

-0.052** (.027)

-0.015 (.017)

N=

0.0123 (.010)
388

-0.009 (.007)
388

R2

.25

.37

Unemployment Rate (t-1)

Consensus Institutions
Table 4.4 shows the shows the results of the regressions testing the impact of consensus
institutions and left-party in power on NSWA reform. One notable finding in the regressions is
that left-party in power is not a significant determinant of NSWA protection and regulation.
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However, for part-time employment regulation overall orientation of the government is
important with a culturally alternative, economically left orientation leading to higher levels of
employment regulation and protection for part-time work. This is interesting because it suggests
that the left as a homogenous entity is not driving reform for NSWA, but rather the overall
composition of the government and its parties in power is.

Control Variables
In all models, for part-time protection and regulation, EU membership is a significant
variable in determining increases in NSWA protection and regulation. This is likely the result of
the EU directives requiring EU member states to institute national laws regulating part-time
work. However, EU membership was not found to be significant in temporary employment
regulation. Additionally, deindustrialization had a positive impact on regulations for temporary
employment. Higher unemployment rates in the short-run lead to decreases in part-time
employment protection.

Discussion
Overall, the regressions show there is not one primary determinant of regulation for
nonstandard work. In fact, the mechanisms underlying the regulation of temporary work
arrangements are quite different from those underlying regulation and protection for part-time
work. Protections for temporary work appear to be influenced far more by partisanship, unions,
and corporatist institutions than part-time work regulation, which is influenced by the overall
ideological orientation of the government, median voter, and membership in the European
Union.
What is interesting is the impact of partisanship and competition on, at least, temporary
employment protections. While the literature suggests insider domination of Social Democratic
parties will lead to decreased protections for nonstandard work, what I find is that is not entirely
cut and dry. An increased ratio of insiders to outsiders increases protections for temporary work.
While the insider/outsider theory posits a competition between insiders and outsiders within the
Social Democratic party, the above regression suggests the nature of this relationship is not quite
adversarial. However, that seems to be predicated on the ability of the Social Democratic party
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to maneuver in the multidimensional party-space as left-competition decreases employment
protection for NSWA as the proportion of insiders in Social Democratic parties’ increases. So,
while the nature of insider/outsider policy may not be strictly one of “us versus them.” When it
comes to preserving their base, Social Democratic parties are less likely to advocate for
protections for temporary work when insider dominated and facing a left-competitor. This is
likely a result of Social Democratic parties choosing to prioritize policies that benefit standard
workers over protections for temporary workers rather than an antagonism towards temporary
workers. As the new politics literature states, parties are forced to make difficult compromises,
temporary employment protection reveals itself to be one of those tradeoffs for Social
Democratic parties.
The models also indicate that unions and corporatism play an important role in temporary
employment protection as union density and coordination are found to be significant in
promoting higher levels of temporary work regulations. Additionally, an increased proportion of
union members aligning with left parties is found to be positively associated with increased
protections for temporary work when union partisanship is controlled for. This suggests two
things. Firstly, that unions play a positive role in temporary work protections. Secondly, the
overall ideological orientation of unions is important in understanding the insider/outsider
cleavage. As more middle-class and educated workers align with Social Democratic parties, the
models suggest the SD party will work to preserve the interests of this base. The interests of the
middle-class and unions are not necessarily one and the same, the previous chapter revealed that
union members are more likely to preference job security, while more educated individuals (who
have increased levels of employment security) are less likely to preference job security. The
models reveal that this cleavage is an important explanation for temporary work protections and
warrants further exploration in the case studies.
Regarding the hypotheses, I can reject the notion that insider domination of labor unions
has a negative impact on NSWA policy. The coefficients show if anything, this impact is
unimportant regarding temporary employment regulation. Corporatist institutions exert a
negative impact on employment regulation for part-time employment and a positive impact on
employment regulation for temporary employment. This finding partially supports that of Rueda
(2007), who finds that corporatist institutions are used to reinforce the divisions between labor
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market insiders and labor market outsiders. However, it also reveals that policy goals of unions
may be important in explaining variation of NSWA policies.
Two additional findings worth pointing out is that left-party in power is not shown to be a
significant factor in determining part-time employment policy, however, the overall partisanship
of the government is an important factor for part-time employment reform. In many ways this
supports the finding of other scholars that Social Democratic parties themselves are not the sole
promoter of labor market policies to protect the most vulnerable sectors of society. Rather, the
orientation of other parties in power matters regardless if they are left or right. Additionally, the
impact of supranational policy via the European Union was found to exert a positive impact,
especially for part-time employment regulation. How the EU influences increases in NSWA
protection will be important to explore in the case-studies.

Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to test if labor unions, corporatist institutions, and left
parties influenced the regulation and protection of non-standard work. I found that unions are an
important variable in explaining regulation for temporary work, corporatist institutions can exert
both a positive and negative influence, and Social Democratic party composition and
competition do influence the regulation of temporary work, but not part-time work. Overall,
insider alignment with Social Democratic parties exerts a positive influence on regulation and
protection for temporary work. However, when faced with a left competitor and a shift towards
a more leftist policy stance, Social Democratic parties moderate their willingness to increase
regulations for temporary work, instead choosing to preserve protections for their insider base.
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CHAPTER VI
NEOLIBERAL LABOR MARKET REFORM AND THE GROWTH OF
NON-STANDARD WORK

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the history and institutional development of labor
markets prior to the NSWA reforms of the 1990s and present. As states responded to
deindustrialization, globalization and high unemployment rates wrought by recessions, they
adopted many policy reforms designed to facilitate entry into the labor market and reduce
welfare spending on unemployment, as well as other benefits. In many ways, these reforms
accelerated the growth of non-standard work as unions, as well as Social Democratic12 parties
worked to protect insider constituencies by maintaining strong employment protections for
standard work, while allowing deregulation to occur at the margins. This strategy would create
the current problem faced in many labor markets today, as segmentation led way to a greater
number of labor market outsiders unable to find stable and secure employment. This problem
would become so ubiquitous; it would lead the European Union to issue a series of Directives in
the late-1990s aimed at addressing the issue by introducing objectives to provide nonstandard
workers with equal pay, pro-rata access to social insurance, and equal treatment for leave,
pensions, and training. This chapter outlines how the issue of NSWA developed in selected case
countries and how the European community mobilized to address the issue.

Case Selection

Case selection for qualitative studies is based on the dual objectives of having a
representative sample as well as useful variation on the variables of theoretical interest. Keeping
this in mind, I analyze four cases: The United Kingdom, Australia, the Netherlands, and Spain.
These countries provide ideal comparisons for a variety of reasons. Firstly, all countries have
open economies and have experienced high levels of deindustrialization. Secondly, all countries

12

For this dissertation, I use the Social Democratic Party coding from the Comparative Manifesto project to identify
Social Democratic parties. While numerous scholars have identified different criteria for defining Social
Democratic parties, the Comparative Manifesto groups Social Democratic and Labor parties together.
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have (at one time or another had) strong-left parties and unions. Finally, all countries have a
high proportion of workers employed in non-standard work arrangements.
As Table 6.1 demonstrates, despite these similarities, the policy outcomes for each
country between the mid-1990s and today are completely different. The United Kingdom
slightly increased protection for part-time and temporary workers. The Netherlands slightly
increased regulation for part-time workers and greatly increased regulation for temporary
workers. Spain greatly increased protection for part-time workers and then increased and
decreased protection for temporary workers. And Australia made no changes to protection and
regulation for NSWA workers.
Table 6.1. Strictness of Employment Protection and Regulation in Case Countries

(0=LOW,
6=HIGH)

Strictness of Part-Time Work
Protections

Strictness of Temporary Work
Protections

1996/2002

2003/2010

2011/2016

1996/2002

2003/2010

2011/2016

AUSTRALIA

1.4

1.4

1.4

1.73

1.73

1.73

NETHERLANDS

4.01

4.23

4.34

2.5

3.3

3.34

SPAIN

3.51

3.65

3.65

4.03

4.75

4.18

UNITED
KINGDOM

2.2

3.58

3.58

1.28

2.38

2.38

Source: OECD Employment Protection Database

Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show the change in part-time and temporary employment in the four
country cases from 1990 to 2016, all countries saw increases in their number of part-time
workers. Changes in temporary work have been more variable with countries like Spain
specifically enacting measures to curb fixed-term contracts and therefore seeing a decrease in the
temporary employment rate. Across the cases part-time work is highly feminized with women
comprising 68.9% of part-time workers in Australia, 73.3% in the Netherlands, 72.8% in Spain,
and 74.3% in the United Kingdom. Temporary work tends to have less of a gender bias with an
equitable number of men and women employed in temporary positions across the selected cases
(OECD, 2017).
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Figure 6.1. Part-time employment rate (1990-2016)
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Figure 6.2. Temporary employment rate (1990-2016)
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The remaining chapter is divided into two substantive sections. Firstly, I provide brief
legislative histories of the fundamental labor and social policy regulations impacting nonstandard
work in the countries selected for the case studies from 1980 to 1995. In this context, I trace the
role of left-parties, unions, and corporatist institutions in creating the environment that allowed
for the incidence of part-time and temporary work to increase. Next, I lay out the history of the
European Directives on nonstandard work and why they were deemed necessary by the EU.

Labor Market Reforms in the UK

The labor market reforms of the conservative governments in the 1980s and 1990s
focused heavily on deregulation of labor markets and the erosion of union power. Unions were
viewed as being excessively powerful and were widely blamed for the country’s economic
malaise. As waves of legislation eroded union powers in the UK, this opened the door for a
decline in protections for workers, especially those employed in low-wage jobs.
The 1980s ushered in over a decade of labor market policy change for the United
Kingdom as the Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher weakened union power,
privatized government owned businesses, and reduced unemployment benefits. Much of the
rationale for this action was spurred by rising levels of unemployment in the United Kingdom.
When Thatcher took office in 1979, the unemployment rate was 5.0%, by 1986, unemployment
had risen to 13.1%, the second highest unemployment rate in the OECD. In the view of the
government, to reduce joblessness, wages would have to drop to spur job creation.
In reshaping the labor market, the Thatcher government actively sought to create a lowcost labor supply that was flexible towards the needs of employers. One labor market reform
focused on the creation of a lower-paid, less protected market for young workers. The Youth
Training Scheme priced wages for young workers below the minimum wage to incentivize
young workers to take better jobs or pursue further education. The program was widely
criticized by trade unions as providing cheap labor to firms, a criticism supported by the lack of
hiring of young workers for permanent positions following their completion of the program
(Bradeley, 1995). The Youth Training Scheme was eventually replaced with the New Workers
Scheme wherein the government subsidized jobs for workers between the ages 18-21. This
coincided with the JobStart allowance of 20 pounds per week for up to 6 months paid to the
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long-term employed if they accepted a wage of less than 80 pounds per week (McLaughlin et al.,
1994).
Another method of accomplishing this was through the abolition of wage councils which
set minimum wages for a variety of different industries. The argument against the wage councils
was that they set wages above what employees, especially the young were worth paying. Upon
winning reelection in 1993, the Conservative government headed by John Major passed the 1993
Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Bill effectively abolishing all wage councils. This
meant the United Kingdom was the only country in the European Union without a formal or
informal system of minimum wages which disproportionately impacted the earnings of lowwage workers (Manning, 2013).
While unions were adamantly against these changes, their power was actively being
eroded as the conservative government worked to curtail their strength. The 1984 Trade Union
Act laid down specific and detailed rules for ballot initiatives prior to striking and enabled unions
to be challenged in the courts of these procedures were not followed. The 1988 Employment Act
enabled union members to take their union to court and eroded protections for closed shops. The
1990 Employment Act gave employers the right to fire union members for engaging in unofficial
strike activities and made it illegal to deny employment to individuals who did not wish to join
unions (Addison & Siebert, 2002). Between 1979 and 1989 union density in the United
Kingdom decreased from 50.7% to 41.1% (ICTWSS, 2018).
During this time, the government actively diminished the role of unions in consultation
and representation on tripartite bodies with employers and itself. The Trade Union Congress
(TUC) adopted several strategies to regain some power including heavy fundraising for the
Labour Party, which it viewed as its only conduit to favorable policy. The TUC also worked to
organize part-time and temporary workers, young workers, and women in the service sector.
However, these initial efforts proved unsuccessful as low retention rates and high employee
turnover made these jobs exceptionally difficult to organize (Towers, 1989).
As a result of these labor market reforms and erosion of protections for unions, the
number of individuals employed in part-time jobs jumped from 18.4% in 1983 to 22.1% in 1993
(OECD, 2017). Between 1983 and 1989, 60% of all jobs created were part-time and 37% of the
full-time workforce earned poverty level wages (McDowall, 2000). The Conservative
government had been successful in creating a low-wage, flexible labor force.
109

Labor Market Reforms in Australia
The labor market reforms of the Australian government in the 1980s and 1990s were
primarily made in conjunction with the unions. Many positive reforms came out of this
partnership, however, even Australian unions at their most powerful were unable to stem the
structural changes occurring in the labor market. Many of the concessions made by the
Australian unions in this time period endorsed more flexible labor markets and worked to
exacerbate insecurity, especially for part-time and temporary workers.
The early 1980s was a period of economic stagnation for Australia. GDP growth hovered at 2%
and the unemployment rate hit 9% during the 1981 recession (Kelly, 2000). In its election
campaign, the Australian Labor party argued the Liberal-National Coalition government (19751983) had created economic issues by decentralizing the industrial relations system. To restore
the system, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) signed an Accord with the Australian Council of
Trade Unions (ACTU). The Accord would represent the first and only successful formal
cooperative working relationship between Australian trade unions and the Labor government.
(Singleton, 1990).
Following the election of the center-left Hawke-Keating government in 1983, the
Australian Labor Party sought to use this Accord to foster cooperation on economic and social
development, as well as provide avenues for consultation about changes to employment
protections and regulations. This led to a brief return to a centralized industrial relations system
(Lansbury, 2000). The development of the Accord coincided with the attempt of the Hawke
government to organize employers into a more unified and effective force for change in labor
policy. This led to the formation of the Business Council of Australia (BCA) in 1983 which
comprised of the largest corporations in the country (Bell, 1995). This organization was never
intended to give business the same level of political power as the labor unions (Matthews, 1994).
However, throughout the later part of the 1980s the BCA argued the labor market was overregulated and proposed introducing enterprise-bargaining in order to enhance employeemanagement interests and add flexibility to the labor market.
The Accord differed greatly from corporatist structures in Europe because it existed only
between labor and the government with no formal consultation with business associations. It is
important to note that the Accord was not a single monolithic policy but represented eight
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distinct Accord Agreements (Mark I-VIII). These agreements focused on three distinct areas of
Australian economic and social policy.
In the first period of the Accords (1983-1986) macroeconomic stabilization was
promoted with a focus on wage restraint by unions and job creation. This period was marked by
a great deal of cooperation between the government and unions and ushered in social
improvements such as universal health care “Medicare” and increased funding for training
programs. The second period of the Accords (1987 -1991) marked a policy narrative
emphasizing the need for structural changes in the economy as economic problems such as the
balance of trade crisis lead to the adoption of managed decentralism or the transition from a
centralized system of industrial relations i.e. one governed by the Australian Industrial Relations
Commission (AIRC) and State tribunals to a decentralized approach governed by bargaining at
the enterprise level (Lansbury & Bamber, 1998). This resulted in the passage of the Industrial
Relations Act 1988 which gave employers and employees the ability to negotiate above the
existing enterprise agreements on matters that were relevant to their employment relationship,
for example, overtime work or leave. Because the process was quite onerous, few
establishments attempted to make these agreements (Hawke & Wooden, 1998).
The final period of the Accords (1991-1995) ushered in a new industrial relations system
as both the BCA and ACTU were supportive of a further decentralized system viewing many of
the decisions made by the AIRC to be capricious and unwarranted and the process of instituting
reforms to be overly bureaucratic. In reaction, the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 was
passed to amend parts of the Industrial Relations Act 1988. A key feature of the Industrial
Relations Reform Act 1993 was the establishment of Enterprise Flexibility Agreements (EFAs)
which could be negotiated without union involvement. While the EFA was intended to be
negotiated between employers and employees, it was still required that the relevant union was
notified about the negotiation regardless of whether any of the employees were members of the
union. This gave unions the opportunity to identify firms with little to no union representation
and the ability to intervene in agreements if desired. The AIRC was also allowed to refuse
ratification of the EFA if they did not find it in the public’s interest and the majority of the firm’s
workforce was required to favor the agreement if it was to be implemented (Sloane, 1994). The
design of this legislation was important and beneficial to unions because it enabled them to retain
a high level of influence in organizing workers and discouraged the creation of non-union
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contracts. During the life of the legislation only 261 EFA’s were approved covering less than
30,000 workers (Wooden et.al, 2000).
There appears to be no consensus among scholars as to why the ACTU through its
partnership with the Labor government served to promote an industrial relations system that left
workers with stagnant real wages and increased income inequality (Strauss, 2013). One
argument is that because of the decentralized nature of union organization before the Accord, the
ACTU was reliant upon the Accord and the power vested in it by the state to legitimize its role in
labor relations (Briggs, 2002). Others have suggested that the ALP used political patronage to
curry support with union leaders offering parliamentary seats, advisor positions, and board
memberships to those that conformed to their policies (Brown, 2004). What is clear is that the
Accord years ushered in a period wherein economic policy did little to bolster the security of
workers and positioned the labor union movement in Australia as one that promotes policies tied
to efficiency and productivity.
Between 1980 and 1993, the rate of part-time employment increased in Australia from
16.4% to 24%. Additionally, two out of every three new jobs created during this time were parttime (ABS, 1994). The share of casual (temporary and sometimes part-time) workers grew from
13% to 24.% ( Gilfillan, 2018). While the Accord had successfully kept protections for standard
workers in place, in aiming for further flexibility in the labor force it bifurcated the workforce
increasing the number of people employed in precarious jobs.

Labor Market Reforms in the Netherlands
The labor market reforms in the Netherlands leading to the expansion of part-time and
temporary work were primarily made as a way for the government to respond to an increasingly
unsupportable social welfare system. They were made in consultation between the unions and
business associations in order to mobilize workers into the labor force. Many of the reforms
would prove unpopular and call into question the role of the social partners. They would also
both directly and indirectly lead to an explosion of part-time and temporary work in the
Netherlands.
Between 1973 and 1983, government expenditures as a percentage of GDP increased
from 40% to 58% and were used to fund generous social assistance programs with few
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restrictions on qualifications for such programs. Both the center-left Uyl government (19741977) and successive center-right van Agt government (1977-1981) did little to curb this welfare
expansion. This in turn created a moral hazard as individuals could easily live on welfare
entitlements if wages did not meet their expectations. Consequently, this led to an increase in the
reservation wage and sent unemployment skyrocketing as firms were unable to meet the wage
demands. By 1984, 10,000 people were being added to unemployment insurance each month
resulting in a 17% unemployment rate (McMahon & Thomson, 2000). One of the major issues
with this entitlement spending was generous unemployment benefits and high-taxes made paid
work less desirable, especially for low-wage workers. For employers, the high cost of
employing individuals resulted in a reduction of low-skill, entry level jobs.
In 1982, the head of the Dutch Trades Unions and head of the Confederation of
Netherlands Industry with Employers negotiated the Wassenaar Agreement to encourage wage
restraint and stimulate hiring. Labor unions initially opposed the promotion of part-time work as
the solution to the unemployment problem, viewing part-time jobs as inferior for their lack of
protection, lower pay, fewer career prospects and low-level of unionization rate. However, the
deep unemployment crisis prompted a reversal of attitude. In addition to wage restraint, the
Labour Foundation (the central organization of trade unions and employers) negotiated a
reduction in the number of weekly hours worked by increasing the number of days off per year
as well as the promotion of part-time work and early retirement to stimulate jobs for the
unemployed (Visser et al., 2004). For the unions, wage moderation meant a trade-off for
employment protections for those on standard contracts. It also bolstered the legitimacy of the
unions, legitimizing their role as representatives of the employed and maintaining their influence
over social policy (Rueda, 2009.
The Wassenaar Agreement provided for several reforms to the Dutch economy. Firstly,
it decentralized wage bargaining to the local level allowing wages to be negotiated between
employers and employees at the sectoral level rather than being set in national negotiations.
Next, it reduced taxes and social security contributions therefore increasing gross wages and
reducing the real minimum wage. Finally, it resulted in a social compact in which employers
were now able to plan for wage growth as wages were now growing in line with productivity
(Watson, et al., 1999).
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In the period following the Wassenaar Agreement, three-quarters of new jobs created
were part-time giving the Netherlands a part-time employment rate of 37%. (Levy, 1999).
Additionally, employers began introducing more temporary positions and on-call contracts.
Collective agreements at the time began to reflect these new work regulations with a loosening
of rules on dismissals for fixed-term contracts. As these new forms of employment grew, by the
mid-1990s, only 56% of the workforce in the Netherlands worked in full-time jobs (OECD,
2015).

Labor Market Reforms in Spain
The labor market reforms in Spain were heavily driven by a desire on the party of labor
unions to maintain exceptionally strong employment protections for standard contracts while
allowing for increased flexibility in the workforce through temporary contracts. Competition
between unions further exacerbated this issue as desire for influence lead to concessions at the
margins. The result of these concessions resulted in the tremendous growth of temporary
contracts in the county.
The death of Francisco Franco in 1975 ushered in a new era of economic policy and labor
reforms in Spain. Under Franco’s fascist government, employers and employees were required
to belong to one central hyper-regulated “union.” As part of the democratic transition, the Royal
Decree of Industrial Relations in 1977 allowed for the creation of free trade unions
(Aguirregabiria & Alonso-Borrego, 2014). The legislation also kept in place many of the
restrictions on dismissals put in place during the Franco years.
In 1980, the Workers Statute, became the first major labor legislation to be enacted under
the democratic Constitution of 1978. The bill represented a compromise between the Spanish
Confederation of Employers' Organisations (CEOE) and the General Workers' Union (UGT). In
debating the bill, there was substantial friction on the Left between the Spanish Socialist
Workers' Party (PSOE) and the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) over how the trade unions
should be modeled. 172 of the 803 proposed amendments to the bill were accepted and
following a compromise between the Center Democratic Union (UCD) and the PSOE on the
legislation regarding lock-out’s and industrial disputes, the bill became law. The Workers
Statute helped strengthen the social partners by leaving all labor ordinances that did not run
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counter to the Statute in place (Sagardoy Bengoechea, 1981). Many of the protections for
permanent contracts were left untouched including mandatory severance payments, the ability to
sue employers for unfair dismissal, and a mandatory notice of 30 days for dismissal (Bentolila,
1997).
The Statue also added provisions designed to introduce flexibility into the labor market
by allowing for fixed-term and part-time contracts. However, the initial legislation only allowed
for fixed-term contracts to be used for jobs that were seasonal in nature, needed to cover absent
workers, or for the start-up of a new firm. Like other countries in Europe, Spain experienced a
severe recession in the 1980s and facing an unemployment rate of almost 20% introduced
reforms to the labor market in 1984. The 1984 labor market reforms were introduced in the
tripartite Economic and Social Agreement. While the UGT was not entirely in favor of these
reforms, they were willing to trade increased institutional and financial support for their union as
a trade-off for promoting the flexibility measures, but only for temporary contracts. The
Workers’ Commissions (CCOO), Spain’s other leading trade union was against the measure and
did not sign on the social pact. The principle goal of this measure was to extend the scope of
work that could fall under fixed-term contracts. Under the new legislation, fixed-term contracts
could be used for 6 months to 3 years, for any activity and were subject to low or non-existent
severance payments. Regulations for permanent contracts remained the same (Adam &
Canziani, 1998).
The 1986 factory council elections between the UGT and CCOO revealed the negative
consequences of the UGT’s policies as they narrowly won majority representation on the factory
councils. The UGT interpreted this as a need to change their tactics and began distancing
themselves from the policies of the leftist PSOE government. One policy, the Youth
Employment Plan proposed by the government in 1987 was viewed particularly negatively. At
the time, Spain’s youth unemployment rate hovered around 40%. To remedy the problem, the
government introduced measures to increase youth employment by reducing social security
contributions for employers and fixing wages for young workers at the statutory minimum. The
UGT immediately expressed radical opposition to the plan and organized along with the CCOO
to plan a major general strike on December 14, 1988. The strike was a resounding success
resulting in most Spanish employees staying home from work and the retirement of the flexible
contracts of the Youth Employment Plan. The strike lead to an uptick in union membership,
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doubling the number of unionized workers from 1 million to 2 million. It also resulted in a loss
of votes for the PSOE to the United Left (IU) left-wing coalition. Although, the PSOE again
won an absolute majority in parliament, its Social Democratic credentials were severely
damaged (Burgess, 1999).
Because of the reforms, the use of temporary contracts in Spain skyrocketed from 10% in
1984 to 34% by 1992 (Casals, 2004). The labor unions, in refusing to budge on strong
employment protections for standard contracts while conceding to labor market flexibility at the
margins had created a scenario in which labor market segmentation was dividing the Spanish
labor force. While the state had attempted to solve the unemployment crisis, a new outsider
crisis was waiting in the wings.

European Directives
EU discussion of regulations for non-standard work began in 1979 amid a period of mass
unemployment and deindustrialization. In 1982 and 1983, the Commission presented proposals
aimed at creating equal treatment for part-time and temporary workers. In each of these cases,
the UK used its veto to block the proposals in the Council.
Throughout the 1980s there existed a rift between the continental states and UK
approaches to labor market reform producing significant tension on the European Commission.
In the view of the Thatcher government, only full deregulation could provide for the flexibility
needed to achieve economic efficiency. As a result, the UK delegation stood in stark opposition
to any harmonized transnational approach to regulation of the labor market (Deakin &
Wilkinson, 1994). The continental states took a different approach, countries such as France,
supported by the European Trade Union Council and European Parliament, wanted to spur job
creation by reducing working hours for full-time jobs rather than promoting part-time work. The
UK, was backed by the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe who
wanted to promote part-time and temporary work as a way to increase flexibility for firms and
decrease labor costs (Bleijenbergh & Bruijn, 2004). Dissention on the policy among the member
states essentially crippled the adoption of the Directives as the existing institutional structure at
the time required the political will of all Member States and provided a limited legal basis for
actions regarding social policy.
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In 1987, the Single European Act revised the Treaty of Rome and allowed for Qualified
Majority Voting removing the power of the United Kingdom to unilaterally block labor market
reforms. Between 1991 and 1994, three new directives were proposed to the Council to regulate
nonstandard work. The first proposal was adopted in 1991 and stipulated that fixed-term and
temporary agency workers were given the same level of health and safety protections on the job
as permanent employees. The other two proposals, focusing on working conditions and social
security, ran into procedural issues with France and the European Parliament arguing that
qualified majority voting should apply to all social issues. The directive on social security also
did not garner a great deal of support with over half of Member states indicating they would not
accept the proposed provisions and the UK and Denmark arguing that reduced labor costs would
not significantly distort competition. As a result, the remaining two proposals did not proceed
forward (Jeffrey, 1995).
In 1991, social policy making within the EU was significantly changed by the adoption of
the Treaty of Amsterdam by 11 member states, the UK being the only state to opt out. Rather
than the Commission developing social policies, all proposals would be presented to the
European social partners consisting of union and employer organizations who would develop the
policy among themselves. If they negotiated a framework agreement they could request the
Council to adopt it as a binding Directive. If they did not, then policy would be determined by
the usual policy-making procedures designated by the Commission (Faulkner, 1998).
Facing significant upheavals in the labor market as the growth of part-time and temporary
work surged, in 1995 the European Commission reached out to its social partners to create a
European framework of legislation to protect the rights of non-standard workers. This resulted
in the creation of Directive 1997/81/EC in 1997 designed to remove discrimination against parttime workers and Directive 1999/70/EC in 1999 designed to remove discrimination against those
on fixed-term contracts.
The Part-time Work Directive sets several stipulations for the regulation of part-time
work. Most notably the principle of non-discrimination for part-time workers. The Directive is
interpreted to mean that part-time workers should be given equal hourly pay to comparable fulltime workers, pro-rata entitlement to provisions such as sick pay and maternity pay where
appropriate, and equal treatment for holidays, maternity leave, parental leave, pension schemes,
and training. However, many of these entitlements are left up the interpretation of the Member
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States. The Directive also encouraged the social partners to remove obstacles for the expansion
of part-time work by enabling workers to transfer from full-time to part-time work and vice
versa, facilitate access to part-time work across all skill levels, and provide information on how
employees may exercise these options.
The Fixed-term Work Directive had similar objectives of providing for the nondiscrimination of temporary workers including equal pay, pro-rata access to social insurance, and
equal treatment for leave, pensions, and training. It also contained provisions designed to curb
the abuse of contracts including objective reasons for renewal of such contracts and regulations
on maximum durations and successive renewals. Additionally, employers were required to
inform fixed-term workers about permanent positions and provide training opportunities to fixed
term workers. Like part-time work regulation, many of the thresholds for this equal treatment
were left up the interpretation of the member-states.
In 2008, the final Directive regarding nonstandard employment was implemented, this
time focusing on individuals employed in temporary agency work. Directive 2008/104/EC,
extends the principles of nondiscrimination to temporary agency workers and establishes they
should receive equal pay and conditions as permanent employees doing the same work. This
Directive has been widely criticized because of the amount of leeway given to Member States in
determining what employees qualify for protection under the Directive (Countouris & Horton,
2009).
Together these three Directives provide the framework for non-standard work in the
European Union. The existence of these Directives exerts a positive impact on the overall level
of protection afforded non-standard workers in the EU. As Directives they serve to set out a
“goal” the European countries must achieve and are transposed into law by national legislatures.
Because the legislation is not binding, much of their interpretation has been left to national
legislatures leading to a significant amount of variation in protections and regulations among
countries. As a form of secondary law, EU member states are bound by treaty to transpose the
Directives in a timely manner or face fines or other penalties. In the case of part-time work
regulation, the Directive refers only to employment conditions (social security measures are
excluded), employers can discriminate against employees based on “objective grounds” which
are terms and conditions interpreted by the member states. They can also discriminate against
casual workers, who also bear no definition (Jeffrey, 1998). The Directives on Fixed-term work
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and TWA also bear similar exclusions leading to many situations in which workers are omitted
from protections based on the mandate of the EU.

Conclusion
The above cases demonstrate that the path towards increasing part-time and temporary
work took many forms, however, several factors are common to each case. Firstly, economic
stagnation served as a motivating factor for many governments to engage in labor market reform.
The need to reduce unemployment and mobilize individuals into the workforce, meant a push for
jobs with less security and protections. In many ways, states also pushed workers into these
positions by reforming programs for workers such as the Youth Opportunities Program in the
UK and the Youth Employment Plan in Spain that purposefully tied employment in lower-wage,
insecure jobs to qualification for benefits provided by the state.
Another lesson to be taken from the cases is that party in power was hardly a relevant
variable for explaining variation in part-time and temporary employment outcomes. With
unchecked rule from the right, the UK saw the proportion of part-time and temporary
employment increase. The Netherlands saw the boom in part-time employment under the center
Christian Democratic Party. In both Australia and Spain under Social Democratic parties, the
number of NSWA increased. As parties responded to an increasingly global world, they were
forced to make difficult choices in terms of the policies they promoted. In all these cases, labor
market flexibility was a dominant policy strategy for the governments of this time period,
regardless of party orientation.
The role of unions in the cases is notable in how they approached labor market reform.
In the cases of Australia, Spain, and the Netherlands, the unions were willing to trade wage
restraint for employment protection for labor market insiders. In both Spain and the Netherlands,
allowing flexibility in the labor market to occur at the margins was written into social pacts. In
the British case, the unions were so decimated by Conservative policy, they could hardly protect
their status in British public opinion, let alone create policy. An interesting thread that emerges
among the cases is that the unions acted in a manner of self-preservation, willing to trade their
relevance and the protection of their constituency for worse working conditions for those on the
outside. In the end, this would fail to stem the decline of unions, as deindustrialization and
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economic change would ultimately decrease their participation. However, clinging to relevance
in this moment of time and unwillingness to advocate for the rights of all workers, would
ultimately lead to the labor market segmentation seen today.
While each country case demonstrates a different path towards labor market
segmentation, the role of the European Union as a force for spurring labor market regulation for
NSWA and therefore closing this gap will become a dominant narrative. Organizational hurdles
prevented the EU from significantly influencing policy in the early 1980s and 1990s, however it
would ultimately lay the framework for significant changes to NSWA regulation and protection.
The influence of this supranational institution would come to serve as a positive influence
towards removing the inequalities created by the country cases. The influence of the EU will be
discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
Overall, the period between 1980 and 1995 saw a tremendous growth of NSWA,
primarily because of the policies adopted by the state, with the consent of unions, to add
flexibility to the labor market. While in some cases these policies worked to reduce
unemployment, in all the cases it served to exacerbate labor market segmentation. This creation
an underclass of worker, unable to find stable and secure employment in a permanent job, would
lay the foundation for discontent and inequality seen in mid-90s and beyond.
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CHAPTER VII
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY, CORPORATISM, AND UNIONS IN
PROTECTION AND REGULATION FOR NONSTANDARD WORK

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to further test my hypotheses that Social Democratic13
parties, unions, and institutions interact to influence NSWA policy. Chapter 05 showed that
part-time employment protections were higher when the country is an EU member state and the
composition of the government is less culturally traditional and leans towards the economic left.
Temporary work protections were higher when there is either a greater concentration of labor
market insiders in Social Democratic parties in the long-term or the Social Democratic party
faces an alternative-left competitor in the long-term, there is a greater ideological distance
between Social Democratic and right parties in the long-term, as well as higher levels of
deindustrialization and union density in the long-term. Chapter 06 examined how these variables
influenced the increase of NSWA through the 1980s and early 1990s and highlighted that leftparty in power was not an important variable in the rise of NSWA. How unions viewed NSWA
reform played a role in the deregulation of labor markets to allow more part-time and temporary
work. Additionally, the strength of corporatist institutions helped to magnify the ideological
orientation of the unions themselves. This chapter expands on the findings of the previous
chapters to examine what factors influenced the development and adoption of NSWA policies.
Since 1995, part-time permanent employment has contributed to over one-third of nonstandard employment growth, much of this a result of higher levels of female labor force
participation. The remaining three-quarters of non-standard work has been in the form of fulltime temporary employment, with part-time temporary employment contributing less than 10%
of overall growth (OECD, 2015). Part-time work is viewed by as an option for mobilizing
individuals into the workforce that would have otherwise not participated such as women with
young children, students, individuals with health problems and the elderly. As a result, part-time

13

For this dissertation, I use the Social Democratic Party coding from the Comparative Manifesto project to identify
Social Democratic parties. While numerous scholars have identified different criteria for defining Social
Democratic parties, the Comparative Manifesto groups Social Democratic and Labor parties together.
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workers are a very heterogeneous group, with over 70% choosing to work in part-time positions
over full-time positions (OECD, 2016). Temporary work is viewed much differently by the state
and employers as the relaxation of temporary employment regulations gives employers the
opportunity to circumvent the strict regulations surrounding permanent contracts. As countries
have eased regulations on temporary work, the rate at which individuals have been employed on
fixed term contracts has grown (OECD, 2004).
The past 25 years have seen a convergence in terms of employment protection legislation
for workers with many countries with formerly high levels of employment protection legislation
relaxing regulations for standard work making it increasingly insecure. At the same time,
employment regulation for part-time and temporary positions have increased on certain measures
with legislation providing greater access to social insurance and protection from discrimination
based on job type. Since the 1990s three-quarters of OECD countries have made regulatory
changes regarding part-time work including requiring equal treatment of full-time and part-time
workers, easing restrictions so part-time workers can receive social insurance, and making it
easier for full-time workers to reduce their hours to become part-time workers. What remains
unclear is why states have responded differently in designing their regulation and protection of
part-time and temporary work.
This gap between non-standard and standard employment is troublesome because it
effects not only present earnings, but future earnings potential. Part-time work is unlikely to be a
stepping stone for a full-time job and part-time workers are twice more likely to live in poverty
than full-time workers. This is not true for temporary jobs, because while temporary jobs have a
defined end-date, the working hours per week for temporary positions is generally equivalent to
full-time positions. Increased use of temporary employment has led to more workers going
through periods of unemployment before finding a permanent position (Blanchard & Landier,
2002). Those employed in nonstandard work already find themselves in a difficult position,
however, regulations and protections have been widely adopted by OECD countries in the past
20 years to help alleviate the inequities of part-time and temporary work.
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Methodology
This chapter examines my hypotheses that Social Democratic party homogeneity and
competition, corporatist and consensual institutions, and union representation are central to
determining the level of regulation and protection for NSWA. The qualitative approach has
strengths in that it allows me to formulate complex, in depth conclusions, and is beneficial in
developing theory as it emphasizes both meaning and discovery. Yin (2009), notes that case
studies are the preferred method of analysis when how and why questions are asked,
investigators have little control over the events, and the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon
within a real-world context, all criteria this research question satisfies.
I use process tracing to outline the causal pathway between the independent variables of
left-party, institutions, and unions and dependent variables of employment regulation for parttime and temporary work. Process tracing, defined as “the systematic examination of diagnostic
evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the
investigator” is a critical component to within-case analysis (Collier, 2011). The within-case
analysis allows me to locate the intervening mechanisms connecting a hypothesized explanatory
variable to an outcome (Mahoney, 2007). Identifying such mechanisms reduces the likelihood of
mistaking a spurious correlation for a causal relationship. Because I studied an intermediate
number of cases in the quantitative portion of analysis, the comparative approach is appropriate
and necessary to validate the hypotheses tested in the previous chapter (Ljiphart, 1971).
To examine the evolution of NSWA legislation in the case studies, I trace the causal
pathways between left-parties, institutions, and unions. The following case studies reveal several
emerging themes in understanding the role of each of these variables. Firstly, the Third-Way
political position adopted by left-wing parties in the country cases exerted a large influence on
the policies adopted by the state. The Third-Way involves several general characteristics
including a concerted transition by the state to a focus on regulation over the provision of social
benefits, an employment centered social policy, and an “asset-based egalitarianism” in which the
state works to reduce inequality by equipping its citizens with social capital, skills, and education
rather than through the redistribution of resources (White, 1998). This emphasis on the Third
Way led Social Democratic parties in the country cases of the United Kingdom and Australia,
and to a lesser extent the Netherlands to dismantle significant portions of the welfare state and
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institute policies that emphasize work over welfare. In this manner, the growth of nonstandard
work was actively promoted by these governments. The Spanish Social Democratic Party also
embraced liberalization and increased flexibility of the labor force. However, they did not
embrace the Third-way ideology in the same way as the leaders of the other cases instead
keeping strong protections for standard work while allowing very relaxed protections for nonstandard work.
With left-parties actively promoting employment over entitlement, two other factors
proved important in determining the strength of NSWA regulation. The power of unions reveals
itself to be an important variable. Although, this is only true when left parties were willing to
cooperate with unions. In the cases of the United Kingdom and Spain, the government was
willing to unilaterally pass labor policy without the consent of unions leading to less favorable
regulations for nonstandard workers. Supranational policy was also found to be an important
variable as the Directives on non-standard work passed by the European commission provided
the impetus for several member states to adopt policies protecting and regulating NSWA. The
difference of policy outcomes between the United Kingdom and Australia demonstrate the
importance of the European Union to NSWA regulation.
This chapter is divided into 3 sections. Firstly, I trace the legislative environment of the
labor market reforms enacted in the country cases. Next, I test the hypotheses regarding the
partisan and dynamic party competition models in the passage of NSWA reform. Finally, I
review the role of unions and corporatism in the strength of NSWA.

Labor Market Reforms in the UK
By the 1990s, Conservative attacks on unions had substantially weakened union strength
and damaged their image in the eyes of the British public. This posed a substantial problem for
the Labour Party whose deep ties and close association with unions was increasingly viewed as a
political liability. As the leader of the Labour Party, Tony Blair, acknowledged the core
constituency of the Labour Party was shrinking and primarily based on the working class and
those reliant on social benefits. He argued the party needed to modernize to attract the growing
middle-class and professional voter constituency (Faucher-King, 1997). Under the auspices of
“New Labour,” Blair sought to reform the party as a nimble problem-solver, uniquely able to
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tackle contemporary issues. In his leader’s speech prior to the 1997 general election, Blair
outlined several initiatives designed to tackle inequality as he pledged Labour would undertake
including increased spending on education and the National Health Service, reductions in youth
and long-term unemployment, and a new relationship with the European Union (Blair, 1996).
Following 18 years of Conservative rule, in 1997, the Labour Party was elected to lead
the United Kingdom in an astounding victory winning 418 of the 658 seats in Parliament
(64.4%) (Clarke, Stewart, Whitely, 1998). Within months the government had created the Social
Exclusion unit to focus on “areas that suffer from a combination of linked problems such as
unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime environments, bad health,
and family breakdown” (DSS, 1999, p.23). Under Labour’s conceptualization, “exclusion”
involved lack of opportunities for paid work.
In July 1997, the New Deal for Young People and New Deal for Lone Parents was
funded to help the long-term unemployed and the economically inactive into employment. Both
programs served as a type of “welfare to work” system. Job seekers were able to choose 1 of 4
options of either subsidized work, full-time education and training, work with a voluntary
organization or with an Environmental Task Force (Wilkinson, 2003). This program, like those
of the Conservative party, emphasized that the solution to poverty was a reduction in
unemployment, regardless of what type of job was taken.
The Blair government is often cited as a classic example of the “Third Way” strategy
which attempts to move beyond the neoliberalism of the “Old” Right and the redistribution and
interventionism of the “Old” Left towards a more market driven approach to public and social
services. This extension of the neo-liberal reforms started under Thatcher explain why attempts
were made to reduce unemployment by cutting social assistance and mobilizing large swatches
of people into the labor force. In a continuation of neoliberal policies, the Blair government
systematically promoted a welfare-to-work style system in which the primary view of
unemployment was not lack of jobs, but rather lack of work readiness. The solution to this was
to reinforce work ethic to reduce welfare dependency and generate tax revenues that could be
applied to other causes (Jessop, 2009). The type of work was of little consequence, only that
individuals were mobilized into the workforce.
The governing ideology of the New Labour government differed from the Conservative
government in two primary ways. Firstly, its policies were designed to govern in a neoliberal
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direction while maintaining its working-class and middle-class support. Secondly, New Labour
sought to modernize the employment relationship by turning workers into partners. In this
viewpoint, there are no separate interests between workers or employers. What is best for
employers, is what is best for workers (Smith & Morton, 2006). This emphasis on the Third
Way played out in Blair’s dealing with the European Union. At a meeting of the Party of
European Socialists, the umbrella organization for the socialist parties making up the EU
member countries, Blair challenged his fellow socialist partners to abandon their “statist”
policies and “modernize or die.” (Helm, 1997).
The phrase “modernize or die” was not only reserved for the European partners, but one
that was also stated confidently to the British unions. The Conservative governments had
adopted a model of political exclusion towards the unions. Seeing an opportunity in the election
of the New Labour government, representatives from the TUC met with the Prime Minister to
argue for the establishment of tripartite and bipartite bodies to build national consensus of
economic policy and employment legislation. The TUC advocated for a role of unions in
building a social partnership to increase employment and productivity. The New Labour
government showed little desire to meet the TUC in formalizing a social partnership system,
instead expressing a willingness to consult union leaders on a limited, ad hoc basis (McIlroy,
2000).
The New Labour movement continually emphasized a pro-business position with a
flexible labor market. Under Blair, the Labour party had managed to attract conservative voters
to the party. Wanting to retain these voters, many of New Labour’s policies catered to their
economic interests. The “Old” Labour constituency was calculated as having a low-risk of
defection leading the Labour party to emphasize its more conservative policies upfront while
slowly and more quietly implementing progressive policies (Moon, 2007). As part of this
rebranding, Labour’s association with unions was deemphasized and the party funding
mechanisms were reworked to reduce the monetary control of unions over Labour. In 1983,
trade unions provided the Labour party with 96% of its income, by 1997, only 40% of the party’s
revenue was from trade unions (Faucher-King, 1997).
Unions, because of the Conservative reforms of the 1980s, were too hobbled to provide a
counterweight to the interests of New Labour. The TUC needed to tread a very fine line
regarding the Labour government because it wanted to restore some of its power with a social
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partnership model and more regulation of the labor market. The Labour Party was viewed as a
necessary, although not ideal partner in achieving this goal. The regulation the TUC wanted was
the “over regulation” the Labour Party wanted to cut putting their interests at odds with each
other. The TUC determined the best strategy it could implement would be to “play nice” to
reverse the tide of conservative policies until union rights had been restored and then more
thoroughly advocate policies such as higher standards for the minimum wage and cut zero-hours
contracts (McIlroy, 1998).
In 1997, Blair indicated he would accept a proposed Employment Chapter and Social
Chapter of the Amsterdam Treaty formally blocked by his conservative predecessors, but only
after it emphasized labor market flexibility and avoided overregulation (Cowles & Smith, 2000).
In accepting the Amsterdam Treaty, the Part-time Directive was extended to the UK, requiring it
to implement an EU directive affording protection to part-time workers. Because the new
Employment Chapter represented the more flexible British approach to labor regulation, it was
left up to each sovereign state to interpret the details of the Directive.
The implementation of the EU’s Working Time Directive in 1998 through the Working
Time Regulations Act was the first piece of legislation adopted by the British government giving
greater statutory rights to British workers, including part-time workers. The Working Time
Regulations Act set a maximum work week of 48-hours, required breaks throughout the day,
created a provision for paid annual holidays and paid annual leave, and regulated night shift
work (Blair, et al., 2001). Part-time workers were the primary beneficiaries of the Act with onethird of part-time employees now eligible for paid holiday (DTI, 1997). In 1999, a national
minimum wage was established benefitting primarily part-time workers, women, young workers
(under 22), and minorities (Metcalf, 1999).
When it came time to implement the Part-time Work Directive, the Government worked
to make sure this legislation also complied with their stated goals of employability, flexibility,
and competitiveness. The goal of the legislation was to encourage part-time work that would
benefit the employer and to a lesser extent the employee. Under the proposed legislation
400,000 part-time workers stood to see their working conditions change for the better, around
7% of the part-time working population (Onubogu, 2002).
The Part-time Work Directive was published for consultation between unions and
employer associations. This posed a unique opportunity for the TUC to advocate for stronger
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regulations of part-time work, while using the European Union as cover for pushing back against
the government’s stance towards regulation. As the conservative government had excluded
unions from the creation of social policy, the inclusion of unions for consultation represented
itself a large gain for the TUC. In 1995, the TUC had launched a two-year campaign to advocate
for better conditions for part-time workers, granting them entitlement to the same rights as fulltime workers. The campaign had three primary goals, equal pay and treatment for part-time
workers, ending discrimination against low-wage earners, and a national minimum wage (House
of Commons, 2018).
The TUC had several issues with the regulations as proposed by the government. Firstly,
the use of the term “employee” instead of “worker” which covered a more narrowly defined set
of individuals and excluded temporary and casual workers. Secondly, that discrimination of
part-time workers must be compared to an equivalent full-time worker doing the same job. This
posed an issue because for many professions there were not comparable full-time employees.
Finally, the bill lacked any regulation for ability of a part-time worker to transfer to full-time
work or vice-versa (Lourie, 2000). Employer associations were overall happy with the proposed
legislation. Although they also advocated for a more detailed definition of “comparable full-time
employee.”
Citing the European Directive and the potential legal challenges to the use of the term
“employee,” the TUC was able to convince the committee to use the term “worker” in the final
draft of the legislation. Additionally, comparisons for part-time workers were more fully defined
so that part-time workers must have a comparable full-time counterpart on the same type of
contract to claim discrimination (Lourie, 2000). After passing both Chambers of Parliament, the
provisions of the Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations
2000 went into effect on July 1, 2000.
The Fixed-Term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations
implemented in 2002 followed a similar trajectory of policy creation. However, controversy in
the law again arose over the use of “employee” vs. “worker” with the TUC again arguing that
defining the regulations to only cover “employees” was against the EU Directive. In using the
term “employee” those with semi-autonomous working relationships and casual workers were
again excluded from protections. The government argued applying the law to only employees
placed it more in line with other national labor regulations which the Directive specifically
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enabled member states to do. Additionally, the regulatory assessment demonstrated it would be
costlier to cover all workers instead to limiting the regulations to employees. To appease the
TUC, the government elected not to change the wording, but rather add an additional provision
enabling individuals on FTC to be eligible for pensions, although employers could exclude
temporary workers for objective reasons (McColgan, 2003).
Additionally, the legislation required finding a comparable full-time worker to declare
discrimination, allowed an employee to remain on a fixed-term contract (FTC) for a duration of 4
years before justification must be made by the employer for not converting the employee to a
permanent contract, and did not specify the maximum length for FTC. One of the starkest
exclusions from protections were temporary agency workers who accounted for 20% of
temporary workers (Koukiadaki, 2016). The employment rights Acts of the Labour government
were widely criticized for the narrow application and lack of benefits provided in the legislation,
yet no legislative changes have been made to the existing regulation since and no significant
legal challenges have changed the scope of the legislation. Following the passage of the
legislation about 1 million workers (just over 16% of part-time workers) saw their working
conditions directly impacted by the policies including receiving the same hourly pay as full-time
workers, entitlements to holidays and social benefits, access to pension schemes and inclusion in
trainings. Because of the requirement of a comparable full-time worker in the organization, the
bulk of part-time workers were not covered by the legislation.
Overall the British case demonstrates several important aspects of reform for NSWA.
Firstly, the priorities of the Social Democratic party are important in levels of NSWA. It is not
simply that the left party is in power, but that the left party is committed to reforms that benefit
part-time and temporary workers. Secondly, it shows the path dependence of prior changes to
the labor system are important in determining the institutional system in which labor reforms
take place. The diminished role of unions and lack of corporatist institutions led to lower levels
of regulation for NSWA. Without a system for union consultation and with a political party in
office that was openly hostile to unions, the union leadership needed to walk a fine line to have
any power over labor policy and to maintain its relevance within the British industrial system.
Finally, the British case demonstrates the importance of supranational institutions. Without the
EU, it is unlikely that NSWA reform would have occurred at all. Implementing the EU Directive
represented important political signaling on the part of Blair and the New Labour government. It
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allowed them to demonstrate that European employment law could be flexible and avoid
overregulation, which was his goal in agreeing to the Employment and Social Chapter. NSWA
reform was not something that was demanded from their constituency, but rather used to
demonstrate how the Third-Way’s ideal labor market reforms could look.

Labor Market Reforms in Australia

When it came to power in 1983, the ALP did not set out to embrace a new political
agenda. Rather the shift of the Australian Labor Party to the right was a based on a combination
of factors including an erosion of Labor’s traditional working-class base (Jaensch, 1989). and an
increasing need to respond to the pressures of globalization (Easton and Gerritsen, 1996). While
the ALP engaged in market-oriented reforms, the Accord with ACTU resulted in incremental
changes to labor policy that were less extreme than what was seen in other majoritarian systems
such as the UK.
The 1996 election ended 13 years of Labor government and ushered in the LiberalNational Party Coalition government (center-right) who pursued more employer driven
workplace change. One of the first pieces of legislation passed by the Howard government was
the Workplace Relations Act 1996 which removed the stipulation that unions must be involved
in the formalization of agreements between employers and employees through the establishment
of Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs). AWAs differed from the EFAs in that they did
not need to be certified by the AIRC and remained confidential to the parties involved (Hawke &
Wooden, 1998).
As industrial reform gathered pace, many unions went into sharp decline. By 1996, most
industrial agreements did not need trade union participation, significantly reducing their
influence on employment conditions (Espoto, 2015). The primary goal of this decentralized
employment relations system was to introduce greater flexibility into the labor market,
consequently much of the job growth in the Australian economy came from part-time, often
casual jobs in industries with low levels of unionization (Lansbury, 2000).
The Workplace Relations Act 1996 represented the conservative government’s signature
labor policy regulation. It makes a clear distinction between regular part-time employees and
other forms of non-standard work. Regular part-time workers were granted pro-rata benefits in
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terms of equivalent pay and conditions given to full-time workers. However, many of these
regulations applied to very select group of part-time workers as the Act also makes exceptions
for the more undefined casual workers. Under Australian law, casual employees can be
terminated with little to no notice and are exempt from annual leave, sick leave, parental leave,
bereavement leave, and severance pay. Additionally, casual workers are not paid for public
holidays. Most part-time workers in Australia are casual and therefore exempt from the parttime protections guaranteed in the legislation (Campbell et al., 2009).
Casual employment is defined by Australian common law as employees who are
presumed to have a contract that is of so minimal duration it barely exists (Carter, 1990). In this
sense, casual employees were intended to be used when labor demand necessitated i.e. in
seasonal work. Casual workers are paid a slightly higher rate than those hired on on-going
contracts to compensate for periods of unemployment and to ensure they receive a similar annual
income. Because the casual work contract is presumed to be of a short duration, casual workers
are exempted from employment benefits tied to continuous service. As the economy
deregulated, the notion of casual work changed significantly with many casual workers finding
themselves in stable jobs with predictable hours for the same employer. However, they lacked
the protections of those in full-time standard work. In many ways, the casual employment
system serves as a way for employers to avoid the regulatory obligations that come with a
permanent employee designation increasing the number of workers in insecure, temporary work
(Campbell & Burgess, 2001).
Additionally, within the Workplace Relations Act 1996, there are few regulations placed
on fixed-term employment. The federal statute allows fixed term contracts to be regulated by
enterprise-level collective agreements. While fixed-term contracts were not regulated in terms of
length, or number of successive contracts, under Australian law, fixed term contract workers are
considered employees and therefore are entitled to protections such as social insurance and paid
leave (O’Donnell, 2008).
Both the ALP and ACTU strongly opposed the changes of the Workplace Relations Act
1996 citing that it would further lead to the casualization of the workforce. Members of the ALP
accused the legislation of “outright discrimination between full-time and part-time employees.”
(Hansard, May 22, 1996). The Howard government balked at this description, instead viewing
their reforms as beneficial in creating permanent part-time employment, that would allow for a
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balance of family and work responsibilities (Hansard, 1996). While the Liberal-National
coalition had a majority in the House of Representatives, it did not have enough votes to
unilaterally pass legislation in the Senate, requiring concessions to be made to the centrist
Australian Democrats who demanded several key amendments to the legislation.
Most notably, the Democrats lobbied for the Australian Industrial Relations
Commission's powers to serve as an independent arbitrator between employers and employees to
serve as a safety net for minimum wages and fair working conditions. Regarding NSWA, the
Commission was not granted the power to limit the number of employees in a particular type of
contract or set maximum or minimum total hours for regular part-time employees. However, as
part of the compromise, the Commission was given the power to set a minimum number of
consecutive hours an employer may require a regular part-time employee to work and require a
regular pattern in hours worked by part-time employees (Boon, 1997). Satisfied with the
accepted amendments, the Liberal-National Coalition and Australian Democrats passed the
Work Place Relations Act 1996.
In 2004, the Howard government again won reelection, this time with majorities in the
House and Senate allowing it to pursue its industrial policy uncontested. This resulted in the
speedy passage of the Work Choices Act which removed protections against unfair dismissals
for workplaces up to 100 employees and abolished the “no disadvantage” test for workplace
contracts (Colvin, Watson, & Burns, 2007). In place of the no disadvantage test, legislative
minimum conditions were created in terms of minimum pay, annual leave, sick leave, and
parental leave. Protections were also removed in terms of penalty rates for working late-night or
early morning hours, leave loadings (the increased pay rate for casual workers), and incentive
payments (Wilkinson, et al., 2009).
The ALP and ACTU quickly mobilized against the WorkChoices legislation. The ACTU
organized the ‘your rights at work’ campaign against WorkChoices featuring television
advertisements, posters, flyers, and rallies against the legislation. On November 15th, 2005, the
ACTU organized a national day of protest against the legislation in which over 500,000 people
participated. The Work Choices legislation would become a central theme of the 2007 federal
election in Australia with the ALP crafting the “Forward with Fairness” plan laying out Labor’s
ideas for reforming the legislation. In stark opposition to the plan, the BCA began its own public
relations campaign in support of WorkChoices. Yet, despite the media campaign, a Newpoll in
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April of 2007 found one-third of respondents believed they were worse off under the
WorkChoices legislation and nearly half of respondents viewed it as being bad for the economy.
In 2007, the ALP won the election upon promising to repeal the WorkChoices legislation
(Waterhouse & Colley, 2010).
The Labor government began consulting with unions and business groups to replace
Work Choices. The Fair Work Bill was introduced to the House of Representatives on 25
November 2008. The ACTU was largely in support of the bill, applauding the reduction of
employer power over working hours. The BCA continued to advocate for a simplified,
nationalized system of employment regulation. Most of the changes to employment regulations
would come in the form of enhanced National Employment Standards including maximum
weekly hours of work, requests for flexible working arrangements, and parental leave
(Waterhouse & Colley, 2010). Unions were able to lobby for increased ability to collectively
bargain through provisions for multi-enterprise bargaining and agreements. Employer
organizations were able to a focus on individual rights and flexibility with limits on the industrial
actions that may be undertaken by unions (Todd, 2011). While neither side was particularly
happy with the Fair Work Act 2009, it very much represented a compromise between unions and
employer associations. As part of that compromise, legislation on part-time, temporary, and
casual work remained unchanged.
Overall, the Australian case helps to reaffirm several of the important lessons learned
from the British case. The Australian case shows the priorities of Social Democratic parties’
matter, path dependence plays an important role in the institutions governing reform, and the
diminished role of unions led to lower levels of regulation for NSWA. Absent supranational
policy guiding the legislation, protections and regulations for NSWA were minor. Both the UK
and Australian cases work to confirm Third-Way politics played an important role in creating a
labor market with higher levels of flexibility and, in turn, higher levels of precariousness and
insecurity.

Labor Market Reforms in the Netherlands
In 1982, the center-right Lubbers I government was formed consisting of Christian
democrats (CDA) and the conservative liberals (VVD). The government enacted several reforms
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during this period including decreasing the generosity of unemployment benefits by reducing the
replacement rate, reducing the duration one could qualify for such benefits, and instituting
overall budgetary reductions on unemployment spending (Delsen, 2002). Following the
reelection of the coalition in 1987, the government (Lubbers II) introduced a new unemployment
benefit scheme under the New Unemployment Insurance Act. Under this new scheme, to receive
benefits past 6 months of unemployment, the unemployed must have been employed for 3 years
prior to unemployment and benefit payouts were linked to previous work history (from 3 months
for those with 60 months’ work history’ to 54 months for those with 480 months (40 years)
(Clasen & Clegg, 2006).
In 1989, the Lubbers III government was elected, however, this time it is formed from the
CDA and Social Democrats (PvDA) creating a center-left government. One of the major
reforms undertaken by this government was to restructure the Disability Insurance Act, a scheme
that functioned like hidden unemployment insurance. Under the current legislation, individuals
could be declared disabled by a doctor if they were unable to work in their current occupation,
but still able to work in other occupations and for vague reasons such as “stress.” Employers
could use this loophole to have employees declared disabled in the case of redundancies avoiding
financial fallout and granting the “disabled” former employee benefit pay higher than they would
have received through unemployment (Barrell & Genre, 1999). By 1990, there were over 1
million adults receiving disability pensions (about 10% of the working age population) (de Gier
et al., 2004). The Lubbers III government worked to reform the disability system introducing an
age-dependent restriction on benefit duration, stricter examinations to receive benefits (for
example requiring those over fifty to take a medical examination) and making eligibility for
benefits dependent on work history. Following the initial reforms, the number of individuals on
disability insurance decreased by 10% (Yerkes, 2010).
This reform occurred against opposition from the unions and parts of the Labour Party
resulting in the organization of a 1 million strong protest march against the measures, the largest
in Dutch post-war history. In drafting the reform, the Lubbers III government had been forced to
issue policy without the consent of the social partners as the Social Economic Council was
unable to draft a unanimous position on reforming disability insurance. This led to criticism of
the social partners as operating too slowly and without transparency from both the opposition
and government. This led to a series of reforms designed to curtail the powers of the social
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partners and limit the influence of corporatism on social policy. In response, the central trade
unions and employer organizations moved to work more closely together, proving the value of
their consultation. A 1992 report outlined how the social partners and government could cleanly
and transparently divide policy making, especially regarding labor (Hemerijck, et al., 2000).
The extreme unpopularity of the disability reforms coupled with a recession in the
economy resulted in a substantial seat loss of one-third for the CDA and one-fourth for the PvDA
in the 1994 elections. The new government formed with the PvDA, along with the VVD and the
progressive liberals (D66) based on the platform of promoting work opportunities over benefits.
Additionally, the social partners began working on Figuring a “new course,” one focused on a
philosophy of participation and decentralization. Unions, for the first time, agreed to a
differentiation of working hours by sector enabling employers to develop more part-time jobs
based on business demands.
The so-called purple coalition enacted a series of reforms designed to further restructure
unemployment benefits including tightening eligibility requirements and reducing the minimum
benefit for those with short work histories. While the previous governments had focused on
cutting welfare state entitlements, the purple coalition focused on strengthening eligibility
requirements for benefits. The concept of “fitting labor” was redefined to one of “acceptable
labor” meaning the unemployed now needed to accept any available job offered that was
considered satisfactory, even if it did not require their education or skill level. Workers also had
to show they were actively looking for work to qualify for unemployment benefits (Vis et al.,
2008).
In 1996, the social partners finalized the “Flexibility and Security” agreement, a
compromise between the unions and employer associations, to protect workers and introduce
flexibility into the workforce. This agreement was given full legislative force in 1999 with the
passing of the Act on Flexibility and Security. The Act decreased dismissal protections for
fixed-term contracts by removing the need for termination of a second-fixed term contract by
government officials. It also increased the number of consecutive fixed-term contracts that could
be issued, if they did not exceed a three-year time-period. The Act also worked to strengthen
rules around on-call contracts where the hours of work are not set in advance and may range
anywhere from 0 to 40 hours a week. Under this new legislation common labor laws were
extended to on-call workers and restrictions were put into place in terms of how employers were
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able to structure stand-by hours and defined the relationship of the employer and employee based
on hours and duration of contract use (van Voss, 2000). Essentially, unions had accepted more
flexibility for employers in exchange for social security rights for NSWA.
Also, in 1999, the legislature passed the Prohibition of Discrimination by Working Hours
Act which forbade employers from discriminating against employees based on their working
hours. This Act essentially gave part-time employees equal treatment with full-time employees.
Disputes over the equal treatment would be mediated by the Equal Treatment committee, which
also dealt with discrimination cases on the grounds of sex, race, age, etc. (Wilthagen & Tros,
2004). The cooperation and compromises between employer’s organizations and national trade
unions resulted in the coining of the term “Polder Model” to describe the neocorpotist strategy
used by the social partners. The PvdA played a large role in the success of this strategy
(Woldendorp, 2005).
In the 2000s as precarious work began to increase, especially in sectors with low levels of
union representation such as the hospitality and food service sectors, Dutch trade unions began to
take on the issue of precariousness in the lower end of the labor market. Part-time jobs
especially had few hours attached to them (under 20 hours) and comprised 70% of all low-wage
jobs in the Netherlands (Salverda, 2010). Wanting to put a halt to insecurity created by these
contracts, Dutch unions began campaigning for better and more decent work for labor market
outsiders (Boonstra et al., 2012).
The Netherlands would not pass a major legislative change to NSWA until 2015 when it
passed the “Work and Security Act.” The legislation was the result of a tripartite agreement
between unions, employer’s associations, and the government to address precarious work.
Measures of the bill included guaranteeing a minimum wage to all workers, reducing the number
of consecutive temporary contracts an individual could be hired on without offering a permanent
contract, prohibition of probation periods for temporary contracts shorter than 6 months, and
introduction of a notice period for temporary contracts. The bill also aimed to reduce the
difference between fixed-term and permanent contracts by reducing dismissal rules for
permanent contracts which had remained unchanged since WWII (Clauwaer et al., 2016).
The Dutch case illustrates the importance of corporatist institutions and unions in creating
NSWA policies. It also shows the need for the government to work with unions rather than
against them in getting reforms passed for NSWA. The Dutch labor market reforms were largely
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based on consensus building not confrontation. The case also reaffirms the importance of the
positioning of the Social Democratic party. The PvdA did not adopt a traditional “third way”
policy position akin to the UK or Australia, but rather worked to provide consensual welfare
reform, job creation, and the maintenance of social security. Finally, the EU Directives were less
significant in instituting change as many of the requirements of the Directives were previously
passed into Dutch law or codified into social contracts.

Labor Market Reforms in Spain

The new-found unity between the unions provided a strong front against further
deregulation of the labor market. In 1991, Spain again experienced another recession and surge
in unemployment which prompted the PSOE to propose further policies to add flexibility to the
labor market. The unions, vehemently opposed to these suggested policies, refused to endorse
the proposals put forth by the PSOE. Instead, the PSOE relied on parliamentary alliances with
conservative parties and executive decrees to adopt policies opposed by the unions. These
reforms included increasing the minimum work period for unemployment benefits from 6
months to 1 year, decreasing the duration of benefits from 20 months to 12 months, and delaying
payments until severance payments had commenced (Rhodes, 1997). This led to the unions
calling another general strike on May 28th, 1992. This strike, unlike the previous one, did little to
convince the government to soften its reforms (Ojeda-Avilés, 2002).
Despite the reforms, by 1993 the unemployment rate in Spain topped 22%. The PSOE,
having lost its absolute majority in the 1993 elections was governing in a left-center coalition
government with the center Convergence and Union party. Unable to come to an agreement with
the unions, the government unilaterally passed the “Urgent Measures to Promote Employment”
which became law in January of 1994. The reform instituted several changes to the labor market
and regulation of non-standard work. Firstly, it abolished some forms of temporary contracts,
but replaced them with provisions for equally precarious contracts. For example,
“apprenticeship contracts,” which mirrored the Youth Employment Plan that prompted a strike in
1988. Under these contracts anyone under the age of 28 could be offered a temporary contract
paid at less than 75% of the minimum wage. These contracts were also exempt from
unemployment benefits or social security contributions. Secondly, part-time work was redefined
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from 2/3rds of full-time employment to a definition based on annual working days below fulltime. This definition absorbed all temporary jobs. Thirdly, the reforms allowed for the
formation of temporary work agencies, allowing private agencies to help place workers into
temporary contracts (Albarracin et al., 2000).
Both the UGT and CCOO lobbied against the passing of the legislation and organized
another general strike on January 24, 1994. Again, the government ignored the union demands
and forged ahead with reforms to the Worker’s Statue including allowing for firms to more
freely use collective dismissals and a gutting of worker rights, making working conditions a
condition of collective bargaining and not inalienable rights as previously specified. Individual
negotiations were given preference over collective negotiations and labor ordinances were
abolished leading to the removal of employment protection for hundreds of thousands of workers
(Martín, 2017). The reforms proved disastrous for the UGT who lost the majority in the factory
council elections in the 1995 elections because of the decline of factory councils in small firms.
The PSOE also suffered an electoral defeat, losing control of the government to the conservative
People’s Party (PP) in a snap election held in 1996 (Burgess, 1999).
Realizing that labor market segmentation and the new Conservative government
represented real challenges to the strength of unions, the UGT and CCOO changed tactics to
compromise with employer organizations. This included a collective agreement with the
employer association of temporary work agencies that set a minimum wage for temporary
agency workers and an agreement to grant temporary workers equal wages with permanent
employees. In April 1997, the Interconfederal Agreement for Employment Stability, was signed
by the CEOE, CCOO, UGT and government to reform some of the more harmful aspects of the
1994 reforms. This included stricter regulations on when temporary contracts could be used,
more severe qualifications for training and apprenticeship contracts, and the introduction of a
new permanent contract with low firing costs to encourage the hiring of young workers (under
30), the long-term unemployed (over a year), and the over-45 unemployed. These new contracts
also provided for tax benefits and reduced social security contributions to incentivize employers
(Ojeda-Avilés, 2002).
Reforms in 1998 focused on regulating part-time work. Under the 1984 regulations, parttime employees were subject to the same contractual rights as full-time workers. As a result,
most of these employees ended up on temporary contracts. Royal Decree-Law No.15/1998,
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attempted to create stable and voluntary part-time work by redefining part-time work as 77% of
full-time work, requiring advance notice of working time to eliminate the on-call nature of parttime work, and introducing equal treatment for part-time workers, pro-rata to full-time workers
(Ibanez, 2011). The aim of the legislation was also to bring Spanish law more in line with the
European Union’s Council Directive 1997/81/EC.
Spanish employers were strongly opposed to the reform and did not sign on to the
collective agreement and the 1998 reforms were not in place for long. In 2001, the conservative
government amended the legislation to promote part-time employment removing the 77% limit
and abolishing the need to contractually state working hours (Vald´es Dal, 2004).
By the mid-2000s the share of temporary jobs remained very high (33.5%) and very few
temporary jobs were converted into open-ended contracts (around 4%). Reforms were
introduced in 2006 to go into effect in 2007 that further incentivized the hiring of individuals into
permanent contracts with low severance pay and to place limits on the use of long-term
temporary contracts, mandating that contracts lasting for two-years in the same job during a
period of 30 months would automatically be converted into open-ended contracts. Law 43/2006
was put forth as a compromise between the social partners and government and additionally
provided subsidies to hire socially excluded groups such as women, the elderly, and disabled,
albeit into less protected contracts than other permanent workers. For a short time period, this
led to a decrease in the number of workers on temporary contracts (Bentolila et al., 2008).
Following the Great Recession in 2008, the unemployment rate in Spain soared once
again to over 20% of the population. The PSOE, initially reluctant to issue reforms, received
pressure from the European Union to act as the unemployment and public deficit rates increased.
In 2010, the Eurogroup meeting concluded that Spain institute austerity measures and Law
10/2010 was unilaterally passed by the government without approval from the unions who called
a general strike in response to the measures. The primary measure of the legislation was to
encourage the use of permanent contracts over temporary ones by reducing severance pay for
permanent contracts and giving the employer more leeway to fire employees. Employment
protection for temporary contracts was tightened making the use of such contracts more
restrictive and imposing a limit of three years for their duration (Picot, 2014).
The reform of 2010 and reforms in 2011 to activate unemployed job seekers and alter
collective bargaining did little to change the unemployment rate. Amid discontent with the
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economy, the conservative PP was elected in 2011. Again, negotiations with the social partners
were unable to come to an amiable conclusion leading to the unilateral adoption of Law 3/2012.
This legislation radically modified employment protection reducing severance pay for all
permanent contracts, significantly reducing the firing cost gap between permanent and temporary
employees. The reform also created contracts with a one-year trial period and no severance pay
and decentralized collective bargaining to the firm, rather than industry level. Since the reforms
have been enacted, the rate of temporary work has been slow to fall in Spain (Garcia-Serrano &
Malo, 2013).
The Spanish labor market reforms demonstrate some interesting points regarding NSWA
regulation and protection. Firstly, having strong unions is of little consequence for NSWA
protections if the government is not willing to work with the social partners. In several
instances, especially with the right government in power, NSWA policy was pursued without the
consent of the unions which resulted in weakening of NSWA protections. This demonstrates
that corporatist institutions are only strong if all parties agree to abide by them. Secondly, the
case also shows how unions can exacerbate insider-outsider cleavage. The UGT adopted a
stance of protecting permanent contracts at the expense of temporary contracts this led to an
overall increase in unregulated fixed-term contract use. This stands in contrast to the case of the
Netherlands where compromise lead to beneficial outcomes for all employees, not just a select
group.

Testing the Partisan Model and Dynamic Party Competition Model

The partisan model argues that the constituency of Social Democratic parties is an
important variable in determining what policies Social Democratic parties adopt. In the context
of NSWA, the concentration of labor market outsiders and labor market insiders in Social
Democratic parties was hypothesized as being an important variable in determining regulation of
part-time and temporary work. According to the partisan model, the more outsiders comprise the
constituency of Social Democratic parties, the higher the level of employment protection for
NSWA would be. Dynamic party competition models argue that the ability of the Social
Democratic party to cater to any one constituency is mediated by the amount of competition they
face in the multi-dimensional policy space. When facing competition from left-parties, Social
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Democratic parties push for more employment protection for their core constituency. If their
core constituency is labor market outsiders they will enact labor market regulations in their favor
(H8) and if their core constituency is labor market insiders, they will enact labor market
regulations in their favor (H9). When the competition Social Democratic parties’ face is from
the center and right, they are likely to enact weaker labor market regulations regardless of
partisan composition (H10 & H11). This is because the Social Democratic party is viewed as the
“lesser” of the two evils and can enact weaker reform without facing electoral penalties.
The case studies reveal several interesting findings in relation to these hypotheses.
Firstly, partisan composition does not appear to be a factor in determining the type of policy
adopted by Social Democratic parties in regarding NSWA. Public policy is an instrument that
both molds public support and creates the electoral coalitions political parties depend on.
Previous scholars of comparative political economy have argued that labor exists as a monolithic
partner to Social Democratic parties. However, the insider-outsider theory argues differently,
that labor is divided into labor market insiders, who find themselves in secure employment and
labor market outsiders who find themselves in insecure employment. Who Social Democratic
parties determine is their core constituency is then important in the policy decisions they make.
For any political party, policy proposals impose opportunity costs because the policy is pursued
in lieu of alternative policies. As the previous chapters have demonstrated, labor market insiders
and outsiders have different policy preferences. Therefore, for Social Democratic parties,
pursing policies that preference one group over the other has the potential to endure members of
their constituency to them, while at the same time isolating others.
Political parties are theorized to have a core constituency with additional groups they
must attract to win a stable electoral coalition. Stable ideological and historic connections
between political parties and social groups makes it easier for political parties to mobilize certain
constituents however, as the labor market has undergone such fundamental changes, who Social
Democratic parties consider their core constituency is important. As Chapter 04 of this
dissertation demonstrates, labor market outsiders are more likely to support job security than
labor market insiders. Therefore, any legislation that directly leads to better employment
protection and regulation for non-standard work is an outsider-friendly policy.
Table 7.1 shows the outsider and insider composition of Social Democratic parties, the
outsider composition of the labor force, and party in power during the major legislative reforms
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to NSWA enacted in the case countries. The cases show no evidence supporting the partisan
model as the singular explanation for NSWA reform. The expectation from the literature is
when the percentage of labor market outsiders in the party is high, there will be positive reform
for NSWA policies. Conversely, when the percentage of labor market insiders in the party is
high, there will be less protection for NSWA policies. The case-studies fail to uphold these
hypotheses. Even as labor market outsiders have grown as a proportion of Social Democratic
constituencies and the labor force in general, there does not appear to be a pattern showing
Social Democratic parties catering to this constituency solely because of their size. As Chapter
04 of this dissertation showed, labor market outsiders are less likely to vote overall than labor
market insiders. It is possible that as an unreliable voting bloc, the demands of labor market
outsiders are not catered to because they are not guaranteed to result in an electoral majority for
the Social Democratic party.
It is also important to note party in power itself is not a determinant of positive change
for NSWA policies with left party in power and right party in power just as likely to positively
reform NSWA. In the three examples in which left-party was solely in power and instituted
reforms to NSWA (Spain, 2010; UK, 2000; UK, 2002), the government was incentivized by the
European Union to pass legislation in to meet certain demands of the EU. This suggests there
may not be a strong partisan influence over NSWA policies. A finding the quantitative analysis
supports.
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Table 7.1. Insider/Outsider Composition during major reforms to NSWA in Case Countries
Country

Major
Legislation

Party in
Power

Change
in
NSWA

AUSTRALIA

The Workplace
Relations Act
1996
Fair Work Act
2009

CenterRight
Center-Left

NETHERLANDS Act on
Flexibility and
Security (1999)
Prohibition of
Discrimination
by Working
Hours Act
(1999)
Flexibility and
Security Act
(2015)
SPAIN
The
Interconfederal
Agreement for
Employment
Stability (1997)
Royal DecreeLaw
No.15/1998
Royal DecreeLaw 5/2001
Law 10/2010
UNITED
Part-time
KINGDOM
Workers
(Prevention of
Less
Favourable
Treatment)
Regulations
2000
Fixed-Term
Employees
(Prevention of
Less
Favourable
Treatment)
Regulations
2002

Left/CenterRight
Left/CenterRight

Left/CenterRight

Outsiders
as % of
SD
Parties

Insiders
as % of
SD
Parties

Outsiders
as % of
Labor
Force

No
Change

19.5%

29.8%

29.6%

No
Change

22.3%

23.1%

46.1%

Positive/
Negative 20.7%

37.7%

47.7%

20.7%

37.7%

47.7%

28.1%

23.2%

58.9%

10.37%

21.4%

26.4%

9.5%

28.6%

29.5%

Negative 13.6%

27.5%

43.5%

Negative 33.7%

22.9%

32.7%

Positive

25.9%

30.5%

39.5%

Positive

24.1%

31.6%

39.4%

Positive

Positive

Right
Positive

Right

Positive

Right
Left
Center-Left

Center-Left

143

While the case studies do not affirm the partisan model, the literature also suggests party
competition influences the strength of NSWA regulation and protection. This hypothesis is a bit
more difficult to tease out the casual effects for because having competitors to the left is more
likely to be facilitated by consensual institutions which promote multi-party systems. The
United Kingdom, Australia, and Spain essentially function as two-party systems with center-left
and center-right parties, while the Netherlands enjoys a more robust multi-party system.
However, in the time period studied, all Social Democratic parties faced far-left competition.
To test the effect of party competition, I examine the party-space in Australia, the
Netherlands, Spain and the UK both prior to the passing of substantial legislative policy
regarding NSWA (t-1) and during the government in which the legislation was passed. I
examine both because the literature suggests parties respond to electoral successes or defeats in
prior election cycles which encourages them to reposition themselves within the policy space to
capture the median voter (Fowler, 2005; Somer-Topcu, 2009). For this reason, the dynamic
party competition model must be evaluated in two ways. Firstly, how parties shift in response to
the previous election. Secondly, how the government is structured following that shift. The
dependent variables differ significantly for each country during this time-period with the British
reforms leading to higher levels of protection for part-time and temporary workers, the
Australian reforms leading to no change in the policies for NSWA, the Dutch reforms decreasing
protections for temporary workers and increasing protections for part-time workers, and the
Spanish reforms increasing protections for both temporary and part-time workers and later
decreasing those protections.
Comparing the Political Spaces of Party Competition and Testing the Dynamic Party
Competition Model
The following section will map out the political space of party competition for Australia,
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Spain. Political space is divided into two dimensions,
the left/right economic dimension and alternative/traditional 14social dimension. Both
dimensions are important for understanding labor policy. Where a party falls on the economic

14

While Kitschelt (1994) uses the terms libertarian and authoritarian to describe the cultural policy dimension, I
elect to use the terms alternative and traditional to remove jargon from my dissertation.
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left/right dimension determines how much regulation they are advocating for within the labor
market, with parties to the left favoring more regulation and parties to the right favoring less
regulation. The alternative/traditional scale determines to whom regulation should apply with
parties on the traditional values spectrum favoring regulations for standard employment and
labor market insiders and alternative cultural parties favoring regulations for NSWA and labor
market outsiders.
Within the dynamic party competition model, Social Democratic parties are expected to
increase their chances of holding office by capturing the median voter (Adams, 2009). Two
strategies allow the Social Democratic parties to pursue this aim. Firstly, they can pivot towards
the center. However, this may lead to a shift in votes by left voters to more radical parties on the
left. Alternatively, SD parties may first opt to squeeze out competition on the left, before
pivoting to the center. Regardless of the strategy adopted, the dynamic party competition model
assumes that SD parties are responsive to the electorate as a whole and not just their own
political base.
The results of this analysis partially confirm the hypothesis that competition from left
parties leads to higher levels of employment regulation and protection for nonstandard workers,
with Australia being a notable exception to this rule and temporary work being far more
influenced by this divide than part-time employment. And disconfirms the hypothesis that a
greater ideological distance between Social Democratic and center and right parties leads to
weaker regulations and protection for NSWA. The findings again support the quantitative
analysis to show that greater ideological distance between Social Democratic and right parties
leads to higher levels of NSWA protection and regulation. The mechanism for this appears to be
the coalitions formed within the parliamentary systems and the ability of the minority party to
influence policy.
Figure 6.1 shows the political space of Australian party competition prior to the
1996 labor market reforms while Figure 6.2 shows the political space of Australian party
competition during the 1996 labor market reforms. Each party is located according to its score
on the economic left/right and alternative/traditional scale (See Chapter 05 for detailed
discussion of how this was calculated). The size of each bubble represents the total votes earned
by each party in the corresponding election year i.e. the larger the bubble, the greater the number
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of votes earned in the election. The figure also displays the median voter towards whom Social
Democratic and other parties are expected to shift.
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Figure 7.1. Political Space of Party Competition Australia (1993)
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Figure 7.2. Political Space of Party Competition Australia (1996)

The figures show no competition among parties to the left of the Social Democratic party
in both years. Between 1993 and 1996, the Australian Labor party significantly shifted its policy
position on the alternative/traditional scale, becoming far more traditional in its policy platform.
The Liberal Party of Australia similarly shifted towards the left and adopted a more traditional
policy stance during this time frame. The 1993 elections comprised of an office-seeking strategy
for the ALP as the party attempted to cultivate new interest groups including the young, women,
and people of color. The alternative cultural orientation of the party represented its commitment
to equality and attempt to become a party that appealed to a wide section of the electorate.
However, this strategy would come at the expense of promoting the working-class interests of
the party’s traditional constituency.
The 1993 win for the ALP was surprising for the Liberal/National Coalition. The
Coalition’s loss was widely attributed to the economic policy plan (Fightback!) released in
December 1992. The Fightback! plan contained a strict neoliberal agenda with cuts to
unemployment benefits, Medicare, and other welfare entitlements and tax cuts for the wealthy
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and middle-class. The plan also introduced a 15% Goods and Services Tax (GST), which would
operate as a value-added tax on certain categories of products. The GST was exceptionally
unpopular and provided a clear dividing line in economic policy between the ALP and coalition.
Both parties would shift their policy platforms in the 1996 election remaining vague on
economic policy and emphasizing more social policy issues. The ALP especially emphasized
environmental issues to appeal to the “green” vote. Political strategists for the Coalition believed
the traditional working-class voters were susceptible to defection and used the ALP’s courting of
various minority and social groups against the party, emphasizing how the industrial policies put
in place by the ALP had harmed the interests of workers. The shift by the ALP towards a more
traditional cultural platform served as an attempt to appeal once again to its working class
(generally white, male, and in standard work) base. The tax hikes adopted by the ALP between
1993 and 1996 further hampered their relationship with the traditional working-class resulting in
the Coalition winning working-class voters 47.5% compared to Labor's 39% and the majority in
the election (Sullivan, 1997).
Following the 1996 election, the ALP found itself in the position of needing to protect
what was left of its constituency and draw working-class voters back to the party. As part of this
restructuring, most of the ALP opposition would be to support insider interests and to reduce the
erosion of protections for standard jobs. As the opposition party, they did not have a lot of
power to stop the reforms proposed by the Coalition. Instead, it would be the centrist Australian
Democrats in the Senate that served as a mediating influence on the Workplace Relations Act
1996. The emergence of the Australian Democrats led to a leftward shift by the ALP, as well as
the Liberal-National Coalition. In the next three subsequent elections, the ALP would remain on
the economic left and traditional cultural spectrum as the Australian Democrats and later
alternative-left Australian Greens entered the policy space. This would change in the 2007
election as the ALP began to distance itself from the ACTU and campaign against the
Workchoices legislation.
Both the National Party and Liberal Party shifted towards the economic left in 1996
which would suggest regulations for NSWA would be stronger. While this ended up being the
case for permanent part-time workers, the traditional cultural orientation of the center-right
coalition led to few restrictions on casual workers (temporary workers), who represent most parttime workers. While NSWA regulations were codified, the loopholes then made the legislation
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essentially moot. Regulations, when put into place, are not particularly useful if those that need
protection are unable to access it.
Figures 7.3 and 7.4 shows the political space of Australia prior to and following the 2007
election. The ALP won a majority in the House of Representatives in 2007. In the Senate, the
ALP needed to court the approval of the Australian Greens to get bills passed. Rather than
advocating directly for changes to part-time, temporary, and casual work, the Australian Greens
proposed legislation that would strengthen parental leave, care leave and flexible work
arrangements. These provisions benefited women in the workforce, although primarily those in
standard work arrangements.
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Figure 7.3. Political Space of Party Competition Australia (2004)
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Figure 7.4. Political Space of Party Competition Australia (2007)

By 2009, the Australian Labor Party found itself in a policy position that is quite far from
primary center challenger (National Party) and right challenger (Liberal Party). As a result, they
were able to shift their policy position more towards the center without facing severe electoral
repercussions. The ALP even went as far as to claim the Fair Work Act 2009 was a success
because neither the ACTU or BCA were particularly happy with the legislation. The emergence
of the Greens as a serious threat to the ALP, would pull the Australian Labor Party in an
alternative-left direction in the 2010 Australian federal election, which despite the pivot resulted
in an electoral gain for the Australian Greens and the formation of a Green/ALP minority
government under Julia Gillard. The Gillard government would pass several reforms benefiting
workers including pension increases, the creation of a disability insurance scheme, extension of
paid parental leave, the right to request more flexible working hours, consultation with
employees before changing work schedules, extension of anti-discrimination laws for gay,
lesbian, and transgender Australians, and restrictions against discrimination towards breast
feeding mothers. While this legislation would positively benefit those working in NSWA, it did
150

little to address the growing prevalence of part-time, temporary, or casual work or work to
eliminate deficiencies between NSWA and standard work.
The Australian case presents a challenge to the dynamic party competition model.
Firstly, with a strong left competitor with a great deal of ideological distance between itself and
the left party, I would expect to see a higher level of protection for NSWA, this does not
manifest. Secondly, with a left-party in power I would expect to see higher levels of protection
for NSWA, this does not occur. However, with moderate ideological distance between itself and
the center and right parties, I would expect to see a lower level of protection for NSWA. In the
case of Australia, there were no changes to NSWA. Three scenarios are possible. One, the
presence of a far-left challenger and an ideologically distant right challenger balanced each other
out, leading to no change. Two, a more likely scenario is the ideological orientation of the
median voter influenced who labor market reforms favored. The median voter during the period
had a strong traditional cultural orientation. As a result, one would expect to see labor market
reforms which favored labor market insiders. Significant labor market reforms were passed in
Australia, they just were just not accessible to those in NSWA and instead favored those in
standard work. Considering the ALP would not pivot strongly in an alternative-left orientation
until the next election, it is likely they were trying to enact policy to maintain their center pivot
and parliamentary majority.

Three, because Australia did not belong to a supranational

institution like the EU that required reforms to NSWA, the parties did not view the legislation as
a priority. The EU was identified as a significant variable for NSWA reform, especially for parttime work and many of the other country cases only made reforms following the issuance of the
Directives on non-standard work. Australia’s failure to pass NSWA reform may be a good
indication that such reform does not develop endogenously but is rather a consequence of
exogenous factors.
Figures 7.5 & 7.6 show the political space of United Kingdom party competition prior to
the 1998 labor market reforms and during the 1998 labor market reforms. The 1992 election had
been a tragic defeat for the Labour Party. Initial exit polls had suggested the election would
result in a hung Parliament. However, the actual election results were an astounding victory for
the Conservative Party as they won 41.9% of the votes to Labour’s 34.4% giving the
Conservative party a majority in the House of Commons. Between the two elections, the shift by
the Labour Party from the alternative-left sphere to the traditional-left sphere is significant. The
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primary reason for this shift was a concerted effort by the Labour party to broaden their
constituency to appeal to more middle-class voters and the median voter. In many ways, this
was a direct attempt by the Labour Party to appeal to labor market insiders who increasingly saw
their rights attacked under the Major government which had passed legislation allowing
employers to fire workers for participating in unauthorized industrial actions and the abolishment
of wage councils (and with it the minimum wage and collective bargaining agreements).
Similarly, the Conservative Party shifted towards the left on the economic scale as it tamped
down on its free market rhetoric which was becoming increasingly unpopular with the British
electorate.

10

5
Liberal Democrats

Alternative/Traditional

Labour Party
-50

0
-40

-30

-20
-10
Median Voter

0

10

20

-5
Democratic
Unionist Party

Scottish National
Party
-10
Ulster Unionist
Party

Economic Left/Right

Conservative Party

-15

-20
Source: Comparative Manifesto Project

Figure 7.5. Political Space of Party Competition United Kingdom (1992)
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Figure 7.6. Political Space of Party Competition United Kingdom (1997)

The 1997 election saw the emergence of New Labour and a convergence between the
Labour and Conservative parties in terms of their policy platforms. The Labour government
effectively had no left competitor, enabling them to shift both towards the center and a more
traditional cultural direction with little electoral loss meaning regulation for NSWA is expected
to be weaker. The electoral strategy adopted by New Labour was exceptionally successful in
1997 as it pulled together a coalition of middle-class, working-class, and low-skill workers,
although voter turnout was lower in 1997 than it was in the 1992 election (IPSOS, 1997). This
new economic left, traditional cultural direction in line with the median voter suggests that
changes to labor market regulations would be structured to benefit labor market insiders.
Policies adopted under New Labour included the introduction of a minimum wage, extending
anti-discrimination laws for LGBT Britain’s, introduction of paid holidays, extension of rights
including paternity leave, maternity leave and pay, increased compensation for unfair dismissal,
and restoration of the legal right to trade union representation. However, while these laws were
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put in place, they did not completely cover all British workers as rights such as parental leave
and annual leave were based on stipulations of hours worked or length of continual tenure for a
company which greatly disadvantaged those in NSWA. Additionally, many of the social reforms
put in place by New Labour relied on tax credits. As outsiders are compensated at a lower rate
than insiders, this also served to reduce their benefits from this legislation.
Overall, the British case is a better demonstration of the dynamic party competition
model. Lack of left competitor meant the Labour party could shift towards the center without
facing the risk of electoral loss. However, the convergence between the Labour Party and
Conservative Party within the policy space does not support the hypothesis that regulation and
protection for NSWA would be higher. It does support the findings in the previous chapter that
greater ideological distance between the SD party and right party leads to higher levels of
protection and regulation for NSWA. The UK has one of the lowest rates of regulation and
protection for NSWA and as the case study demonstrates, much of this was by design of New
Labour to create legislation that would continue to be business-friendly. The UK case also
shares similar traits with that of Australia in that the traditional cultural orientation of the
government lead to increased regulations for labor market insiders, but lesser regulations for
outsiders. It is possible to hypothesize that without the intervention of the EU, regulation and
protection for NSWA would not have been a priority for New Labour. Ascending to the EU,
was the catalyst for positive change to NSWA regulation, not a policy decision determined by
the government.
Figures 7.7 and 7.8 show the political space of the Netherlands party competition prior to
the 1999 labor market reforms and during. The general positioning of the PvdA in the 1994
election represented an office-seeking strategy by the party leaders who had determined the
PvdA did better electorally when it was in government. This was a result of their attempts to
deradicalize the party platform (Wolinetz, 1995). The dominant strategy of the party was
therefore to remain as an attractive coalition partner to the CDA, who had served as a member of
every Dutch government since 1918 and had the power to pick and choose its coalition partners.
However, the CDA would have a disastrous result in the 1994 elections because of the unpopular
disability reforms as well as internal divisions within the party and the retirement of former
Prime Minister Lubbers from politics (Green-Pedersen, 2002). The 1994 election resulted in
large gains for the VVD, D66 and two parties for the elderly. The CDA dropped from 35.3% of
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the votes to 22.2%, while the PvdA fared better dropping from 31.9% to 24%. While the PvdA
arose as the majority party, the formation of the government was quite tricky as any combination
of the PvdA, VVD, or CDA government would have to include D66. The centrist D66 party,
founded on reforming the Dutch democratic system, refused to join any coalition other than one
formed from the PvdA, VVD, and D66. As this was the only feasible way government could
form, this created the “purple coalition.”
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Figure 7.7. Political Space of Party Competition Netherlands (1994)
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Figure 7.8. Political Space of Party Competition Netherlands (1998)

The alternative-left Green Left Party and Socialist Party in the Netherlands served as the
largest left competitors for the PvdA. This created a dilemma for the PvdA who could either
move toward the left in its policy orientation to reduce votes of its left competitor or remain in
the center, capturing the median voter but losing votes to its leftist competitors. Choosing a
more centrist path is the least costly strategy for SD parties when competition from alternativeleft and centrist parties is weak. As both the left-competitors in the Netherlands are relatively
large and the centrist competition is strong, remaining in this position was exceptionally risky for
the PvdA who was likely to lose its core supporters.
To maintain its political appeal, the core policy promoted by the purple coalition was job
creation and higher levels of labor market participation, promises it delivered upon. The 1998
election was quite collegial with the coalition partners agreeing again to govern. The CDA
continued to find itself in a difficult position as an opposition party, shifting to the left by
emphasizing improvements in social security and family policy. This gave the PvdA an
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opportunity to move leftwards in its economic stance as its center competitor became weaker and
its leftist competitors became stronger, this proved to be the logical choice to make. In the 1998
election, the CDA would continue to lose seats, this time only receiving 18.4% of the vote. Both
the Green Left Party and Socialist Party gained seats receiving 7.3% and 3.5% of the vote.
Based upon the policy space in the Netherlands at the time, a large ideological divide
between the left parties and SD party is expected to lead to higher levels of regulation for
NSWA. The distance between the PvdA and the VVD increased in 1998, suggesting lower
levels of regulation for NSWA. However, the CD party remained relatively close, suggesting
higher levels of regulation for NSWA. The reforms passed by the purple-coalition in 1999 were
quite beneficial to part-time workers granting them equal treatment with full-time workers. The
reforms in the Netherlands for temporary workers are not as generous with a reduction in
regulations for fixed-term contracts. While the coalition was willing to compromise with parttime workers, the government was less inclined to tighten regulations for temporary workers.
Chapter 05 demonstrated that when there is a left competitor and an insider dominated SD party,
regulations for temporary work are expected to be lower. This appears to be what happened in
the case of the Netherlands as insiders comprised 37.7% of the PvdA compared to outsider’s
20.7%. It is possible that this constrained the ability of the SD party to pivot too far to the left, as
their constituency was still primarily comprised of insiders leading to mixed reforms for NSWA.
The 2010 elections in the Netherlands were an early election, triggered by the inability of
the coalition partners (CDA, PvdA and CU). to agree on continued Dutch involvement in
Afghanistan. The financial crisis loomed heavily on the election, as all parties proposed cuts to
government spending. The election lead to a minor victory for the VVD with 20.5% of the vote,
compared to 19.6% for the PvdA. Following the election, it took 127 days to form a government
with the CDA, VVD and PVV finally succeeding. The 2010 election demonstrated the
fragmentation of the Dutch electorate and the difficulty the new coalition would have governing
(Van Holsteyn, 2011). While the three main parties received close to 90% of the vote in the
1950s, by the 2010s, combined they received less than 50% of the votes, making it difficult to
form governments and influencing the electoral strategies taken by Dutch political parties.
Early elections were again called in 2012, this time amid disagreement between the
coalition partners over austerity measures. The government needed to cut 16 billion Euro from
the deficit to meet the measures set by the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact. To compete with the
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rising alternative-left challenge of the Socialist Party, the PvdA, emphasized compensation to
lower-income groups and increased public investment to boost economic growth. The VVD, on
the other hand, maintained its emphasis on fiscal austerity and welfare cuts, wavering little in its
position from the previous election. The strategy would prove successful for both parties with
both parties gaining seats. The VVD would gain a plurality with 26.6% of seats the PvdA’s
24.8% (Van Holsteyn, 2014). This would lead to the formation of a VVD/PvdA coalition
government. Figures 7.9 and 6.10 show the political space in the Netherlands during the 2010
and 2012 elections.
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Figure 7.9. Political Space of Party Competition Netherlands (2010)
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Figure 7.10. Political Space of Party Competition Netherlands (2012)

Based on the political space of the Netherlands in 2012, the dynamic party competition
model predicts that strong party competition from the Green Left and Socialist Party would lead
to increased protection for NSWA, while ideological distance between the PvdA and VVD
would lead to decreased protection for NSWA. While protections for temporary contracts
increased during this time, this was done as a trade-off for reduced protections on permanent
contracts. This trade-off falls in line with the increased alternative cultural direction of the
median voter. The PvdA found itself in a similar political situation as the 1998 reforms,
although with one less coalition partner. What is notable is the insider dominance of the party
had waned, leading to a greater vote share among outsiders and a positive reform towards fixedterm contracts. This supports the findings in Chapter 05 that the office-seeking and vote-seeking
strategies intersect at least when influencing temporary employment protections.
Figures 7.11 and 7.12 show the political space of Spain’s party competition prior to the
1998 labor market reforms and during the government that passed them. The 1993 election in
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Spain had been a contentious one for the PSOE as their core working-class voters expressed
dissatisfaction with the party, its labor market reforms, and the general state of the economy.
The victory of the PSOE had been a surprise, only facilitated by, as exit polls showed, last
minute leftist voters changing their minds and casting a ballot for the PSOE rather than
abstaining or voting for the leftist competitor, United Left (Navarro, 2015). The incumbency
advantage is very strong in the Spanish system, especially among undecided voters which may
have helped solidify the PSOE’s win (la Calle et al., 2010). The victory for the PSOE was slim
as the party captured 38.8% of the popular vote to the PP’s 34.7%.
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Figure 7.11. Political Space of Party Competition Spain (1993)
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Figure 7.12. Political Space of Party Competition Spain (1996)

This led to the formation of a government between the PSOE and the centre-right
Convergence and Union Party (CU). The labor market reforms pushed by the government
increased flexibility at the expense of insiders and without the approval of the unions. The 1994
European Parliament elections previewed the discontent with these policies leading to the loss of
three and a half million voters from the PSOE. The strategy for both the PSOE and PP was to
appeal to the center voter, where the vast majority of Spaniards identified themselves (Balfour,
1996). In the 1996 election, the PSOE would be defeated by the PP, receiving only 37.6% of the
vote to the PP’s 38.8%. Many of the defectors from the PSOE ended up supporting the far-left
UL, who increased its number of seats from 18 to 21. The PP, with a stability deal from the CU
and Basque and Catalan nationalist parties would form a government.
The literature suggests that with a right-centre government in power, labor market
reforms in Spain at this time would be disadvantageous to outsiders. However, the relative
closeness of the PSOE to its right competitor and the strength of the United Left as a left
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competitor worked to make a shift towards deregulation electorally unappealing for the PP.
While there was fragmentation among the left parties, the total votes for the left totaled 1 million
more than the right, meaning most constituents (51.2%) supported left parties.
The first labor market reform instituted by the PP was to restructure the unpopular 1994
legislation put in place by the PSOE. This legislation was negotiated as a compromise between
unions and employers associations. These reforms were aimed at creating greater opportunities
for permanent contracts, albeit less secure ones. The legislation both harmed labor market
insiders by reducing protections and bolstered labor market outsiders by incentivizing certain
groups to be hired into full-time permanent employment. The reforms instituted by the PP had
two clear motivations, firstly, to benefit employers, one of their key constituencies and secondly
to attract outsiders, a demographic the PSOE had largely ignored (Rueda, 2007).
Laws strengthening part-time employment additionally had this motivation. However,
they were also influenced by a need to bring Spanish law in line with European Union’s
Directive on Part-Time Work. In many ways the transposition of the Directive was stricter than
what was in the EU legislation with a firmer cap on part-time hours and requirements that
workers know their schedules ahead of time. The PP viewed these policies as important to the
creation of greater levels of employment that was more stable, and supportive of their goals to
reform the Spanish economy in preparation for integration into the European Monetary Union.
Opposition to the legislation came from the left, who felt it did not go far enough in providing
protections for part-time workers. Issues included ensuring the voluntariness of part-time
employment and removing discrimination towards part-time workers in terms of benefits
(Congress of Deputies, 1998). With a positive view of the legislation from the coalition
government, the legislation would pass without reform.
As show in Figure 7.13, the 2000 election represented a major shift for the PSOE in terms
of policy it significantly shifted its policy platform to the economic left and closer in line with
the IU. The PSOE approached the IU to negotiate a pre-campaign pact. However, the final pact
did not involve the parties combining to form a single-ticket, but rather the parties agreed to form
a coalition government should the PSOE win a plurality. The PSOE felt that allying with the IU
would serve its goal of bringing back leftist voters who had deserted the party. Regardless of
this effort, the PP won a majority of the seats in the House and 44.54% of the vote, becoming the
first ever centre-right majority government in Spanish history (Chari, 2000).
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Figure 7.13. Political Space of Party Competition Spain (2000)

The 1998 labor reforms were passed with the consent of unions, but against the wish of
business associations. With the PP firmly in the majority the centre-right party introduced
legislation to amend the 1998 law. The IU strongly opposed the change, advocating instead for a
reduction of the working day to 35 hours. They criticized the government as focused on the
quantity of jobs it was creating while ignoring the quality. The PSOE also advocated for a
reduction in working hours and criticized the government for proposing changes against the
wishes of the unions. The PP supported their policy by citing their party’s reductions in longterm unemployment and the need to further reform the labor market in line with the maintaining
the goals set out by the EU. The PP viewed the reforms as removing rigidities within the labor
market, freeing employers to hire more employees. While both the IU and PSOE tried to get
alternative text to the amendments passed, both measures failed, and the PP’s labor market
reforms were adopted (Congress of Deputies, 2001). Overall, the legislation both reduced
protections for part-time employment and worked to incentivize the hiring of individuals into
permanent contracts. The policy space in Spain in 2000 was much different than in the previous
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election. With a majority government, the PP was able to pass reforms without the need for
compromise.
The PSOE won a surprise victory in 2004 amid upset about the PP’s handling of the
deadliest terrorist attack in European history and their intervention in the Iraq war (Chari, 2004).
The PSOE was able to form a minority government with several regional parties. In 2006, labor
market reforms were introduced to incentivize the hiring of individuals into open-ended
contracts. The main beneficiaries of this reform were women, the young, and disabled groups
that are more likely to find themselves labor market outsiders. With the continued political
competition of the IU, who had shifted more left economically and less traditional culturally, the
vote-seeking PSOE adopted a strategy to appeal to labor market outsiders. The political space of
Spain in 2004 is shown in Figure 7.14.
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Figure 7.14. Political Space of Party Competition Spain (2004)

This strategy was positively rewarded in the 2008 election wherein the IU lost a
significant number of votes and seats, receiving less than 4% of the vote and gaining only 2 seats
in the Parliament. The PSOE would again form a minority government, this time on the heels of
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the Great Recession. The 2010 reforms were largely influenced by the need for austerity
measures as cited by the EU, who facing a crisis in the Eurozone was desperate to reduce
unemployment in Spain as well as the public debt crisis the country was facing. These austerity
reforms targeted many of the employment protections insiders benefitted from including
increased and eased grounds for dismissals and a decentralization of collective bargaining
structures. The legislation further reduced restrictions on the use of temporary work agencies
and other fixed-term contracts as a manner of adding additional flexibility to the labor market
and reducing unemployment. These labor market reforms were exceptionally unpopular with
trade unions who held a general strike in protest of the measures, employer associations who felt
they did not go far enough and voters who would deliver a resounding victory to the PP in the
next election (Suárez Corujo, 2014). The political space of Spain in 2008 is shown in Figure
7.15.
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Figure 7.15. Political Space of Party Competition Spain (2008)

Again, the intervention of the European Union stands as an important variable for
understanding NSWA reform. However, while in the case of the United Kingdom, the EU’s
intervention lead to positive change, in the case of Spain, the need for austerity measures led to
negative change. This intervening variable makes it difficult to tease out what type of measures
the PSOE would have introduced had they not been required to liberalize their employment
protections.
The cases work to partially confirm the dynamic-party competition model plays a role in
NSWA regulation. Parties react to competition within the policy space by shifting their priorities
to capture the median voter. The dynamic party competition model appears to be an explanation
for NSWA regulation on its own, and in some cases in combination with the partisan model. In
the case of Australia, the dynamic party competition model does not fully explain labor market
reforms as there is no legislative change to NSWA. However, the Australian case highlights the
importance of the positioning of the median voter, as well as the influence of the European
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Union on NSWA reform. The case of the UK demonstrates that lack of left competitor
combined with minor ideological distance from the center and right competitor led to lower
levels of protection and regulation for NSWA. This supports the findings from Chapter 05, but
not the hypotheses derived from the literature. The UK case also reaffirms the role of the EU in
NSWA reform. The case of the Netherlands shows again that left party competition is an
important variable and provides the clearest evidence that they dynamic party competition and
partisan model combine to produce NSWA results, at least in terms of temporary work
protections. And finally, the Spanish case highlights that right parties are also influenced by
party competition, as well as the influence of the EU in NSWA reform.
One variable worth revisiting is the role of left parties in labor market reform. The cases
show that left party in power is not an important variable in determining NSWA protection and
regulation. Parties on the left, and Social Democratic parties, were more than willing in the case
studies to reform labor markets, often to the disadvantage of labor market insiders and outsiders.
However, the case studies also demonstrate that in certain instances, the Social Democratic
Parties realized the shrinking size of their working-class base and worked to mobilize to attract
additional voters. In the case of the UK and Australia, this mobilization was more towards the
middle-classes. In Spain and the Netherlands, there was some attempt to mobilize for outsider
support. However, this only occurred as labor market outsiders became a larger proportion of
the electorate. This suggests that as labor market outsiders comprise more and more of the
electorate and therefore have more influence on the median voter, parties will be more likely to
adjust their platforms to fit their needs.
Testing the Role of Corporatism and Unions
The final hypotheses tested in the case studies focus on the role of corporatist institutions
and unions in determining regulation for NSWA. The literature suggests corporatist institutions
may result in either stronger or weaker protections for NSWA depending on the make-up of
unions (H12, H13, H14). The greater the number of outsiders in labor unions, the stronger
employment protection and regulation for NSWA will be (H15). However, when insiders
dominate labor unions, protections for NSWA will be weaker (H16).
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Table 6.2 shows a composite measure of each case country’s rate of corporatism by
combining measures of government intervention and wage centralization. The UK has the
lowest levels of corporatism, while the Netherlands has the highest rate of corporatism in the
90s, eventually tying with Spain for the highest rate in the late 2010s. Although a liberal market
economy, Australia has relatively high levels of corporatism, compared to the UK and other
liberal market economies countries.
Table 7.2. Composite Score of Corporatist Institutions
(1=LOW;
10=HIGH)

1996/2000

2000/2005

2006/2010

2011/2015

AUSTRALIA

4

4

4.8

5

NETHERLANDS

7

7.6

7.4

7

SPAIN

5

6.6

6.4

7

2.1

2.5

2.5

2.5

UK

Source: ICTWWS

In examining the cases, the hypothesis that strong corporatist institutions will result in
stronger employment protection and regulation for NSWA is confirmed. In the UK, the Labour
party made it very clear that it had no intention of cooperating with unions or restoring the labor
relations system decimated by the Thatcher/Major reforms. In Australia, while the Australian
Labor Party initially worked to establish tripartite negotiations, the reforms of the Liberal Party
attempted to destroy this effort to build a corporatist structure. Despite those efforts, the overall
level of corporatism in Australia remains moderately high. However, in both cases, the UK and
Australia have relatively weak NSWA regulation and protection despite varying levels of
corporatism. The case studies reveal that the ideological orientation of the Australian labor
unions of the time were not in favor of instituting labor market reforms geared at labor market
outsiders. However, reforms to the labor market did occur during this time and primarily
benefited labor market insiders. The literature suggests that the impact of corporatism will be
mediated by the make-up of unions. The Australian case serves to provide support for this
hypothesis.
Low levels of protection and regulation are not observed in the Netherlands and Spain
where strong corporatist systems lead to higher levels of NSWA protection and regulation. In
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the case of the Netherlands, the Polder model, led to high levels of cooperation with employer’s
organizations to develop mutually beneficial social pacts. In the case of Spain, a period of union
harmony also led to compromise with employer organizations and increased protections and
regulations for NSWA. What is interesting about these cases is that unions in both countries had
to find these compromises to retain their own power and preserve the corporatist system itself.
In Spain, when the unions acted in a confrontational manner and the government found the
demands of the unions to be unreasonable, the government simply passed the policy without the
approval of the social partners. This however resulted in mass demonstrations by the unions and
a shortened tenure for the party in power. In the Netherlands, the compromises of the unions and
employers were based on the threat of policy implementation without approval which spurred the
social partners to further compromise.
The literature argues that the composition of unions is important in determining the levels
of NSWA protection and regulation. The gap in union membership between full-time and parttime workers has been declining as unions have refocused on gaining part-time workers as
members (Kirton & Greene, 2005). The literature suggests when labor market insiders comprise
the majority of union members, social pacts will be drawn to ensure their protection at that
detriment of outsiders (Rueda, 2005). The cases partially support this hypothesis.
Table 6.3 shows the percent of labor union membership comprised of labor market
outsiders. Despite having the highest rate of labor market outsider membership, Australia has
the weakest level of protection for NSWA. As the proportion of outsiders in the labor market
has grown and within unions has grown, there is some indication that this balance has had an
impact on the reforms unions push for. As outsiders have grown as a proportion of labor union’s
membership, the demands of labor unions to reform NSWA have grown.
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Table 7.3. Labor Market Outsiders as a Percentage of Union Members
1996/2000

2001/2005

2006/2010

2011/2015

AUSTRALIA

38.7%

45.8%

43.6%

51.5%

NETHERLANDS

30.6%

33.2%

36.2%

40.5%

SPAIN

15.1%

23.2%

36.9%

46.0%

UNITED KINGDOM

33.7%

40.1%

36.8%

30.3%
Source: ISSP

In the case of the Netherlands, the increased unionization rate of women, labor market
outsiders in the Netherlands, led to union’s shifting course on blocking policies that enabled parttime and temporary work. Realizing that the Christian Democratic government’s welfare system
for childcare would lead many women into part-time work, the unions began to prioritize quality
part-time and temporary employment (Visser, 2002). The campaign of the TUC in the UK for
part-time worker rights came about as a need identified by the unions to become more inclusive
of an increasingly diverse working population, especially for women. Part-time reforms
coincided with campaigns against racism and disability discrimination at work (Heery, 1998). In
Australia, the ACTU has recently begun a campaign towards fighting for greater rights for casual
workers with the “Change the Rules” campaign (ACTU, 2018). This has culminated in the
introduction of legislation to extend the regulations of the Fair Work Act to casual workers.
Since the Great Recession, labor unions in Spain have made a concerted effort to reach out to
young workers (another predominately outsider group). In doing so, they have proposed reforms
that tackle reducing temporary and involuntary part-time employment (UGT, 2018).
Table 6.4 shows the labor union density of each country in the time period studied. It is
important to note that both Australia and the UK have higher levels of union membership than
the Netherlands or Spain. However, with weak corporatist institutions, the ability of these
unions to implement policy change is minor. Both the ACTU and TUC have made strides to
unionize labor market outsiders in the past 5 years. However, their ability to influence
legislation has been minor. The Dutch and Spanish unions have been far more successful in this
regard, advocating and adding protections for NSWA, as well as increasing their unionization
rate of outsiders.
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Table 7.4. Labor Union Density
1996/2000

2001/2005

2006/2010

2011/2015

AUSTRALIA

27.9%

23.2%

19.2%

16.7%

NETHERLANDS

23.8%

21.4%

19.4%

18.4%

SPAIN

16.8%

15.6%

16.2%

16.0%

UNITED KINGDOM

30.7%

28.2%

27.1%

25.4%
Source: OECD

There is some evidence that the insider/outsider divide may help to determine the policies
unions choose to stand behind. The Spanish case best illustrates the idea of the insider-outsider
cleavage with the Spanish trade unions allowing deregulation of temporary contracts while
promoting the rights of permanent workers. However, as unemployment remained stubborn and
temporary contracts became the norm, the UGT and COO reversed courses to push for better
regulation of fixed term contracts. The Netherlands also sees a similar pattern with the unions
allowing for the deregulation of part-time and temporary jobs to preserve permanent contract
protections. This is until part-time jobs became the most common contracts and the unions
began to promote better working regulations for part-time workers. This can be contrasted with
the push of the ACTU in Australia, to campaign for better regulation of casual work which has
yet to be passed as legislation. The TUC in the UK has additionally worked to challenge
insecure work through the abolishment of zero-hours contracts. However, while in the
Netherlands and Spain unions have been successful in regulating NSWA. In Australia and the
UK, the unions have not been a driving force in this regulation as they are relatively weak.
In all the countries studied the need to increase labor market flexibility was an important
feature of labor reform policy in the 1980s and 1990s. High unemployment rates drove the
governments of many countries to institute difficult reforms that shrank the welfare state and
changed employment patterns for workers. The cases demonstrate that stronger corporatist
institutions, and particularly the willingness of the government to abide by the recommendations
of the social partners play an important role in determining the level of employment protection
and regulation for NSWA. The cases also show that corporatist institutions are instrumental in
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passing reforms geared towards NSWA, but the willingness of unions to address outsider
interests also plays an important role. As the quantity of outsiders in unions has increased, labor
unions have pushed for more and more reforms of NSWA.

Discussion

In examining the cases, there are several issues that reveal themselves as important to
determining the level of NSWA regulation and protection. Firstly, the change in messaging and
representation of the Social Democratic parties themselves, especially as viewed from the lens of
the “new left.” The Social Democratic parties instituted policy during the 1980s through today
are far different from the Social Democratic parties of the 1960s and 70s. The “third way”
policies of the Labour Party in the United Kingdom, Australian Labor Party in Australia, and to a
lesser extent the PvD in the Netherlands focused on a decentralization of the welfare system and
emphasis on individual autonomy and self-governance. The embrace of globalization and a
move away from broad attempts to regulate the labor market modified the electorate supporting
left parties. In many ways, it is the beneficiaries of these policy choices that have become the
core constituency of the Social Democratic parties, those who are younger, better educated and
middle class, those that work in human services, and those with post-materialist values
(environmentalists, feminists, etc.) (Kitschelt, 1988). Because of this realignment, an
insider/outsider divide based on economic security becomes less of an issue because the Social
Democratic party is not serving as an instrument of unions or the working class. Instead, the
Social Democratic party served to lessen economic security for the population for the sake of job
creation.
The policy tradeoffs made by the Left during this period additionally show the difficult
calculus of the “new politics” of the welfare state. Amid high levels of unemployment and a
fiscally untenable entitlements system, parties were forced to make difficult choices.
Flexibilization of the labor market was not initially seen as one of those difficult choices,
especially when the alternative was high numbers of the unemployed. In this sense, giving
people opportunities for jobs was viewed as the better outcome. The old-Left was able to be
tough on regulation and protection for all jobs because of unprecedented job growth during the
1950s and 60s. The new Left had to adapt or face decimated welfare systems and massive
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cohorts of the unemployed. In many ways, this also helps to explain why there has not been a
push from Social Democratic parties to further regulate NSWA, the policies that created NSWA
were done so explicitly to create a secondary labor market, reducing the flexibility of this labor
market could very well lead to the negative consequences that required the creation of the
secondary labor market in the first place.
The dynamic party competition model works to explain the ability of Social Democratic
parties to maneuver and make these difficult choices. When Social Democratic parties face
competition from the left, especially alternative-left parties, the more likely they are to preserve
and strengthen labor policies for fear of losing voters to their competitors. There is less evidence
supporting the hypothesis that the closer Social Democratic parties are ideologically to their
center and right competitors, the more they can allow labor market deregulation without facing
significant electoral consequences. As found in Chapter 05, ideological distance appears to
benefit SD parties as it can serve as a salient electoral issue to differentiate themselves from right
parties, as the Australian and Spanish cases demonstrate.
Contrary to the insider-outsider argument, corporatist institutions serve to help strengthen
NSWA protections and regulations. There is some evidence that unions did play a role in
deregulation at the margins. Again, this was in response to high and stubborn levels of
unemployment. In the early part of these case studies, unions did help to exacerbate the
problem. But as the level of NSWA grew, they also served as actors that worked to ameliorate
the precariousness of part-time and temporary work. It was only in systems in which corporatist
institutions remained intact that they were able to do so.
Finally, the European Union stands out as an important variable in influencing
governments to protect NSWA. The Directives on part-time and temporary work served as a
catalyst for many of the labor market changes seen during this period. Additionally, the
harmonization of policies and the economic criteria set out by the EU required states to
implement policies to fall in line with the European Union. In some cases, this proved to be
positive for NSWA. In other cases, this led to deregulation as austerity measures trumped
economic security for workers. However, the EU alone is not responsible for the entire design of
NSWA systems. The Netherlands, Spain, and UK are all EU member countries and their NSWA
policies are quite different. While the EU was responsible for why these countries instituted
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NSWA reform when they did, the Directives were all filtered through the domestic institutions
and party politics of the various countries.

Conclusion
In many ways, this chapter serves to repudiate the argument that Social Democratic
parties are in important variable in determining the strength of protection and regulation for
NSWA. As the “new left” has replaced the “old left” regulation of labor markets has dwindled
as a policy that Social Democratic parties willing to promote. It is only in systems in which they
face valid electoral competition from other left parties that they work to strengthen labor
protections for labor market outsiders. Corporatist and consensual institutions that promote
coordination among the social partners additionally play an important role, as does the
maintenance of union power within the labor relations system. Supranational institutions also
serve as conduits for positive change in NSWA policy.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION

The extraordinary growth of jobs that are part-time, temporary, and ambiguous is a
relatively recent phenomenon in advanced industrialized countries. Most of the labor laws in
developed states were designed to facilitate standard work, defined as full-time, permanent
employment for a single employer. Beginning in the 1980s these economies started to
experience significant shifts within their labor markets as industrial employment declined, their
economies became more exposed to global forces, and high-skill jobs became more valuable
than low-skilled or semi-skilled jobs. Inequality was exacerbated in this period as job growth
accelerated in precarious work and flexible work arrangements were championed as the solution
to labor market rigidity and unemployment.
In many ways, the growth of non-standard working arrangements (NSWA) was by
careful design of states who faced high levels of unemployment and unsustainable welfare
entitlements. States needed to mobilize more people into the labor force, which meant creating
more jobs. Creating more jobs meant enticing firms. Their dominant policy to do so was
through the creation of a secondary, less regulated labor market. In many places, employment
protection legislation for standard work provided the catalyst for the growth of NSWA as firms
created new jobs and hired individuals in part-time and temporary work to circumvent
employment protection laws (Buddelmeyer et al., 2008). The ubiquity of NSWA allowed firms
to become more flexible and provided a cost-effective solution to organizational issues
(Wolosky, 1995). For some employees, this was also beneficial as NSWA served to enable
work/life balance (Treas et al., 2011). However, for the labor market overall, the rise of NSWA
served to worsen the relative position of employees, placing a growing number of them in
precarious situations.
The proliferation of NSWA led to an increasingly segmented labor market, one divided
into labor market insiders and outsiders. Labor market insiders are more likely to find
themselves in stable, protected jobs and labor market outsiders, are more likely to find
themselves in unstable, less protected jobs. As the class divisions of the welfare state reformed
along the lines of job stability and security, the division between labor market insiders and
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outsiders created a significant political cleavage, especially for Social Democratic parties, the
past champions of the welfare state (Rueda, 2006, 2007; Häusermann & Schwander, 2010). This
segmentation created an increasingly important issue for states to address, requiring them to
determine their role in moderating market forces on employment outcomes.
This fragmentation between insiders and outsiders was only exacerbated by the new
politics of the welfare state. Labor market insiders had every incentive to oppose changes to
employment protections for standard work and to allow changes to employment policy to occur
at the margins. Labor market outsiders had every incentive to demand radical transformations to
existing legislation to provide more security for themselves within the labor market.
Governments had every reason to utilize broad coalitions between opposition parties, organized
labor, and business associations to institute reform and avoid blame for establishing any
unpopular changes (Myles and Pierson, 2001).
The purpose of this dissertation was to determine through what mechanisms states were
able to institute reforms and explain why states vary in their employment regulation and
protection for workers in non-standard work arrangements. Overall, I find several factors
matter for NSWA outcomes. Firstly, labor market outsiders are less likely to vote. This lack of
political participation dramatically diminishes the motivation to promote NSWA policies as
outsiders do not represent a consistent electoral constituency. Secondly, the mechanisms
underlying part-time employment regulations and temporary employment protections vary
greatly. Part-time employment regulations are the result of membership in the European Union
and the Part-time and Temporary Directives passed by the EU in the mid-90s. They are also
influenced by the overall composition of the government, with left governments and those that
lean towards less traditional cultural values instituting more generous reforms. Instituting
temporary work protections is more political. Social Democratic parties, when insiderdominated, tend to endorse more insider-friendly policies. A more significant divide on
economic issues from right parties allows for Social Democrat parties to differentiate themselves
and promote greater protections for temporary workers. Unions and corporatism also play a role
in temporary work protections, with stronger corporatist institutions and higher union density
promoting stronger temporary work protections. These reforms, especially those of the
European Union, have worked to reduce the gap in employment regulation between non-standard
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work and standard work. Employment protection between NSWA and standard work remains
quite stark, especially for temporary jobs.

Synthesis of Empirical Findings

My project sought to answer why states vary in their employment regulation and
protection for workers in non-standard work arrangements. Several additional questions were
asked to clarify this primary question. Firstly, do labor market insiders and outsiders have
different policy preferences which influence the willingness and ability of parties to support
NSWA protection and legislation? Secondly, does the heterogeneity of Social Democratic parties
as it relates to the insider/outsider divide and party competition play an essential role in
determining employment protection and regulation for NSWA? Thirdly, how do consensual
decision-making and corporatist institutions influence the type of NSWA policies promoted by
the state? And finally, what is the role of labor unions in providing for employment protection
and regulation for NSWA? As economic insecurity increases, and individuals continue to find
themselves within precarious positions in the labor market, these questions become more and
more important to answer.
In answering the first question, a robust definition of labor market insiders and outsiders
was first needed because how labor market outsiders are operationalized plays a vital role in
understanding the economic and social risk accompanying labor market segmentation. Building
off Rehm (2009) and Häusermann & Schwander (2010), I define labor market outsiders as an
individual with a high probability of being employed in nonstandard work arrangements. To
operationalize labor market outsiders, individuals with a higher than average risk of finding
themselves in part-time work and/or unemployment based on their occupational group, sex, and
age are classified as labor market outsiders.
While several scholars have worked to define what constitutes a labor market insider and
outsider, this definition proves to be a more robust way to measure this divide. This is because it
accounts for the cultural and institutional barriers individuals face within the labor market. More
and more empirical evidence suggests these are important factors to consider when looking at
how likely an individual will be able to attain a “good job.” Younger workers have both a hard
time breaking into the labor market and when they do, the new jobs that are available are less
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secure than previous ones. During the Great Recession, many companies adopted a two-tiered
system of wages and benefits meaning new labor market entrants would face worse working
conditions than their older, already established co-workers, even when doing the same work.
Women face many obstacles in remaining attached to the labor market, especially once they start
their families. The so called “mommy penalty” makes it difficult for women to remain in fulltime employment, particularly when they are the primary care givers within their family. Finally,
workers in low-skill jobs find themselves facing a lack of job security as they face inconsistent
work hours and little employment protection. My definition of labor market outsiders considers
these factors which aligns it well with the empirical literature on who faces part-time work and
unemployment. It also provides a definition rooted in socio-economic risk, which in subsequent
chapters proves to be an important determinant of political behavior. The empirical findings of
Chapter 03 show the proportion of outsiders in the labor force has grown since the mid-1990s.
Women, the young, and low-skilled workers are the most likely to find themselves in NSWA.
This finding matches other studies, as well as the empirical evidence of the continued growth of
part-time and temporary employment.
Next, in Chapter 04, I determined how being a labor market outsider translated into
political preferences and partisan mobilization. I conducted a quantitative analysis and found the
greatest cleavage between labor market insiders and outsiders regards job security and pensions,
with labor market outsiders supporting both significantly more than labor market insiders. The
results of this chapter are quite contrary to the hypotheses derived from the insider-outsider
literature. Labor market insiders are not found to favor policies that support employment
protection. Labor market outsiders are not found to favor policies that promote job creation.
And labor market outsiders are not found to favor policies that support redistribution and reject
policies that support social insurance. Overall, these findings all contradict the hypotheses found
in the insider-outsider literature. Although, as noted in the chapter, this overall rejection of the
hypotheses may be a result of how labor market outsider is operationalized, and the time-period
studied. As this study showed, the growth in labor market insecurity is largely time-period
dependent. For example, while production workers were largely labor market insiders in the
1970s, today, many find themselves on the outside. Many definitions of labor market outsider do
not take this into account, which is why my definition greatly improves upon current
measurements for labor market outsiders because it factors in occupational group, sex, and age.
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Additionally, my definition looks at insiders/outsiders beyond the Great Recession, an event
which strongly impacted how individuals view the economy.
Two findings in this chapter stand out as important for further examination. Firstly, the
insider/outsider divide has become less pronounced over time. This change is likely the result of
the Great Recession which resulted in an increasingly insecure labor market for all workers. It
also likely serves as an indication the insider/outsider framework does not have much power as
an analytic frame moving forward to study economic insecurity. While the country cases
demonstrate that the insider/outsider served as a salient cleavage in the 1980s and 1990s, postGreat Recession and the massive structural overhaul of the labor market that accompanied it,
there are far less prominent differences between labor market outsiders and insiders. While
insiders once held favored status within the labor market, this has changed, and labor market
insiders themselves are increasingly finding themselves employed in insecure positions. It was
full-time workers that bore the brunt of the Recession, with firms choosing to eliminate
thousands of standard jobs. The effects of this economic shockwave continue to reverberate with
people delaying major life decisions, such as getting married, having children and retiring
because they fundamentally lack trust in the economy. Overall, this lack of belief that their jobs
are safe has resulted in both insiders and outsiders seeking better protections and regulations
from the government, but not necessarily at the expense of each other.
A better measurement of the divide within societies is to use a measure of socioeconomic
risk. As one’s level of socioeconomic risk increases, so does support for government intervention
in the markets. These findings are in line with literature on redistribution which finds that lower
income leads to support for redistribution (Rehm, 2009). Using a continuous measure of
socioeconomic risk also has the benefit of addressing countries where many people find
themselves in insecure employment relationships. Overall, it provides a better measure of overall
employment risk within a country, rather than which groups are facing better conditions than
others. This has important implications for the partisan decisions that individuals will make
within a country.
In chapter 04, I also examine how outsiderness translates into partisan support. Using
quantitative analysis, the findings of this chapter show labor market outsiders are far less likely
to participate in the political process. The chapter confirms the hypothesis that labor market
outsiders less likely than labor market insiders to vote. This finding supports the literature
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showing when individuals feel disillusioned with the platforms of existing political parties they
are less likely to vote (Adams et al., 2006.) This has important implications for democratic
countries as large proportions of the population express discontent with their current political
processes. Democracies function when there is political participation. When individuals feel the
system does not meet their needs, they are likely to become radicalized and fall prey to
ideologues who promise to break down current institutions. This is overall not healthy for
democracy and highlights an important consequence of mainstream political parties not
embracing platforms that ameliorate the economic insecurity issues the electorate is facing.
Currently, advanced democracies are facing a crisis as public belief in the efficacy of
government declines. If governments cannot establish to the electorate that they can effectively
issue policies that provide security to their citizenry, citizens will feel they owe no loyalty to the
government.
The analysis also shows that, when they do vote, labor market outsiders are more likely
than labor market insiders to vote for left parties. This finding is directly in line with the
literature showing that those with low-incomes, which includes a large majority of labor market
outsiders, are more likely to support left parties (Cusack et al., 2008; Giger, Rosset, & Bernauer,
2012). This finding also demonstrates that the electorate of left parties may be less secure than
initially thought. While SD parties have made attempts to shore up their base with individuals
from the middle-classes, their platforms of redistribution appeal to those who are less secure.
Emergence of alternative-left parties have served to fragment the left, leading a lack of cohesive
messaging and strategy for SD and far-left policies as to how they intend to mitigate the risks of
late-stage capitalism. When SD parties appeal to the more secure middle classes, they lose
support from outsiders to far-left parties or through the abstinence of votes by outsiders.
This movement to parties at the extreme of the political spectrum is additionally
confirmed with the finding that labor market outsiders are more likely to vote for extreme
parties, with both being a labor market outsider and higher levels of socioeconomic risk as
significant factors of far-left party support, but only higher levels of socioeconomic risk
increasing support for far-right parties. This finding is in line with the literature showing that
those fearing a deterioration of their economic status are more likely to vote for extreme parties
(Kriesi, 1999). It also may provide a clue as to what is currently being observed within the
advanced industrialized countries as parties on the far-right adopt populist and protectionist
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rhetoric designed to appeal to those facing insecurity within the labor market. The vitriol towards
immigrants and scapegoating of immigration as a reason for why the labor market is behaving
unfavorably is presented as a perverse solution to increasing levels of economic insecurity. As
individuals have become more economically insecure the messaging these parties target is to
provide the very security individuals lack within the labor force. This makes them an attractive
option for those whose needs have gone unmet by the more traditional parties.
After clarifying the definition of labor market outsider and determining substantial
differences between labor market insiders and outsiders, the next several chapters of my
dissertation determine how the relationship between Social Democratic parties, labor unions, and
institutions interact to influence NSWA. In studying NSWA policy, the first requirement was to
create an indicator of employment regulation and protection for non-standard work. This
required dividing NSWA into its component parts and focusing the study on part-time
employment regulations and temporary employment regulations separately. To do this, I created
an indicator by content-coding legislation on NSWA to determine the level of protections and
regulations for part-time and temporary employees.
In Chapter 05, I used panel data to determine which variables significantly influenced
changes in part-time and temporary work protections. The findings of this chapter fall squarely
in line with the new politics literature as multiple agents are found to be responsible for NSWA
reform. The models show that part-time work regulations and protections are primarily the result
of the European Union Directives and the overall short-term ideological orientation of the
government instituting the reform. In this sense, the Directives are filtered through the lens of
the government initiating them. This supports other studies that show the overall orientation of
the government is an important determinant of labor market policy, not simply the party in power
(Hieda, 2013). The role of the EU is important to consider, especially within political climates
where the party in power faces a high risk of punishment for enacting unpopular reforms. While
NSWA reforms were generally very positive for workers, in many cases there was not a large
amount of political will to enact such reforms arising within the politicians of the country itself.
The EU served as both the impetus for the policy and a buffer towards enacting it. As the new
politics literature suggests actors seek to avoid being blamed for the policies they legislate, the
EU served as an important institution that allowed political parties to institute reforms, without
facing blame for doing so.
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Additionally, cultural variables are found to be important in determining regulations and
protections for part-time work. Median voters that trend towards less traditional cultural values
in the long-term and governments that are more economically leftward and less culturally
traditional are more likely to increase protections for part-time workers. This finding
demonstrates the willingness of the SD party to adopt an “office-seeking” strategy matters as the
median voter shifts and the party is willing to embrace policies that may conflict with their base
(Schumacher et al., 2012, Stimson et al., 1995, Adams et al., 2004). It also demonstrates that
shifts within the culture of the country can prompt change within the labor market. As more and
more individuals embrace values such as equality, gender equity, and autonomy, parties are
incentivized to shift their positions to address these values. These less traditional views of what
the labor market should be and who regulation should favor serve to increase protections for
part-time work.
Temporary work protections are found to be the result of multiple agents with SD parties
only advocating for stronger temporary employment protections when their party is insiderdominated or when facing party competition from alternative-left parties. When facing both,
temporary employment protections are not as strong because faced with unstable electoral
constituencies, SD parties promote insider interests at the expense of outsider policy. This
finding supports the literature demonstrating that SD parties are ideologically inflexible and
vulnerable to shifting their policies away from what their core constituency’s preferences
(Kitschelt, 1994; Steenbergen & Edwards, 2007). The fragmentation of the left has created many
issues for SD parties who have had a difficult time retaining their legacy of protectors of
working-class interests. It is telling that the further away SD parties are from their leftcompetitors on cultural issues, the more likely there is to be stronger protections for temporary
work. This is because SD parties are unwilling to shift their policy positions to a more extreme
stance, unless they are legitimately threatened by a far-left competitor who may take votes away
from the old left.
Social Democratic parties do much better differentiating themselves from competitors on
economic issues than cultural ones. When the SD party and right party have a more significant
divide on economic issues, there are higher levels of protection for temporary work, but when
both the SD party and right party are more traditional, this leads to a decrease in temporary
employment protections. This finding partially confirms the dynamic party competition model,
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but also shows that the axis the parties differ on matters for labor market policy. The ideological
distance between SD parties and center parties is not found to be an important variable in
explaining NSWA protections and regulations. Social Democratic parties do well when they can
differentiate themselves on economic issues. Having an economic issue serve as a salient divide
between the SD party and right competitor works in the favor of the SD party by letting the party
position itself as the party that champions the needs of workers. This leads to higher levels of
regulation for temporary work.
In examining the mechanisms of NSWA reform further, case studies were used to explore
the linkages between SD parties, unions, and institutions in NSWA reform. Chapter 06 focuses
on how NSWA increased in the case countries of the UK, Australia, Netherlands, and Spain.
The findings support the notion that government policies are responsible for the insider/outsider
divide. In countries where wage moderation was compromised for strong protections for
standard work, unions exacerbated labor market segmentation by protecting insiders at the
expense of outsiders. These union policies directly contributed to the increase of precarious
NSWA to allow for flexibility in the labor market. In most cases, unions were willing to allow
the creation of a less regulated job market for maintenance of their relevance and power.
Coupled with an increased neoliberal orientation of both left, center, and right parties at the time
led to the expansion of lesser-regulated part-time and temporary work. The European Directives
on part-time and temporary employment represented an important milestone in dealing with the
problem of increasingly insecure labor markets by creating a common set of standards for
NSWA that called for equal treatment compared to standard workers and pro-rata access to
benefits. The findings of this chapter are largely in line with what Rueda (2007) proposes. And
demonstrate part of the reason why individuals have become distrustful of Social Democratic
parties.
Chapter 07 builds upon both Chapters 05 and 06 to examine the passage of NSWA in the
country cases and further test the hypotheses that SD parties, unions, and institutions influence
NSWA reform. The case studies find the ideological distance between Social Democratic Parties
and other left parties are associated with lower levels of employment regulation and protection
for temporary work when Social Democratic Parties are insider-dominated. Again, part-time
employment does not appear to be as impacted by partisan divides. As SD parties were forced to
find voting constituencies beyond the working-class bloc, they catered to the educated middle183

class professionals. This ideological movement and a vote-seeking strategy on the part of SD
parties led to weaker levels of NSWA as they promoted policies that benefited this constituency
over labor market outsiders. The case studies also revealed that the ideological distance between
Social Democratic Parties and center parties are not associated with lower levels of employment
regulation and protection for NSWA. For right parties, the ideological distance between SD and
right parties benefit NSWA protections. Ideological distance allows for SD parties to promote
themselves as the better party for more robust labor protections and for labor market reform to
serve as a significant wedge issue. In this manner, they can cast blame on the right parties while
promoting more radical labor reforms.
The case studies also show that consensual decision-making institutions influence the
type of NSWA policies promoted by the state. Strong corporatist institutions result in stronger
employment protection and regulation for NSWA. Corporatism and the willingness of
governments to abide by social contracts served as a positive mechanism for both part-time and
temporary work reforms. The case studies do not show a greater concentration of outsiders in
unions leads to stronger employment protection and regulation for NSWA or the higher the
concentration of insiders in unions leads to weaker employment protection and regulation for
NSWA. It is only recently that labor unions have started to advocate strongly for NSWA reform.
As part-time and temporary work has become more prevalent, unions have made stronger efforts
to lobby the government to institute reforms. The cases find that, like the quantitative findings,
union density and the relative power of unions have determined how successful unions have been
in establishing stronger NSWA policies.
Again, like the quantitative section, the European Union reveals itself to be an essential
intervening variable in explaining NSWA reform, especially for part-time work. In the case of
the UK and Spain membership in the EU catalyzed the political will to institute NSWA reforms.
Both the Directives issued by the EU and a standard set of principles designed to guide economic
governance heavily influenced how states regulated and reformed their labor markets. The
implications for this are essential as scholars decipher how states make policies under a
complicated set of circumstances. Adherence to EU principles plays a vital role in making
necessary, but not endogenously developed political decisions.
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Theoretical Implications and Contributions

This project has contributed to the growing research calling into question the new politics
of the welfare state and the ability of governments to mediate inequality. Labor markets and
employment relationships operate within economic, political, and ideological contexts that are
country specific and vary across nations. There is growing discontent with the status quo in
many advanced democracies as socio-economic security has eroded and workers find themselves
the casualties of capitalism, rather than the beneficiaries of such systems. This study works to
reinforce many of the findings of the new politics and insider/outsider literature.
Altogether, the theoretical contribution of this dissertation to the literature on the new
politics of the welfare state is fourfold. This research contributes to (1) the understanding of
outsider partisanship and political behavior, (2) the role of the Social Democratic party and party
competition in labor market reforms, (3) the role of corporatist institutions in perpetuating the
insider/outsider divide (4) an understanding of union strategies and their implications for parttime and temporary employment reform.
First, regarding labor market outsiders, this dissertation makes two substantive
contributions. Firstly, the development of a definition of labor market outsider aligned with the
cultural, societal, and institutional biases impacting the type of employment individuals can find.
The classification of labor market outsiders is substantial in determining their political behavior.
The definition developed in this dissertation better captures individuals who face significant
socioeconomic risk and are likely to suffer adverse employment consequences as a result. This
operationalization also identifies an emerging sub-group, the semi-secure, those that do not have
a higher than average or lower than average probability of finding themselves in non-standard
work arrangements. The identification of this group suggests precariousness is growing in
advanced economies and the binary insider/outsider divide is unlikely to provide a salient
cleavage for future research. However, the degree of socioeconomic risk appears to be a viable
alternative to this measurement.
One theoretical contribution of this finding is to cast doubt on the use of the
insider/outsider divide as an analytic framework. Even with a robust definition of who labor
market insiders and outsiders are across time and across countries, the hypothesized antagonism
between the two groups simply failed to manifest as a salient explanation in my study.
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Furthermore, outsiderness is not found to be a binary manifestation within the labor market as
more and more individuals find themselves in precarious positions. The use of socioeconomic
risk in explaining the labor market and partisan preferences of individuals provides a far more
useful tool in analyzing the labor market conditions of different demographic groups.
Understanding individual level preferences for partisanship and policies is an important
question to answer in political economy. This study contributes to that literature by proposing
and supporting the notion that an individual’s socioeconomic risk exposure within a country
shapes both policy and partisan preferences. This has profound implications for how political
scientists study post-industrial societies as individuals face increasingly levels of precariousness
within the labor markets. Furthermore, it provides a useful theoretic tool for examining the
building of political coalitions and the demands made by individuals upon the state.
This dissertation also sheds light on the political participation and partisan orientation of
labor market outsiders. The findings show that labor market outsiders behave similarly to lowincome voters and align themselves with parties on the left and far-left (Cusack et al., 2008;
Rehm, 2009; Giger, Rosset, & Bernauer, 2012) or abstain from voting altogether (Giger et al.,
2013; Gilens, 2012; Marx, 2014). These findings have significant implications for understanding
policy reform in advanced democracies. Deprived of their security, labor market outsiders do
not protest or incite political action. Instead, they withdraw from political life. This discontent
with political parties’ signals something wrong within the systems of representative democracy
as a growing proportion of the electorate feels alienated from the political process and chooses to
remove themselves from political participation because they do not feel the current political
system represents their interests. This discontent should serve as a warning bell for democratic
institutions as outsiderness and insecurity grow this problem is only likely to reinforce economic
and social inequalities.
Additionally, this study ties increasing levels of economic insecurity to the emergence of
extreme parties, especially far-right parties, within advanced industrialized countries. Scholars
have sought to answer what contributes to the appeal of parties presenting xenophobic and
populist platforms, especially as anti-immigrant rhetoric has increased in recent years. Although
not the primary question of my dissertation, this study provides support for the theory the
attraction to such parties is tied to the decline of economic security and a fundamental shift of
labor market risk onto the worker. This has profound impacts for politics as we tie the linkages
186

of economic risk to polarization and radicalization within the political space. As workers find
their power eroding, they are lashing out at the establishment. This is an area of great importance
which will require further study to effectively tease out the connections between risk and
partisanship.
Similar to other political histories of the 1980s and 1990s, this study finds a weakening of
electoral alignments and an emergence of new political issues leading to a fragmentation of the
left (Kitschelt, 1988, 1994; Przeworski and Sprague 1988; Betz & Meret, 2012). Changes in the
labor market have exacerbated this problem as a widening gap between expected and realized
benefits manifested in political discontent with the status quo. As the promise of economic
security dwindled, and opportunity for upward mobility stagnated, the appeal of Social
Democratic parties diminished. Social Democratic parties themselves did little to help this issue
as they increasingly adopted more and more neoliberal reforms, primarily working to erode the
security of the workers that once formed their core base.
This study finds that the presence of alternative-left parties provides a far more
significant explanation for NSWA reform than Social Democratic Party power. Alternative-left
parties provide competition for SD parties by threatening their electoral support. This threat
provides the impetus for strategic SD parties to blur the interests of their traditional workingclass electorate and those of the alternative-left electorate, including labor market outsiders, to
present themselves as competent representatives of alternative-left causes. This study shows that
this is the mechanism for temporary employment protections, although with a caveat as insider
domination of SD parties in the presence of alternative-left competitors reduces the positive
impacts of insider domination and left-party competition. This likely results because SD parties
are less ideologically flexible than other political parties and unwilling to respond to short-term
shifts in political opinions when it jeopardizes their core constituency (Adams & Somer-Topcu,
2009). This study also works to confirm that party competition plays a vital role in the policies
that political parties promote. This study also adds to the theoretical findings concerning the
fragmentation of the left and the unwillingness of Social Democratic parties to embrace less
traditional cultural policies.
Additionally, this study contributes to the new politics literature by demonstrating that
left parties are no longer the primary mechanism through which labor market reforms take place.
In the case of NSWA policies, left party in power was not a significant variable in explaining
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part-time or temporary employment regulation and protection. Instead, both the left and right
were equally willing to increase protections and regulations for workers. This dissertation
reveals that the European Union was a crucial intervening variable in explaining the behavior of
parties. In examining NSWA, there is substantial evidence to suggest that EU integration is the
primary variable explaining part-time employment regulation. There are multiple mechanisms
for this. Firstly, through the European Directives, state actors were required to enact policy
favorable to labor market outsiders. Secondly, the Court of Justice of the European Union
served as an institution that other political actors were able to appeal to in order to strengthen
labor reforms (or in the case of the UK, threaten to appeal to). Overall, the findings are essential
in illustrating the overall impact of political parties in light of supranational organizations and
raises additional questions about state sovereignty over domestic policies.
Finally, this study also contributes to the examination of insider/outsider divides and the
impact of corporatism and unions in magnifying these issues. Overall, I find mixed results for
the effects of corporatist institutions and unions. This finding is contrary to the results of Rueda
(2007) who argues corporatist institutions magnify the impact of insider-outsider differences by
giving unions the power to protect their insider core which leads to less employment protection
for individuals employed in NSWA. This study finds the result is constrained to the time-period
studied. As labor market outsiders have increased and the Great Recession has so fundamentally
changed the structure of the labor market, the theorized antagonism between labor market
outsiders and insiders does not provide a solid theoretical frame. Post-recession unions have
made tremendous strides to organize and promote better working conditions for part-time and
temporary workers. Corporatist institutions have given them the power to realize these demands.

Suggestions for Future Research

In this dissertation, I examine how states have responded to increasing levels of risk in
their labor markets. Like many studies in comparative political economy, this study was limited
by the ability and comparability of quantitative data. Most notably different comparative
measures of employment were exceptionally difficult to obtain as most cross-national surveys do
not ask questions regarding part-time and temporary work. As increasing numbers of people
find themselves employed in these non-standard work arrangements, simply delineating between
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the employed, unemployed, and non-labor force participants is not enough. Greater care needs
to be taken in data collection instruments to determine the full scope of employment possibilities.
Additionally, I show that socioeconomic risk is an essential driver of partisan attitudes
and political participation. Exploring these connections is an important next step in
understanding modern politics. As electorates across the OECD become further polarized and
constituents express more considerable displeasure with their political systems, understanding
what is driving these attitudes will become increasingly important for maintaining stable
regimes. I suggest that increases in socioeconomic risk may be alienating vast sections of the
electorate and driving labor market outsiders towards political extremes. The aftermath of the
Great Recession has been one of increasing dissatisfaction with politics as capitalism has
delivered more and more unequal outcomes. It was Schumpeter (1942) who suggested that
capitalism would be its own greatest foe, leading to a call for socialism as cultural contradictions
became aggravated and lead to social unrest. I uncover some hints that this is already occurring.
As socioeconomic risk grows, there is potential for a destabilizing force within political systems.
As the insider/outsider divide appears to be a relic of the transition to post-capitalism, the study
of socioeconomic risk provides a more robust frame for studying social cleavages within society.
Another avenue for future study uncovered in this dissertation is the need for further
study of the role of supranational institutions in domestic policy creation. While not identified as
an important variable in the literature, membership in the European Union proved to be an
essential variable in determining NSWA protection and regulation. Furthermore, the role of
supranational institutions, their policy-making process, and adherence by states may lead to
policy solutions for other collective problems faced by countries around the world, for example,
climate change. As the neoliberal orientation of governments has constrained their ability and
willingness to pass policies that limit business interests, the role of the EU becomes more
important to understand.
One final area worth more examination regarding labor policy is the finding that left
parties in power are not crucial to passing NSWA reform, but the median voter is. When the
median voter leans more leftward economically, and less culturally traditionally, NSWA
regulation is stronger. The parties likely play an important role in the messaging of the
importance of these issues. However, my study shows that their ability to influence policy is not
limited by their ability to attain office. This movement of the median voter is important because
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it demonstrates that reform may be a cultural issue. As insecurity increases the demands on
government changes within society at large may prompt the reforms sought to reduce
inequalities. If anything, this is a hopeful finding and warrants further study as to how shifts in
cultural attitudes are translated into political action within the new politics of the welfare state.

Conclusion

The labor market has changed fundamentally over the past 40 years leading to increasing
levels of insecurity for most people in advanced industrialized economies. Despite this shift in
the general standard of living for most people, the political will to enact change and strengthen
protections and regulations for those in non-standard forms of employment has been minimal.
While people are certainly feeling the effects of increasing levels of insecurity and inequality,
political parties have been slow to increase employment regulations and protections for nonstandard workers. However, this appears to be starting to change as large sections of the
electorate embrace more egalitarian ideals, and unions push for reforms to part-time and
temporary work. The challenge moving forward will be for states to provide protection for all
workers regardless of their work arrangements.
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APPENDIX A
Table A.1. Total Percentage Outsiders in the Labor Force

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Chile
Czechia
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea
Latvia
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States

1996/2000
34.3
37.2
-7.16
18.6
26.37
-13.95
32.29
28.12
28.35
-20.98
38.25
---13.1
-29.43
26.43
32.12
4.83
34.27
0.99
3.12
20.97
32.31
38.43
31.15
30.29

2001/2005
33.84
36.14
21.67
19.75
21.66
34.26
-16.95
41.45
42.03
17.16
-38.75
46.79
-17.73
30.65
18.33
11.42
32.3
32.85
31.84
16.34
31.58
6.85
7.55
27.94
32.44
39.04
42.65
32.44
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2006/2010
37.1
35.93
33.64
29.38
19.78
28.91
-23.4
44.53
44.51
14.39
-45.43
47.43
-23.05
32.19
24.54
18.77
38.12
33.35
30.64
25.12
31.46
15.23
10.96
39.34
36.23
43.6
34.79
33.29

2011/2015
44.01
42.99
31.85
29.62
20.3
17.67
9.83
23.91
40.44
43.42
23.59
35.38
43.27
39.45
-29.64
30.09
25.17
19.88
42.33
34.74
33.31
26.89
-29.37
20.86
56.26
36.77
44.16
33.76
30.9

Table A.2. Percentage Women in the Labor Force considered Outsiders

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Chile
Czechia
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea
Latvia
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States

1996/2000
74.71
69.11
-12.22
33.32
52.78
-26.2
63.19
65.34
50.42
-43.3
71.42
---23.47
-58.25
55.27
61.04
9.57
72.79
2.14
6.63
54.35
65.11
80.75
55.3
41.09

2001/2005
67.15
65.35
47.34
29.49
33.21
58.83
-27.53
71.59
86.4
28.47
-68.09
63.75
-40.06
64.12
23.3
24.8
74.36
56.02
62.06
56.37
56.37
12.04
15.47
66.34
64.13
79.02
72.59
48.68
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2006/2010
72.51
67.17
68.86
52.57
34.41
46.92
-33.21
79.8
87.3
21.63
-74.62
76.03
-52.17
62.74
28.09
40.89
75.95
57.76
59.68
40.93
54.34
20.72
22.27
74.83
68.99
79.83
59.37
50.66

2011/2015
83.62
79.56
57.25
43.82
36.82
29.11
8.27
27.34
66.59
91.25
23.87
64.56
53.8
74.56
-65.25
57.37
31.85
47.49
81.27
66.67
62.41
50.12
-32.59
41.7
80.62
63.43
89.16
53.55
40.97

Table A.3. Percentage Young People in the Labor Force considered Outsiders

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Chile
Czechia
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Japan
Korea
Latvia
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States

1996/2000
35.16
37.18
-7.16
18.67
26.37
-14
32.29
28.13
28.35
-20.98
38.52
--13.11
-29.43
26.75
32.12
4.83
34.27
-3.12
20.97
32.36
38.44
31.18
30.34

2001/2005
34.48
36.14
21.67
19.75
22.19
34.29
-16.95
41.45
42.1
17.18
-38.96
47.81
17.73
30.65
18.35
11.5
32.63
33.04
31.84
16.34
31.62
7.04
7.56
27.94
32.44
39.04
42.7
32.6
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2006/2010
37.95
35.93
33.64
29.38
19.89
29.39
-23.4
44.53
44.64
14.39
-45.53
47.94
23.05
32.27
24.54
19.14
38.12
33.58
30.64
25.12
31.46
15.33
10.96
39.41
36.23
43.6
34.85
33.6

2011/2015
44.9
42.99
31.88
29.62
20.43
16.63
9.83
23.91
40.44
43.46
23.59
35.38
43.9
39.67
29.64
30.09
25.71
20.06
42.34
35.09
33.31
26.89
10.76
29.39
20.88
56.26
36.77
44.16
33.8
31.06

APPENDIX B
Table B.1. Coding for 2015, 2005, & 1997 Work Orientations Survey
Variable

Job Security

Operationalization
ISSP 2015, ISSP 2005, ISSP 1997 “For each of the following,
please tick one box to show how important you personally
think it is in a job.
(Please tick one box on each line)
How important is...
Q.3a ... job security”

Min

Max

1

5

Recoded “ 5 = very important, 4 = important, 3 = neither
important or unimportant, 2 = not important, 1 = not
important at all.)
Outsider

See operationalization in chapter 03.

0

1

Insider

See operationalization in chapter 03.

0

1

Semi-Secure See operationalization in chapter 03.

0

1

Socioeconomic
Risk

Varies Varies

Female

Age

Combined unemployment rate and part-time employment rate
for demographic group to which the individual belongs.
ISSP 2015, ISSP 2005, ISSP 1997; Dummy variable: (SEX:
Sex of respondent: 1 = female, 0 = male)

ISSP 2015, ISSP 2005, ISSP 1997; (AGE: Age of respondent,
based on age in years: 1 = “18-25,” 2=”26-35,” 3=”36-45,”
4=”46-55,” 5=”56-65,” 6=”66-75,” 7=”76 and older.”)

0

1

1

7

0

4

1

5

ISSP 2015, ISSP 2005, ISSP 1997
Education

Based on highest completed education (DEGREE): 0 = none,
1 = primary, 2 = lower secondary, 3 = upper secondary, 4=
post-secondary or higher
ISSP 2015, ISSP 2005, ISSP 1997

Income

Annual personal income, based on national income-variables.
(Standardized based on income quintiles: 1= low-income, 2=
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middle-low income, 3 = middle income, 4 = high-middle
income, 5 = high income.)
ISSP 2015, ISSP 2005, ISSP 1997
Public

dummy measuring if respondent works in the public sector;
(TYPORG2 1 = 1 “public sector employment”; 2 = 0 “private

0

1

Union

ISSP 2015, ISSP 2005, ISSP 1997 dummy measuring if
respondent belongs to a union: (UNION 1 = 1 “current union
member” 2, 3 = 0 “not current union member.”)

0

1

Standard

ISSP 2015, ISSP 2005, ISSP 1997 dummy measuring if
respondent works full-time based on national definition.
Derived from (HRSWRK.)

0

1

Part-time

ISSP 2015, ISSP 2005, ISSP 1997 dummy measuring if
respondent works part-time based on national definition.
Derived from (HRSWRK.)

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

1

sector employment”)

Dummy measuring if respondent is self-employed.
SelfEmployed

ISSP 2015 (EMPREL: 2 = 1 “self-employed, no employees”
1, 3, 4 = 0 “not self-employed.”)
ISSP 2005, ISSP 1997
(WRKTYPE 4=1 “self-employed” & “NEMPLOY: 9995 = 1
“self-employed, no employees.”)
Dummy measuring if respondent is an employer.

Employer

ISSP 2015 (EMPREL: 3 = 1 “self-employed, with
employees” 1, 2, 4 = 0 “not self-employed, with employees.”)
ISSP 2005, ISSP 1997
(WRKTYPE: 4=1 “self-employed” & “NEMPLOY >=1 = 1
“self-employed, with employees.”)
Dummy measuring if respondent is in the labor force. ISSP
2015 (MAINSTAT: 3,4,5,6,7,8,9 = 1 “not in labor force”, 1,2
= 0 “in labor force.”)

Inactive

ISSP 2005, 1997
(WORKSTAT: 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 = 1 “not in labor force” 1, 2,
3, 5 = 0 “in labor force.”
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Dummy measuring if respondent is unemployed. ISSP 2015
(MAINSTAT: 2=1 “unemployed”, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 = 0
“not unemployed”)
Unemployed

ISSP 2005, 1997

0

1

0

1

1

5

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

1

(WORKSTAT: 5 = 1 “unemployed” 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 =
0 “not unemployed”)
Dummy measuring if respondent is married. ISSP 2015
(MARITAL: 1,2 =1 “married” 3, 4, 5, 6 = “not married.”)
Married

ISSP 2005, 1997 (MARITAL: 1 = 1 “married.” 2, 3, 4, 5 = 0
“not married.”)
ISSP 2015 based on party voted for in last federal election.

Party
Affiliation

ISSP 2005, 1997 based on self-assessed party affiliation.
“Political party affiliation: left/right placement” 1=”Far-Left”,
2=”Left”, 3=”Center,” 4=”Right,” 5=”Far-Right.”
ISSP 2015 based on party voted for in last federal election.

Far Left

ISSP 2005, 1997 based on self-assessed party affiliation.
Dummy variable (1=far left affiliation, 0 = no far left
affiliation)
ISSP 2015 based on party voted for in last federal election.

Left

ISSP 2005, 1997 based on self-assessed party affiliation.
Dummy variable (1=left affiliation, 0 = no left affiliation)
ISSP 2015 based on party voted for in last federal election.

Center

ISSP 2005, 1997 based on self-assessed party affiliation.
Dummy variable (1= center affiliation, 0 = no center
affiliation)
ISSP 2015 based on party voted for in last federal election.

Right

ISSP 2005, 1997 based on self-assessed party affiliation.
Dummy variable (1=right affiliation, 0 = no right affiliation)
ISSP 2015 based on party voted for in last federal election.

Far Right

ISSP 2005, 1997 based on self-assessed party affiliation.
Dummy variable (1=far right affiliation, 0 = no far right
affiliation)

220

Table B.2. Coding for 2016, 2006, 1996 Role of Government Survey
Variable

Operationalization

Min

Max

New_Jobs

Here are some things the government might do for the
economy. Please show which actions you are in favour of
and which you are against: Government financing of
projects to create new jobs. Recoded as: 5= “Strongly in
favour of”, 4=”In favour of”, 3=”Neither in favour of nor
against” 2= “Against”, 1= “Strongly against”

1

5

Redistribution

On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the
government's responsibility to ... Reduce income
differences between the rich and the poor. Recoded as:
4=”Definitely should be”, 3= “Probably should be,”
2=”Probably should not be,” 1=”Definitely should not be”

1

4

Listed below are various areas of government spending.
Please show whether you would like to see more or less
government spending in each area. Remember that if you
say "much more", it might require a tax increase to pay for
it.

1

5

Government should spend money: Old Age Pensions.
Recoded as 5= “Spend much more,” 4=”Spend more,”
3=”Spend the same as now,” 2=”Spend less,” 1=”Spend
much less”

1

5

Government should spend money: Unemployment
Unemployment Benefits. Recoded as 5= “Spend much more,” 4=”Spend
Benefits
more,” 3=”Spend the same as now,” 2=”Spend less,”
1=”Spend much less”

1

5

Outsider

See operationalization in chapter 03.

0

1

Insider

See operationalization in chapter 03.

0

1

Semi-Secure

See operationalization in chapter 03.

0

1

Socioeconomic Risk

Combined unemployment rate and part-time employment
rate for demographic group to which the individual
belongs.

Varies Varies

Pension
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Party
Affiliation

ISSP 2006, 1996 based on self-assessed party affiliation.
“Political party affiliation: left/right placement” 1=”FarLeft”, 2=”Left”, 3=”Center,” 4=”Right,” 5=”Far-Right.”

1

5

Far Left

ISSP 2006, 1996 based on self-assessed party affiliation.
Dummy variable (1=far left affiliation, 0 = no far left
affiliation)

0

1

Left

ISSP 2006, 1996 based on self-assessed party affiliation.
Dummy variable (1=left affiliation, 0 = no left affiliation)

0

1

Center

ISSP 2006, 1996 based on self-assessed party affiliation.
Dummy variable (1= center affiliation, 0 = no center
affiliation)

0

1

Right

ISSP 2006, 1996 based on self-assessed party affiliation.
Dummy variable (1=right affiliation, 0 = no right
affiliation)

0

1

Far Right

ISSP 2006, 1996 based on self-assessed party affiliation.
Dummy variable (1=far right affiliation, 0 = no far right
affiliation)

0

1

Political
Interest

ISSP 2006, 1996; “I feel that I have a pretty good
understanding of the important political issues facing our
country.” Recoded as 5=”Strongly agree,” 4=”Agree,”
3=”Neither agree nor disagree,” 2= “Disagree,” 1=
“Strongly disagree.”

1

5

Female

ISSP 2006, 1996; Dummy variable: (SEX: Sex of
respondent: 1 = female, 0 = male)

0

1

Age

ISSP 2006, 1996; (AGE: Age of respondent, based on age
in years: 1 = “18-25,” 2=”26-35,” 3=”36-45,” 4=”46-55,”
5=”56-65,” 6=”66-75,” 7=”76 and older.” )

1

7

1

5

1

5

Education

Income

ISSP 2006, 1996; Based on highest completed education
(DEGREE): 1 = none, 2 = primary, 3 = lower secondary, 4
= upper secondary, 5= post-secondary or higher
ISSP 2006, 1996; Annual personal income, based on
national income-variables. (Standardized based on income
quintiles: 1= low-income, 2= middle-low income, 3 =
middle income, 4 = high-middle income, 5 = high income.)
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Public

ISSP 2006, 1996; dummy measuring if respondent works
in the public sector; (TYPORG2 1 = 1 “public sector
employment”; 2 = 0 “private sector employment”)

0

1

Union

ISSP 2006, 1996; dummy measuring if respondent belongs
to a union: (UNION 1 = 1 “current union member” 2, 3 = 0
“not current union member.”)

0

1

Standard

ISSP 2006, 1996; dummy measuring if respondent works
full-time based on national definition. Derived from
(HRSWRK.)

0

1

Part-time

ISSP 2006, 1996; dummy measuring if respondent works
part-time based on national definition. Derived from
(HRSWRK.)

0

1

Dummy measuring if respondent is self-employed.
Self-Employed

ISSP 2006, 1996; (WRKTYPE 4=1 “self-employed” &
“NEMPLOY: 9995 = 1 “self-employed, no employees.”)
Dummy measuring if respondent is employer.

0

1

Employer

ISSP 2006, 1996; (WRKTYPE: 4=1 “self-employed” &
“NEMPLOY >=1 = 1 “self-employed, with employees.”)
Dummy measuring if ISSP 2006, 1996; (WORKSTAT: 4,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10 = 1 “not in labor force” 1, 2, 3, 5 = 0 “in labor
force.”

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

1

Inactive

Dummy measuring if respondent is unemployed.
Unemployed

Married

ISSP 2006, 1996; (WORKSTAT: 5 = 1 “unemployed” 1, 2,
3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 = 0 “not unemployed”)
Dummy measuring if respondent is married. ISSP 2006,
1996; (MARITAL: 1 = 1 “married.” 2, 3, 4, 5 = 0 “not
married.”)
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Figure B.1. Labor Market Outsider and Insider Partisan Preferences (2015/2016)
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Source: ISSP
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APPENDIX C
Calculation of Indicators of Employment Regulation and Protection for Non-standard
Work
For each country, employment protection and regulation is described along 16 measures. These
measures can be classified into three main categories i) Measures of equal treatment; ii) Access
to social insurance; iii) regulation of work contracts. Starting with these 16 measures, I construct
summary indicators that allow for comparisons to be made across countries and years.
In order to create my index, the first 16-inputs were initially expressed as either units of time (i.e.
months needed to access benefits), as a number (i.e. number of successive fixed-term contracts
allowed), as a score on an ordinal scale (0 to 6 or yes/no), and as a proportion of full-time
equivalency (i.e. threshold needed to achieve access to benefits.) The first step in creating the
index was to score all relevant legislation on these first-level measures of employment regulation
and protection. I used data from the ILO’s TRAVAIL legal database, the Employment
Protection Legislation Database (EPLex,) the United States Social Security Administration
(which provides a comprehensive analysis of social security programs around the world with
subsequent changes to legislation), as well as labor acts, codes, and legislation where available.
After scoring each country, I then weighted each component and normalized the scores into a
range of 0 to 6, with higher scores representing stricter regulation and protection.
Table C.1. First step of the procedure: the basic measures of NSWA Regulation and
Protection: Part-time Work
Original unit and short description
Item 1
Scale
0-No provisions
1-PT workers granted
pro-rata benefits on
Equal Treatment
some rights, but not all.
for PT workers in
2-All PT workers
employment
granted pro-rata
conditions and
benefits on all rights.
compensation.
3-PT workers granted
equal treatment and
benefits as FT workers.
Item 2
Part-time Laws exclude some categories of
workers
% of PT workers
excluded

Assignment of numerical strictness scores
0
1
2
3
4

5

6

Scale (0-3) x 2

None <10% <10% <30% <50% <70% >90%
Score (0-6) * -1

Item 3
Definition of PT
work
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0-No definition
1-Covers workers up to
50% of FT
2-Covers workers up to
75% of FT
3-Covers workers up to
99% of FT
Item 4
Preferential
consideration for
FT
work/Mechanism
for requesting
increased hours
Item 5
Notification of
Full Time
Positions
Item 6
Social Insurance
Thresholds
Annual Leave
Pensions
Unemployment
Parental/Maternity
Leave
Item 7
Provisions for OnCall Work (Zerohours contracts)

Scale (0-3) x 2

Yes/no
0-No
1-Yes

No

-

-

-

-

-

Yes

Yes/no
0-No
1-Yes

No

-

-

-

-

-

Yes

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

>80%
>80%
>80%
>80%

>60%
>60%
>60%
>60%

>40%
>40%
>40%
>40%

>20%
>20%
>20%
>20%

<10%
<10%
<10%
<10%

None
None
None
None

% of FT work for
thresholds

0-No provisions for oncall work
1-Limits on number of
hours an employee can
be stand-by
2-Limits on number of
hours an employee can
be stand-by. Standby
time is considered
"working-time."
3-Limits on number of
hours an employee can
be stand-by. Standby
time is considered
"working-time."
Compensation offered
for stand-by time.

Scale (0-3) x 2
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Table C.2. First step of the procedure: the basic measures of NSWA Regulation and
Protection: Temporary Work

Item 1

Equal Treatment for FC
workers in employment
conditions and
compensation.

Item 2
Fixed Contract Laws
exclude some categories
of workers

Item 3
Social Insurance
Thresholds
Annual Leave
Pensions
Unemployment
Parental/Maternity
Leave

Original unit and
short description
Scale
0-No provisions
1-FC workers
granted pro-rata
benefits on some
rights, but not all.
2-All FC workers
granted pro-rata
benefits on all
rights.
3-FC workers
granted equal
treatment with FT
workers.

% of workers
excluded

Continuous
Employment for
thresholds – Months

0

Assignment of numerical strictness
scores
1
2
3
4
5

Scale (0-3) x 2

>90

>70

>50
>30 >10
Score (0-6) * -1

<10

None

>18
>18

>12
>12
>12

>9
>9
>9

>6
>6
>6

>3
>3
>3

<3
<3
<3

None
None
None

>18

>12

>9

>6

>3

<3

None

>18

Item 4

Restrictions on use of
FC contracts

6

0 when there are no
restrictions on the
use of fixed term
contracts.
1-when exemption
exist on both the
employer and
employee sides
2 - if specific
exemptions apply to
situations of
employer need (e.g.

Scale (0-3) x 2
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launching a new
activity) or
employee need (e.g.
workers in search of
their first job.)
3 - fixed-term
contracts are
permitted only for
objective or material
situation, i.e. to
perform a task
which itself is of
fixed duration.
Item 5
Maximum number of successive FTC

No
limit

>5

>4

>3

>2

>1.5

<1.5

No
limit

>36

>30

>24

>18

>12

<12

>6

<6

Item 6
Maximum length of single term contract
Item 7
Types of work TWA can 0-No restrictions
be used
3-TWA is illegal
Item 8
Restrictions on TWA
use
Item 9
Maximum Duration of contract - months

No

No
limit
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>36

>24

Yes

>18

>12

Table C.3. EPL Summary Indicators at Three Successive Levels of Aggregation and
Weighting Scheme
Level 3 (0-6)

Level 2 (0-6)
Equal Treatment (1/3)

Level 1 (0-6)
Equal Treatment for PT workers (1/2)
PT Laws exclude some categories of
workers (1/2)

Definition (1/10)
Mechanisms for Full-Time
Work (1/10)
Regulation and Protection
for Part-time Work

Definition of PT Work (1/1)
Preferential consideration for FT work
(1/2)
Notification of Full Time Positions (1/2)

Social Insurance (1/3)

Annual Leave (1/4)
Pensions (1/4)
Unemployment (1/4)
Paid Parental/Maternity Leave (1/4)

Zero-hour contracts (1/5)
Equal Treatment (1/5)

Provisions for On-Call Work (Zerohours contracts) (1/1)
Equal Treatment for FC (1/2)
FC Laws exclude some categories of
workers (1/2)

Social Insurance (1/5)

Annual Leave (1/4)
Pensions (1/4)
Unemployment (1/4)
Paid Parental/Maternity Leave (1/4)

Regulation and Protection
for Temporary Work

FTC Restrictions (3/10)

Restrictions on use of FC contracts (1/2)
Maximum number of successive FTC
(1/4)
Maximum length of single term contract
(1/4)

TWA Restriction (3/10)

Types of Work TWA can be used (1/2)
Restrictions on renewals (1/4)
Maximum Duration (1/4)
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Table C.4. Strictness of Part-time Work Protections
Country
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Chile
Czechia
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States

1996-2002
1.40
3.53
1.64
1.36
2.14
1.73
1.22
3.46
4.11
3.80
2.39
1.80
1.80
2.81
2.90
3.18
2.80
1.80
4.01
1.43
1.48
1.74
3.61
3.84
3.51
3.03
3.17
2.20
0.38

2003-2009
1.40
3.53
2.90
1.35
3.00
2.57
2.42
5.00
5.40
4.09
3.08
3.60
3.00
3.47
4.10
3.35
2.98
1.80
4.23
1.43
2.84
2.30
4.90
4.10
3.65
4.58
3.40
3.58
0.38
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2010-2016
1.40
3.53
2.90
1.35
3.00
3.20
2.94
5.21
5.40
4.45
3.08
4.53
3.00
3.53
4.10
3.50
2.98
1.80
4.34
1.43
4.70
4.10
4.90
3.77
3.65
4.58
3.40
3.58
0.38

Table C.5. Strictness of Temporary Work Protections
Country
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Chile
Czechia
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States

1996-2002

2003-2009

2010-2016

1.73
3.28
3.12
1.10
2.43
1.60
1.88
4.00
2.97
4.13
2.65
1.38
1.38
0.75
4.78
1.40
2.72
4.00
2.50
1.28
3.70
2.75
2.07
2.57
4.03
2.72
1.68
1.28
0.40

1.73
3.23
3.53
1.10
2.43
1.65
2.10
4.00
3.83
4.13
2.28
2.94
2.18
1.93
3.95
1.23
2.38
4.00
3.30
1.75
3.86
3.90
2.30
3.60
4.75
3.20
1.68
2.38
0.40

1.73
3.23
3.53
1.10
2.45
1.68
2.68
4.00
3.83
4.13
2.28
3.24
2.18
1.93
3.85
1.63
2.25
3.54
3.34
1.75
3.90
4.00
2.44
3.51
4.18
2.78
1.68
2.38
0.40
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Table C.6. NSWA EPL time series: breaking points
Country

Reform Description

PT
EPL

FC
EPL

No Changes

N/C

N/C

Added total number of months employed threshold for pensions.

N/C

-

Australia

Austria
2004
Belgium
1997

Reduced Restrictions on FTC

-

2002

Adopted non-discrimination legislation for PT and Temporary
work

2002

Restrictions on duration of TWA contracts is increased

+

+

N/C

_

Increased hours needed to work per year to qualify for
unemployment insurance.

-

N/C

Reform of labor code adopting measures allowing for preferential
consideration for PT workers, as well as legislation for 0-hours
contracts. Restrictions on maximum duration of FTC

+

+

2002

Adoption of non-discrimination legislation for PT work.

+

N/C

2008

Part-time workers can receive unemployment benefits

+

N/C

2008

Adoption of non-discrimination legislation for FTC

N/C

+

2013

Lowers working hours exclusions for pension contributions

+

N/C

2002

Legally defines PT work

+

N/C

2012

Notification of Full-time positions for PT workers

+

N/C

Adoption of non-discrimination legislation for PT work & FTC.

+

+

Canada
1996
Czechia
2006
Denmark

Estonia

Finland
2001
France
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2007

Strengthened protections and rights for PT workers including
creating a comprehensive definition and providing preferential
treatment for PT workers.

+

N/C

2009

Increased working hours thresholds for unemployment benefits

-

N/C

2015

Reduced hours of work needed to qualify for maternity benefits.

+

N/C

N/C

-

+

+

Germany
1997

Renewals for FTC and TWA increased

2000

Adoption of non-discrimination legislation for PT work and FTC.

2002

Maximum duration for TWA increased.

N/C

-

2004

Limit on duration of TWA lifted.

N/C

-

+

+

N/C

+

Hungary
2003

Adoption of non-discrimination legislation for PT work and FTC.

2007

Stricter rules on renewal of FTC.

2012

Definition of PT work, preferential treatment, and regulation of
zero-hour contracts. Time limits for employment under TWA.

+

+

Adoption of non-discrimination legislation for PT work and FTC.

+

+

1997

Adopted provisions for zero-hours contracts.

+

N/C

2001

Adoption of non-discrimination legislation for PT work and
definition of PT work.

+

N/C

2003

Notification of FT positions for PT workers. Adoption of nondiscrimination legislation for FTC.

+

+

2007

Annual Leave qualifications extended to PT workers.

+

N/C

Iceland
2004
Ireland

Italy
1997

Reasons for FTC cases increased.

N/C

-

1998

TWA permitted

N/C

-

2000

Adoption of non-discrimination legislation for PT work. Reform
of TWA removes restrictions for unskilled workers.

+

-

2001

Valid cases for FTC expanded.

N/C

-

2002

Adoption of non-discrimination legislation for FTC

N/C

+
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2003

Reform of TWA expands cases it can be used in.

N/C

-

2014

Restrictions on successive number of FTC.

N/C

+

1999

Use of TWA extended to all occupations

N/C

-

2000

Relaxed qualifying conditions for unemployment benefits.

2007

No limit on successive number of FTCs.

N/C

-

2015

Equal treatment for FTC and PT workers.

+

+

1997

Equal treatment for PT workers.

+

N/C

1998

Reduced restrictions on TWA

N/C

-

2006

Increased Maximum length of FTC

N/C

-

2012

Annual Leave and Unemployment extended to some FTC workers.

N/C

+

2012

Reductions on restrictions and maximum duration of FTC.

N/C

-

+

N/C

N/C

-

+

N/C

N/C

+

+

+

N/C

+

Japan

+

Korea

Mexico

Netherlands
1996

Equal Treatment for PT workers.

1999

Reduced restrictions on TWA.

2001

Right to reduce or extend working hours

2002

Equal Treatment for FTC.

2015

Strengthened provisions for on-call work & reduced maximum
length of FTC.

New
Zealand
2000

Increased restrictions on FTC and TWA.

Norway
2001

Notification of full-time positions for PT & relaxed pension
requirements for FTC.

+

+

2005

Preferential hiring for PT to FT positions.

+

N/C

2006

Restrictions on length of single FTC.

2009

Equal treatment for PT workers.

+
+
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2015

Removed restrictions on number of successive FTC.

N/C

-

1996

Remove restrictions on types of work for TWA.

N/C

-

1999

Extended maximum length of single FTC.

N/C

-

2003

Equal treatment for FTC.

N/C

+

2006

Change in unemployment law to allow FTC workers access.

N/C

+

2008

Restrictions on renewals and type of work for TWA.

N/C

+

2009

Equal treatment for PT work.

2012

Reduced restrictions on use of FTC.

Portugal

+
N/C

-

+

+

Slovak
Republic
2001

Equal treatment for FTC and PT workers.

2003

Reduced restrictions on length and use of FTC.

N/C

-

2008

Increased employment tenure needed for unemployment benefits.

N/C

-

2011

Increased restrictions on use of FTC.

N/C

+

2012

Reduced restrictions on use of FTC.

N/C

-

2013

Increased restrictions on use of FTC.

N/C

+

Slovenia
2002

Equal treatment for FTC & notification of FT positions for PT
workers.

+

+

2010

Increased employment tenure & hours needed for unemployment
benefits.

-

-

2012

Increased employment tenure & hours needed for maternity
benefits.

-

-

1998

Redefined PT work.

+

N/C

2001

Equal treatment for FTC & PT workers.

+

+

2007

Increased restrictions on FTC & expansion of TWA.

N/C

-

2011

Increased restrictions on maximum length of FTC and reduced
restrictions on TWA.

N/C

-/+

2013

Decreased restrictions on use of TWA.

N/C

-

Spain
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2015

Unemployment benefits extended to FTC workers.

N/C

+

1997

Restrictions on length of single contract.

N/C

+

1997

Reduced restrictions on use of FTC.

N/C

-

2002

Equal treatment for PT workers & FTC.

N/C

+

2008

Reduced restrictions and number of successive FTC & TWA.

N/C

-

Introduced provisions for on-call work.

+

N/C

2000

Equal treatment for PT workers.

+

N/C

2002

Equal treatment for FTC. Reduced maximum duration of FTC.

N/C

+

No Changes

N/C

N/C

Sweden

Switzerland
2000
United
Kingdom

United
States
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Figure C.1. Strength of PT Regulation and FTC regulation (2016)
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Figure C.2. Strength of PT Regulation and PT work rate (2016)
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Figure C.3. Strength of FTC Regulation and Temporary work rate (2016)
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APPENDIX D
Table D.1. Manifesto Variable Coding for Traditional/Alternative Dimensions
Traditional Dimension

Alternative Dimension

National way of life: pro

National way of life: con

Traditional morality: pro

Traditional morality: con

Multiculturalism: con

Multiculturalism: pro

Law and order

Minority groups: pro

Social harmony

Non-economic groups

Table D.2. Manifesto Variable Coding for Left/Right Dimensions
Left Dimension

Right Dimension

Centralization: pro

Decentralization

Market Regulation

Free enterprise

Economic planning

Protectionism: con

Corporatism

Productivity

Protectionism: pro

Infrastructure

Keynesian economics

Economic orthodoxy

Controlled economy

Welfare: con

Nationalization

Education: con

Marxism

Labor groups: con

Social Justice
Welfare: pro
Education: pro
Labor groups: pro
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Table D.3. Variable Coding for NSWA Protection and Regulation Regressions
Variable

Source

Operationalization

Min

Max

Employment
Protection: Part-time
work

Author’s
calculations

Strength of Employment
Protection and Regulation for
Part-time Work.

.375

5.64

Employment
Protection: Temporary
Contracts

Author’s
calculations

Strength of Employment
Protection and Regulation for
Temporary Work.

.4

5.1

Social Dem Party
Homogeneity

ISSP/Author’s
Calculations

Ratio of labor market insiders to
labor market outsiders in Social
Democratic Party.

.585

21.9

Center Party
Homogeneity

ISSP/Author’s
Calculations

Ratio of labor market insiders to
labor market outsiders in Social
Democratic Party.

.228

27.7

Right Party
Homogeneity

ISSP/Author’s
Calculations

Ratio of labor market insiders to
labor market outsiders in Social
Democratic Party.

.827

22

Value of the ideological distance
on the Left/Right Economic
Left Party
Manifesto Project continuum between the Left
Challenger/Social
Dataset (version
party with the greatest number
Democratic ideological 2017b)
of votes and the Social
10.7
difference: Economic
Democratic party with the
Dimension
greatest number of votes in the
preceding election.

6.7

Value of the ideological distance
on the Left/Right Economic
Center Party
Manifesto Project continuum between the Center
Challenger/Social
Dataset (version
party with the greatest number
Democratic ideological 2017b)
-7.9
of votes and the Social
difference: Economic
Democratic party with the
Dimension
greatest number of votes in the
preceding election.

12.04
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Value of the ideological distance
on the Left/Right Economic
Right Party
Manifesto Project continuum between the Right
Challenger/Social
Dataset (version
party with the greatest number
Democratic ideological 2017b)
-4.1
of votes and the Social
difference: Economic
Democratic party with the
Dimension
greatest number of votes in the
preceding election.

13.00

Value of the ideological distance
on the Authoritarian/Libertarian
Left Party
Manifesto Project (Traditional/Alternative)Cultural
Challenger/Social
continuum between the Left
Dataset (version
Democratic ideological 2017b)
party with the greatest number
-1.7
difference: Cultural
of votes and the Social
Dimension
Democratic party with the
greatest number of votes in the
preceding election.

4.8

Value of the ideological distance
on the Authoritarian/Libertarian
Center Party
Manifesto Project (Traditional/Alternative)
Challenger/Social
Cultural continuum between the
Dataset (version
Democratic ideological 2017b)
Center party with the greatest
7.64
difference: Cultural
number of votes and the Social
Dimension
Democratic party with the
greatest number of votes in the
preceding election.

7.81

Value of the ideological distance
on the Authoritarian/Libertarian
Right Party
Manifesto Project (Traditional/Alternative)
Challenger/Social
Cultural continuum between the
Dataset (version
Democratic ideological 2017b)
Right party with the greatest
6.36
difference: Cultural
number of votes and the Social
Dimension
Democratic party with the
greatest number of votes in the
preceding election.

2.34

Consensus Institutions

Comparative
Political Data
Set, 1960-2015

Lijphart first dimension. Proxy
variable: Calculated with the
number of effective parties in
parliament.
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2.37

2.05

The absence of minimal
winning and single-party
majority cabinets (calculated
from gov_type with (1) singleparty majority government and
(2) minimal winning coalition
coded as ‘0’, otherwise ‘1’).
The proportionality of electoral
systems
A measure for cabinet
dominance, calculated by taking
the average cabinet duration.
Coordination of wage-setting:
1=Fragmented wage bargaining,
confined largely to individual
firms or plants

Corporatism

ICTWSS
Database Version
5.1

2=Mixed industry and firm-level
bargaining, weak government
coordination through MW
setting or wage indexation
3=Negotiation guidelines based
on centralized bargaining

1

5

1

5

4=Wage norms based on
centralized bargaining by peak
associations with or without
government involvement
5=Maximum or minimum wage
rates/increases based on
centralized bargaining
1= No government influence
over wage bargaining
Government
Intervention

ICTWSS
Database Version
5.1

2= Government influences wage
bargaining by providing an
institutional framework of
consultation and information
exchange
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3= Government influences wage
bargaining indirectly through
price-ceilings, indexation, tax
measures, minimum wages
4= The government participates
directly in wage bargaining
(tripartite bargaining, as in
social pacts)
5= The government imposes
private sector wage settlements,
places a ceiling on bargaining
outcomes or suspends
bargaining

Union Density

OECD

The ratio of wage and salary
earners that are trade
union members, divided by the
total number of wage and salary
earners

Full-time Employment
Protections

OECD
Employment
Protection
Database

Level of Employment Protection
.25
as coded by OECD

4.58

Homogeneity of Labor
Unions

ISSP

Ratio of labor market insiders to
labor market outsiders in Union.

.709

9.12

Left Partisanship
Unions

ISSP

The percentage of union
members comprising left party
voters.

4.37

75

ISSP

The percentage of union
members comprising center
party voters.

3.2

66.7

Right Partisanship
Labor Unions

ISSP

The percentage of union
members comprising right party
voters.

1.88

57.62

Left Party in Power

Comparative
Political Data
Set, 1960-2015

Government composition:
relative power position of leftwing parties in government
based on their seat share in
parliament, measured in

0

100

Center Partisanship
Labor Unions
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5.68

88.23

percentage of the total
parliamentary seat share of all
governing parties.

Comparative
Political Data
Set, 1960-2015

Government composition:
relative power position of center
parties in government based on
their seat share in parliament,
measured in percentage of the
total parliamentary seat share of
all governing parties.

0

100

Right Party in Power

Comparative
Political Data
Set, 1960-2015

Government composition:
relative power position of rightwing parties in government
based on their seat share in
parliament, measured in
percentage of the total
parliamentary seat share of all
governing parties.

0

100

EU Membership

European Union
Website

Binary Measurement: 0=NonEU Member, 1= EU Member

0

1

Deindustrialization

OECD STAN
Industrial
Analysis
Database

Service-sector employment
relative to overall employment

62.5

90.7

Unemployment Rate

OECD

the number of unemployed
people as a percentage of the
labor force

2.92

23.78

GDP Growth

World
Development
Indicators

Annual percentage growth rate
of GDP at market prices based
on constant local currency.

.854

9.35

Trade Openness

OECD

Total exports and imports of
goods and services as a
percentage of GDP

19.1

200.35

Immigration Rate

United Nations:
International
Migration
Database

Inflows of foreign population as
a % of total population.

.043

1.96

Center Party in Power
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Table D.4. Coding of Parties
SD = Social Democratic Party
LC = Left Competitor
CC = Centre Competitor
RC = Right Competitor
Country: Australia - 1993
Far-Left

Left

Center

Australian Labor
Party (SD)

Right

Far-Right

Liberal Party of
Australia (RC)
National Party of
Australia

Country: Australia - 1998
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Australian Labor
Party (SD)

Australian
Democrats (CC)

Liberal Party of
Australia (RC

Far-Right

National Party of
Australia

Country: Australia – 2004
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Australian
Greens (LC)

Liberal Party of
Australia (RC)

Australian Labor
Party (SD)

National Party of
Australia

246

Far-Right

Country: Australia - 2010
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Australian
Greens (LC)

Liberal National
Party of
Queensland

Australian Labor
Party (SD)

Liberal Party of
Australia (RC)

Far-Right

National Party of
Australia

Country: Austria – 1995
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Far-Right

The Greens (LC)

Austrian Social
Democratic
Party (SD)

Liberal Forum
(CC)

Austrian
People’s Party
(RC)

Freedom
Movement

Country: Austria – 1999
Far-Left

Left

The Greens (LC)

Austrian Social
Democratic
Party (SD)

Center

247

Right

Far-Right

Austrian
People’s Party
(RC)

Freedom
Movement

Country: Austria – 2002
Far-Left

Left

Center

The Greens (LC)

Austrian Social
Democratic
Party (SD)

Right

Far-Right

Austrian
People’s Party
(RC)

Freedom
Movement

Austrian
Communist
Party

Country: Austria – 2008
Far-Left

Left

The Greens (LC)

Austrian Social
Democratic
Party (SD)

Center

Austrian
Communist
Party

Right

Far-Right

Austrian
People’s Party
(RC)

Freedom
Movement

Alliance for the
Future of Austria

248

Country: Belgium–1995
Far-Left

Left

Center

Ecologists

Christian
People’s Party
(CC)

Flemish
Socialist Party
(SD)

Christian Social
Party

Francophone
Socialist Party
(LC)

Flemish Bloc

Live Differently

Flemish Liberals
and Democrats

Right

Far-Right

Far-Right

Country: Belgium–1999
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Ecologists

Christian Social
Party

Christian
Democratic and
Flemish (RC)

Flemish
Socialist Party
(SD)

Flemish Bloc

Francophone
Socialist Party
(LC)

Flemish Liberals
and Democrats
(CC)

Live Differently

Liberal
Reformation
Party Francophone
Democratic
Front - Citizens’
Movement for
Change
249

Country: Belgium–2003
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Ecologists

Christian Social
Party

Christian
Democratic and
Flemish (RC)

Francophone
Socialist Party
(LC)

Flemish Bloc

New Flemish
Alliance

Live Differently

Flemish Liberals
and Democrats
(CC)

Socialist Party
Different – Spirit
(SD)

Reform
Movement

Far-Right

Country: Belgium–2010
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Far-Right

Ecologists

Christian Social
Party

Christian
Democratic and
Flemish

Flemish Interest

Francophone
Socialist Party
(SD)

List Dedecker

New Flemish
Alliance (RC)

Green!

Reform
Movement (CC)

Open Flemish
Liberals and
Democrats

Socialist Party
Different (LC)

250

Country: Czechia – 1998
Far-Left

Left

Communist
Party of
Bohemia and
Moravia (LC)

Czech Social
Democratic
Party (SD)

Center

Right
Association for
the Republic –

Republican
Party of
Czechoslovakia

Christian and
Democratic
Union - Czech
People's Party

Civic
Democratic
Party (RC)

Freedom Union

251

Far-Right

Country: Czechia – 2002
Far-Left

Left

Communist
Party of
Bohemia and
Moravia (LC)

Czech Social
Democratic
Party (SD)

Center

Right
Association for
the Republic –
Republican
Party of
Czechoslovakia

Christian and
Democratic
Union - Czech
People's Party Freedom Union Democratic
Union

Civic
Democratic
Party (RC)

252

Far-Right

Country: Czechia – 2006
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Communist
Party of
Bohemia and
Moravia (LC)

Czech Social
Democratic
Party (SD)

Green Party

Christian and
Democratic
Union - Czech
People's Party

Far-Right

Civic
Democratic
Party (RC)

Tradition,
Responsibility,
Prosperity 09

Country: Denmark - 1994
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Far-Right

Red-Green
Unity List

Social
Democratic
Party (SD)

Centre
Democrats

Liberals (RC)

Progress Party

Socialist
People’s Party
(LC)

Christian
People’s Party
Conservative
People’s Party
(CC)
Danish SocialLiberal Party

253

Country: Denmark - 1998
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Far-Right

Red-Green
Unity List

Social
Democratic
Party (SD)

Centre
Democrats

Liberals (RC)

Danish People’s
Party

Socialist
People’s Party
(LC)

Christian
People’s Party

Progress Party

Conservative
People’s Party
(CC)
Danish SocialLiberal Party

Country: Denmark - 2005
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Far-Right

Red-Green
Unity List

Social
Democratic
Party (SD)

Centre
Democrats

Liberals (RC)

Danish People’s
Party

Socialist
People’s Party
(LC)

Christian
People’s Party
Conservative
People’s Party
(CC)
Danish SocialLiberal Party

254

Country: Denmark – 2007
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Far-Right

Red-Green
Unity List

Social
Democratic
Party (SD)

Conservative
People’s Party
(CC)

Liberals (RC)

Danish People’s
Party

Danish SocialLiberal Party

New Alliance

Progress Party

Socialist
People’s Party
(LC)

Country: Finland – 1995
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Finnish Social
Democrats (SD)

Finnish Centre
(CC)

National
Coalition (RC)

Left Wing
Alliance (LC)

Finnish
Christian Union

Young Finnish
Party

Finnish Rural
Party

Swedish
People’s Party

255

Far-Right

Country: Finland – 1999
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Finnish Social
Democrats (SD)

Finnish Centre
(CC)

National
Coalition (RC)

Left Wing
Alliance (LC)

Finnish
Christian Union

Far-Right

True Finns

Swedish
People’s Party

Country: Finland – 2003
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Finnish Social
Democrats (SD)

Christian
Democrats in
Finland

National
Coalition (RC)

Left Wing
Alliance (LC)

True Finns
Finnish Centre
(CC)

Swedish
People’s Party

256

Far-Right

Country: Finland – 2007
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Finnish Social
Democrats (SD)

Christian
Democrats in
Finland

National
Coalition (RC)

Left Wing
Alliance (LC)

Far-Right

True Finns
Finnish Centre
(CC)

Swedish
People’s Party

Country: France – 1993
Far-Left

Left

Center

French
Communist
Party (LC)

Right

Far-Right

Rally for the
Republic (RC)

National Front

Union for
French
Democracy

Socialist Party
(SD)
The Greens

257

Country: France – 1997
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Far-Right

Ecology
Generation

Rally for the
Republic (RC)

National Front

French
Communist
Party (LC)

Union for
French
Democracy

Socialist Party
(SD)

The Greens

Country: France – 2002
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Far-Right

French
Communist
Party

Union for
French
Democracy

National Front

Socialist Party
(SD)

Union for the
Presidential
Majority (RC)

The Greens (LC)

258

Country: France – 2007
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Far-Right

French
Communist
Party (LC)

Democratic
Mouvement
(CC)

Union for a
Popular
Movement (RC)

National Front

Socialist Party
(SD)
The Greens

Country: Germany – 1994
Far-Left

Left

Center

Alliance‘90/Greens Free Democratic
(LC)
Party (CC)

Party of
Democratic
Socialism
Social Democratic
Party of Germany
(SD)

259

Right
Christian
Democratic
Union/Christian
Social Union
(RC)

Far-Right

Country: Germany – 1998
Far-Left

Left

Center

Alliance‘90/Greens Free Democratic
Party (CC)
Party of
Democratic
Socialism (LC)

Right

Far-Right

Christian
Democratic
Union/Christian
Social Union
(RC)

Social Democratic
Party of Germany
(SD)

Country: Germany – 2005
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

The Left. Party
of Democratic
Socialism (LC)

Alliance‘90/Greens

Free
Democratic
Party (CC)

Christian
Democratic
Union/Christian
Social Union
(RC)

Social Democratic
Party of Germany
(SD)

Far-Right

Country: Germany – 2009
Far-Left
The Left
(LC)

Left

Center

Alliance‘90/Greens Free Democratic
Party (CC)
Social Democratic
Party of Germany
(SD)

260

Right
Christian
Democratic
Union/Christian
Social Union
(RC)

Far-Right

Country: Hungary – 1994
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Hungarian Social
Democratic Party
(LC)

Alliance of Free
Democrats (CC)

Christian
Democratic
People’s Party

Hungarian
Socialist Party
(SD)

Federation of
Young
Democrats

Hungarian
Democratic
Forum (RC)

Independent
Smallholders’
Party

261

Far-Right

Country: Hungary – 1998
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Hungarian
Socialist Party
(SD)

Alliance of Free
Democrats (CC)

Christian
Democratic
People’s Party

Federation of
Young
Democrats Hungarian Civic
Party (RC)

FiDeSz-MPPMDF-Alliance

Hungarian
Democratic
Forum

Hungarian
Justice and Life
Party

Independent
Smallholders’
Party

262

Far-Right

Country: Hungary – 2002
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Hungarian
Socialist Party
(SD)

Alliance of Free
Democrats (CC)

Federation of
Young
Democrats Hungarian Civic
Party (RC)

FiDeSz-MPPMDF-Alliance

Hungarian
Democratic
Forum

Independent
Smallholders’
Party

263

Far-Right

Country: Hungary – 2010
Far-Left

Left

Center

Hungarian
Socialist Party
(SD)

Hungarian Social
Democratic Party
(LC)

Right

Far-Right

Alliance of
Federation of
Young
Democrats Hungarian Civic
Union Christian
Democratic
People's Party
(RC)

Movement for a
Better Hungary

Federation of
Young
Democrats Hungarian Civic
Union

Country: Ireland – 1992
Far-Left

Left

Center

Democratic Left
Party (LC)

Familiy of the
Irish

Green Party

Progressive
Democrats

Labour Party
(SD)

Soldiers of
Destiny (CC)

264

Right

Far-Right

Country: Ireland – 1997
Far-Left

Left

Center

Democratic Left
Party

Familiy of the
Irish

Green Party
(LC)

Progressive
Democrats

Labour Party
(SD)

Right

Far-Right

Right

Far-Right

Soldiers of
Destiny (CC)

Country: Ireland – 2002
Far-Left

Left

Center

Green Party
(LC)

Familiy of the
Irish

Labour Party
(SD)

Progressive
Democrats

Soldiers of
Destiny (CC)

265

Country: Ireland – 2007
Far-Left

Left

Center

Green Party
(LC)

Familiy of the
Irish

Labour Party
(SD)

Progressive
Democrats

Right

Far-Right

Right

Far-Right

Soldiers of
Destiny (CC)

Country: Japan - 1993
Far-Left

Left

Center

Japanese
Communist
Party (LC)

Democratic
Socialist Party
(SD)

Clean
Government
Party

Social
Democratic
Party of Japan

Japan Renewal
Party
Liberal
Democratic
Party (RC)

266

Country: Japan - 2000
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Japanese
Communist
Party (LC)

Democratic
Socialist Party
(SD)

Democratic
Party of Japan
(CC)

Liberal
Democratic
Party (RC)

Liberal Party

New Clean
Government
Party

New
Conservative
Party

Far-Right

Country: Japan - 2005
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Japanese
Communist
Party (LC)

Democratic
Socialist Party
(SD)

Democratic
Party of Japan
(CC)

Liberal
Democratic
Party (RC)

Liberal Party

New Clean
Government
Party
People's New
Party

267

Far-Right

Country: Japan - 2009
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Japanese
Communist
Party (LC)

Democratic
Socialist Party
(SD)

Democratic
Party of Japan
(CC)

Liberal
Democratic
Party (RC)

New Clean
Government
Party

Your Party

Far-Right

People's New
Party

Country: Netherlands – 1994
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Far-Right

Green Left (LC)

Labour Party
(SD)

Christian
Democratic
Appeal (CC)

Centre
Democrats

Reformed
Political Party

Democrats‘66

People’s Party
for Freedom and
Democracy (RC)

Socialist Party

Reformatory
Political
Federation

Reformed
Political League

268

Country: Netherlands – 1998
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Far-Right

Green Left (LC)

Labour Party
(SD)

Christian
Democratic
Appeal (CC)

People’s Party
for Freedom and
Democracy (RC)

Reformed
Political Party

Democrats‘66

Reformatory
Political
Federation

Socialist Party

Reformed
Political League

Country: Netherlands – 2003
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Far-Right

Green Left

Labour Party
(SD)

Christian
Democratic
Appeal (CC)

Christian Union

List Pim Fortuyn

Democrats‘66

People’s Party
for Freedom and
Democracy (RC)

Socialist Party
(LC)

Livable
Netherlands

269

Country: Netherlands – 2010
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Far-Right

Green Left

Labour Party
(SD)

Christian
Democratic
Appeal (CC)

Christian Union

Party of
Freedom

Democrats‘66

People’s Party
for Freedom and
Democracy (RC)

Reformed
Political Party

Socialist Party
(LC)

Country: New Zealand – 1993
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

The Alliance
(LC)

New Zealand
Labour Party
(SD)

New Zealand
First Party (CC)

New Zealand
National Party
(RC)

Far-Right

Country: New Zealand – 1999
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Far-Right

The Alliance
(LC)

New Zealand
Labour Party
(SD)

New Zealand
First Party (CC)

New Zealand
National Party
(RC)

ACT New
Zealand

Green Party of
Aotearoa New
Zealand

270

Country: New Zealand – 2005
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Far-Right

Green Party of
Aotearoa New
Zealand (LC)

Māori Party(CC)

New Zealand
National Party
(RC)

ACT New
Zealand

Jim Anderton’s
Progressive
New Zealand

Labour Party
(SD)

Country: New Zealand – 2008
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Far-Right

Green Party of
Aotearoa New
Zealand (LC)

Māori Party(CC)

New Zealand
National Party
(RC)

ACT New
Zealand

Progressive
Party

United Future
New Zealand

New Zealand
Labour Party
(SD)

271

Country: Norway – 1993
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Norwegian
Labour Party
(SD)

Centre Party
(CC)

Conservative
Party (RC)

Christian
People’s Party

Progress Party

Socialist Left
Party (LC)

Far-Right

Liberal Party

Country: Norway – 1997
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Norwegian
Labour Party
(SD)

Centre Party

Conservative
Party (RC)

Christian
People’s Party
(CC)

Progress Party

Socialist Left
Party (LC)

Far-Right

Liberal Party

Country: Norway – 2005
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Norwegian
Labour Party
(SD)

Centre Party
(CC)

Conservative
Party

Christian
People’s Party

Progress Party
(RC)

Socialist Left
Party (LC)

Liberal Party

272

Far-Right

Country: Norway – 2009
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Norwegian
Labour Party
(SD)

Centre Party
(CC)

Conservative
Party

Christian
People’s Party

Progress Party
(RC)

Socialist Left
Party (LC)

Far-Right

Liberal Party

Country: Portugal – 1995
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Portuguese
Communist
Party

Social
Democratic
Party (CC)

Social
Democratic
Center-Popular
Party (RC)

Socialist Party
(SD)

Unified
Democratic
Coalition (LC)

273

Far-Right

Country: Portugal – 1999
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Left Bloc

Social
Democratic
Party (CC)

Social
Democratic
Center-Popular
Party (RC)

Portuguese
Communist
Party

Far-Right

Socialist Party
(SD)

Unified
Democratic
Coalition (LC)

Country: Portugal – 2005
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Ecologist Party
‘The Greens'

Left Bloc (LC)

Social
Democratic
Party (CC)

Social
Democratic
Center-Popular
Party (RC)

Portuguese
Communist
Party
Socialist Party
(SD)

Unified
Democratic
Coalition

274

Far-Right

Country: Portugal – 2009
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Ecologist Party
‘The Greens'

Left Bloc (LC)

Social
Democratic
Party (CC)

Social
Democratic
Center-Popular
Party (RC)

Portuguese
Communist
Party

Far-Right

Socialist Party
(SD)

Country: Slovakia – 1994
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Workers’
Association of
Slovakia (LC)

Common Choice
(SD)

Coexistence

Christian
Democratic
Movement

Democratic
Union of
Slovakia
Hungarian
Christian

Hungarian Civic
Party
Hungarian
Coalition (RC)

Democratic
Movement

Movement for a
Democratic
Slovakia (CC)

National
Democratic
Party - New
Alternative
Slovak National
Party

275

Far-Right

Country: Slovakia – 1998
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Party of the
Democratic Left
(SD)

Movement for a
Democratic
Slovakia (CC)

Party of the
Hungarian
Coalition

Party of Civic
Understanding

Slovak
Democratic
Coalition (RC)

Far-Right

Slovak National
Party

Country: Slovakia – 2002
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Communist
Party of
Slovakia (LC)

Direction-Social
Democracy (SD)

Alliance of the
New Citizen

Christian
Democratic
Movement

Party of the
Democratic Left

Movement for a
Democratic
Slovakia (CC)

Party of the
Hungarian
Coalition (RC)

276

Far-Right

Country: Slovakia – 2010
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

Direction-Social
Democracy (SD)

Bridge

Christian
Democratic
Movement (RC)

Freedom and
Solidarity (CC)

Movement for a
Democratic
Slovakia

Far-Right

Civic
Conservative
Party

Slovak National
Party

Country: Spain – 1993
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

United Left (LC)

Andalusian
Party

Aragonese Party

People's Party
(RC)

Basque
Solidarity

Basque
Nationalist Party

Catalan

Canarian

Republican Left

Coalition

Spanish Socialist
Workers’ Party
(SD)

Centre
Democrats
Convergence
and Union (CC)

277

Far-Right

Country: Spain – 2000
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

United Left (LC)

Andalusian
Party

Aragonese Party

People's Party
(RC)

Basque
Solidarity

Basque
Nationalist Party

Catalan

Canarian

Republican Left

Coalition

Spanish Socialist
Workers’ Party
(SD)

Convergence
and Union (CC)

Galician

Nationalist Bloc

278

Far-Right

Country: Spain – 2004
Far-Left

Left

Center

Right

United Left (LC)

Andalusian
Party

Basque
Nationalist Party

People's Party
(RC)

Aragonist
Council

Canarian
Coalition

Navarrese
People's Union

Basque
Solidarity

Convergence
and Union (CC)

Catalan
Republican Left

Galician
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